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ABSTRACT 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was a negative event, unexpected by most 
scholars and practitioners. A swift response by Australian Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (A-REITs) in an attempt to mitigate its negative effects was needed, given the 
magnitude of the fallout. Negative returns on average exceeded that of the Australian 
share market over the subsequent two years, whilst the ensuing recovery was slower 
than all of the major Global REIT markets to 2012. The severity of the crisis was so 
large, that not only was the value of property assets substantially impaired, but 
sufficient cash flow to fund interest repayment on debt was reducing and 
approaching a level where insolvency and potential liquidation imposed a short term 
fatal risk. 
The taxonomy used in this thesis is threefold. Firstly, executive management 
is responsible for operational decisions, discharging its duties to maximize 
shareholder wealth. There is a great urgency to improve financial performance and to 
recapitalise with equity in order to avoid bankruptcy, which is so prominently 
examined in the trade-off theory of corporate finance. Secondly, the board of 
directors is responsible for monitoring executive activity and to structure 
remuneration which reflects the difficulty of managerial tasks undertaken. 
Remuneration typically includes a substantial incentive component, which is set to 
align the interests of agent executives with principal shareholders. The setting of 
incentives is critical in urgently addressing appropriate operational strategies to drive 
a revival against the negative externalities inherently imposed by the crisis. Thirdly, 
the incentive-driven response by A-REITs is best evaluated by a particular subset of 
its owners, including institutional and large investors. They not only have the 
professional skills and experience to evaluate managerial performance accurately, 
but they also have a unionised power and are able to influence fiduciaries and to 
punish substandard management through disposal of large blocks of shares. 
 This thesis examines executive capital structure decisions, the drivers of 
corporate remuneration, and evaluation by major shareholders, using ratios and board 
attributes for A-REITs from 2006 to 2012. The A-REIT market is the second largest 
of its kind in the world and is generally important to study because it utilises many 
billions of dollars of investor capital, with management taking on the role of agent 
fiduciaries. This study contributes to the literature by analysing the distortions 
 viii 
 
apparent in managerial decision making throughout the GFC. There is no precedent 
in the literature postulating theoretical relationships over crisis, but fiduciaries are 
expected to protect their own interests in conjunction with serving equity holders, 
and results show that this is the case. 
There is currently no resolution in the literature as to the optimal capital 
structure, but this thesis firstly examines contemporary capital structure and finds 
that A-REIT capital structure decisions are similar to that of U.S REITs given similar 
earnings payout regulations. Certain elements of pecking order theory and trade-off 
theory are both supported and refuted, whilst the GFC results in better performing A-
REITs obtaining a greater share of restricted debt supply. The debt shortage tends to 
force A-REITs into issuing equity capital, relative to the preferred issue of debt 
during economically stable conditions. Despite the absence of a widely accepted 
equilibrium capital structure, this thesis shows that through their initial response to 
the GFC, A-REITs appear to strive toward a capital structure that is appropriate 
under the prevailing economic environment. 
The second taxonomy analyses the payment of remuneration which should 
optimally incentivize managerial actions. This thesis finds that non executive 
directors are compensated for their degree of responsibility which increases after the 
GFC onset, and they also receive pay raises when they oversee a reduction of risky 
debt. Agency factors are present, with more powerful CEOs receiving higher cash 
pay and reduced equity incentives after the GFC onset when unit prices are 
depressed. During this volatile period, they also receive higher base pay to 
compensate for increased risk and for the associated reduction of bonuses. These 
findings are the first to demonstrate a mix of fair compensation and self-serving 
behaviour during any crisis and highlight the exacerbation of agency issues where 
property investment vehicles and the positions of their fiduciaries are at risk. 
Thirdly, this thesis contributes to the literature by analysing the differences in 
investment strategies between fiduciary institutions and other powerful investors in 
light of any GFC factors which may cause them to be distorted. Institutional 
investors who trade in a competitive funds management environment, and are 
fiduciaries themselves, tend to have a short-term outlook, particularly after the GFC 
onset, chasing after the best short term returns. Despite this, they do exhibit some 
monitoring behaviour to a greater extent than theory postulates. Institutional 
 ix 
 
investors also prefer to entrust more experienced and integrated fiduciaries to 
manage A-REITs in which they have an ownership because they are able to 
undertake the monitoring function themselves and do not have to rely as much on 
director independence. Large non-institutional investors conversely, are willing to 
buy long and follow this strategy whilst waiting for improvement after GFC onset. 
By being external to the competitive pressures in the funds management industry, 
large non-institutional investors are not affected as much by the multiple agency 
issues that tend to plague institutional investors. These are all new findings in the A-
REIT industry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the introduction to the thesis on Agency Issues 
Surrounding A-REITs and the Global Financial Crisis. Australian real estate 
investment trusts (A-REITs) originated in Australia with the initial listing of General 
Property Trust, a non-direct property investment vehicle in 1971. The concept of a 
property trust was founded in the U.S in the 1930’s to circumnavigate legislation that 
prohibited companies from owning property which was not directly related to their 
core activities. A-REITs are property-specific unit trusts, which must be registered as 
a managed investment scheme. They must also be managed by a responsible entity 
trustee who holds a financial services licence. In order to be listed, Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) rules specify that A-REITs must be owned by at least 
400 unit holders, with all of them holding at least $2,000 worth of units. For listing 
purposes, A-REITs must own assets of at least $15 million, of which at least half 
must be used for investment purposes. Similar to REITs elsewhere in the world, they 
tend to pay out all of their earnings in order to be exempted from paying corporate or 
penalty taxes.  
Many A-REITs are stapled, which is the process of linking their units to the 
shares of their management company, known as a responsible entity, and offering a 
security which is a hybrid of both. To diversify operations, a responsible entity often 
undertakes property development, which is more risky, but allows the consolidated 
A-REIT to engage in more active investment opportunities than would otherwise be 
permitted by regulation overseeing passive, buy-and-lease managed property 
investment schemes. 
As is the case with other corporate entities, A-REITs commence their life 
with an initial public offering of equity. This process is highly regulated and involves 
expenditure on prospectuses and engaging the services of underwriters to fulfill 
unsubscribed offers. Ideally, this would occur when equity prices are high such that 
either the maximum amount of funding is received by them, or as little as possible 
Chapter One: Introduction 
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unitholder dilution occurs. For an alternative generation of funds, A-REITs rely 
heavily on debt funding. Despite not having to pay tax, the cost of debt relative to 
equity is attractive. Every A-REIT has its own unique capital structure. The mix of 
debt and equity financing is chosen in order to minimize the cost of capital and 
expected bankruptcy costs if the entity becomes insolvent. 
Capital structure decisions and other corporate strategies are undertaken by 
fiduciaries that are well compensated for making decisions on behalf of thousands of 
unitholders. Ideally, stewardship needs to be compensated with a mix of 
remuneration. Base salary covers the scale and level of difficulty of tasks required. 
Short term bonuses reward fiduciaries when predetermined targets are exceeded. 
Long term incentives are payments of equity that cannot be vested for a set period 
and vary in value over time, mainly depending on the long term value to the market 
of decisions previously made by fiduciaries.  
Institutional and large non institutional investors have substantial power in 
the capital market. They are professional investors who hold large blocks of units 
and thus, have an incentive to monitor the performance of A-REITs through 
fiduciary actions. Their decisions to buy into and sell out of specific A-REITs could 
have an impact on the equity values of existing unit holders. Institutional investors 
manage smaller investor funds that are ultimately invested into A-REITs. This 
represents a two-tiered agency scenario, which is susceptible to self interest by 
fiduciaries on both institutional investor, and A-REIT levels. 
This research intends to contribute toward, and complement existing 
literature by analysing the determinants of capital structure, determinants of base 
salary, short term and long term remuneration on several levels of fiduciary 
responsibility, and to find the determinants of equity held by institutional and non 
institutional large investors between 2006 and 2012. The research is based primarily 
on both quantitative and qualitative data stated in annual A-REIT reports and the 
DatAnalysis Premium database. The analyses are performed by multivariate 
unbalanced panel OLS regression coefficients along with their levels of significance. 
The overall study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reports the literature 
review. Chapter 3 describes the A-REIT industry, detailing its breakdown by type of 
property investment, performance, regulation, and place in the global REIT market. 
Chapter One: Introduction 
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Chapter 4 presents analysis on the determinants of capital structure. Chapter 5 
presents analysis on the determinants of fiduciary remuneration. Chapter 6 presents 
analysis on the determinants of institutional and large non-institutional investment. 
Chapter 7 concludes the overall thesis. This chapter, however, proceeds as follows. 
Section 1.2 explains the motivation of the study. Section 1.3 summarizes the 
findings. Section 1.4 links the contributions of the study. Section 1.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
 
1.2 MOTIVATION OF THE THESIS 
 
The global REIT market has grown tremendously over the last half century 
by way of both property asset growth and integration into listed equity markets. 
Global listed property market capitalisation has grown from approximately $1.5 
billion in 1971 to $948 billion by June 30 2012, with 626 REITs listed by this stage. 
The A-REIT sector is the second largest REIT market in the world, being only 
second behind the United States. In comparison to the global market, A-REITs have 
a market capitalisation of nearly $80 billion, with 47 A-REITs listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The literature demonstrates that REITs are a 
useful inclusion in an investment portfolio. Their returns perform differently from 
direct property (Mei and Lee, 1994), and share lower correlations with domestic 
share and bond returns (Eichholtz, 1996) whilst availability of assets spread across 
different purposes and geographical regions offers diversification benefits (Mueller 
& Ziering, 1992; Mueller, 1993; Newell & Worzala, 1995; De Wit, 1997; Worzala & 
Newell, 1997; Lee & Byrne, 1998). Information flow of REITs to investors is also 
more efficient (Barkham & Geltner, 1995:1996; McAllister, 1999; Seiler et al., 
1999). The benefits and wide utilisation of REIT investment vehicles motivate the 
need to study Australian REITs in greater detail. 
A-REITs are economically significant, and coupled with high growth in the 
property industry, it is suggested that their capital structure, performance incentives, 
and evaluative monitoring are important areas of research. Firstly, most of the 
literature regarding capital structure focuses on non-REIT entities. The fundamental 
regulatory difference between REITs and non-REITs is that A-REITs do not have to 
pay tax if they pay out all of their profits. They consequently do not usually receive 
tax deductions on interest expenses. This may distort preferences for either debt or 
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equity capital and invites altered expectations of the developed theories that apply to 
non-REIT companies. Given early research into capital structure in perfect markets, 
(e.g., Modigliani and Miller 1958) and its progression through market imperfections, 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Miller 1977; Myers 1984), analysis of REIT capital 
structure is only a recent area of inquiry. The focus on REIT capital structure tends to 
centre around support for pecking order, trade-off, agency, and market timing 
theories. 
The above theories are both supported and refuted, and findings tend to be 
inconsistent throughout the capital structure literature. This suggests that capital 
structure decisions may be more targeted over specific time periods, industries and 
jurisdictions. One standout factor common to A-REITs is their dramatic equity 
recapitalisation during the 2008 and 2009 financial years, shortly after onset of the 
GFC. These recapitalisations were conducted to reduce interest-bearing debt that 
could have led to insolvency given low or negative cash flow. There is currently a 
lack of research explaining how negative global events alter capital structure 
decisions in Australia. One exception is the analysis by this author conducted on data 
from 2006 to 2009 incorporating the height of the GFC (Zarebski & Dimovski, 
2012). The slow speed with which A-REITs recovered from the GFC relative to 
REITs in other parts of the world raises questions about being able to generate 
enough future capital for growth opportunities, in particular stapled A-REITs which 
rely on extensive development opportunities. A-REITs with international property 
exposure particularly in the US faced greater risk of asset devaluation and a longer 
recovery. An aversion to operational risk taking during the recovery suggests that A-
REITs have been careful about preferring one type of capital over another in order to 
avoid returning to the capital generation problems experienced during the GFC. To 
my knowledge, there is no literature analysing capital structure over the GFC and 
recovery period. 
Fiduciary management is responsible for making corporate decisions that 
maximize the wealth generation of equity holders. Information detailing the structure 
of fiduciary remuneration for A-REITs in annual reports is mandated under 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listing rules. It seems however, that this 
information remains vague and can only seldom be precisely reconciled with the pay 
awarded for achieving specific value maximizing tasks. The discrepancy between 
pays of corporate executives and general employees makes reconciliation even more 
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difficult. This issue was highlighted by a study on remuneration by the Australian 
Productivity Commission in 2009. The Australian Corporations Act (2001) also 
deems this to be an important and sensitive issue having made amendments 
mandating a board spill if at least 25% of voting members vote against a 
remuneration report over two consecutive years.  
Literature has primarily analysed pay-for-performance linkages, with Chopin 
et al. (1995), and Pennathur and Shelor (2002) focusing on performance measures, 
whilst Scott et al. (2001) and Pennathur et al. (2005) isolate equity based incentives. 
The board of directors are tasked with performing internal monitoring on CEOs, but 
relationships and power imbalances between both do exist, (e.g., Ghosh and Sirmans 
2002;2005, and Feng et al. (2007). It is therefore important to analyse the presence of 
agency issues that led to excessive, non-targeted remuneration being awarded at the 
expense of unit holders. New research of importance includes the drivers of 
remuneration after onset of the GFC. With performance indicators generally 
negative, risk management variables are conjectured to dominate, especially with 
radical changes in capital structure. It is also important to understand the areas of 
responsibility of all three levels of reported management, specifically the board of 
directors, CEO, and other top managers. Finding specific achievements that are 
rewarded and incentivised, particularly after onset of the GFC will give insight into 
specific organisational responsibilities in responding to crises, and also find evidence 
of the ways in which fiduciaries may seek to serve their own self interests. 
Institutional investors provide an avenue of external monitoring that 
supplements internal board monitoring. Internal monitoring is conjectured to suffer 
from agency issues but external monitoring is cost effective given the size of 
institutional investors and the quantity of funds under their management (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Gillan & Starks, 2000). 98% of fast-growing industry superannuation 
funds include A-REITs in their portfolios (Newell, 2007), which reflects their 
importance as a widely held investment option. Section 671(B) of the Corporations 
Act (2001) mandates disclosure by entities of at least a one percent change in 
ownership of substantial shareholders. This reflects the equity price impact that the 
transactions of institutions can have on smaller shareholders. An additional factor of 
importance is that many institutional investors generate revenue from the size of 
assets under management, and are therefore facing competition from other 
institutions when attracting equity from smaller investors.  
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The competitive nature of the funds management industry creates a greater 
urgency for institutions to maximize returns to capital providers whilst minimizing 
exposure to volatility. Greater price volatility of A-REITs relative to the industry-
diversified ASX index after GFC onset led to a greater propensity for institutional 
investors to short sell A-REIT equity, particularly as unit prices and profits had 
stagnated over long periods. A-REITs took longer to regain price levels after the 
GFC onset relative to the ASX index and other REIT markets globally. Given the 
greater focus on short term ownership, there is potential to deprive capital providers 
of longer term growth and its resulting gains. A-REIT equity regained its lost value 
around three years after the onset of the GFC, whilst growth sped up and has now 
exceeded that of most industries over the last twelve months. This poses a question 
as to whether competitive institutions are more prone than are other large investors to 
a short term investment focus. Short termism, as postulated by Hartzell and Starks 
(2003), and Parrino et al. (2003) tends to reduce long-term monitoring by institutions 
and shifts this to less efficient individual monitoring by smaller investors. A problem 
therein is that the decisions of institutions tend to affect smaller investors. On one 
hand, long term gains may be denied to smaller investors who have entrusted their 
capital to institutions. On the other hand, smaller individual investors not aligned 
with institutions may face greater costs of monitoring and may also suffer immediate 
depreciation in equity values when large blocks are sold by institutions and other 
large investors. 
Private equity placements are faster and cost less than public offers 
(Dimovski & O’Neill, 2012), which makes them desirable for corporate entities to 
undertake. A-REITs generally had higher levels of debt than other types of 
companies, which made capital restructuring more urgent after the GFC brought 
about negative profitability and imposed difficulty in maintaining interest 
repayments. The ability to attract private investors depends upon positive financial 
status as well as a board structure conducive to reduction in agency issues. It is 
therefore important that institutional investors that are considering buying into 
placements are able to find an appropriate mix of expected financial prosperity and 
board structure to reduce inefficiency. This appropriate mix is vital for A-REITs to 
strive towards in the event that another unexpected crisis affects the industry. 
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1.3 FINDINGS OF THE THESIS 
 
1.3.1 Capital Structure 
 
Determinants of capital structure are generally consistent with those of 
numerous international studies involving U.S. companies. The major corporate 
finance theories of pecking order, trade-off and agency are both supported and 
refuted with respect to an array of ratio variables generally, although after the GFC 
onset, pecking order theory is wholly supported. Signalling theory is refuted, whilst 
market timing theory is only supported after the GFC onset. Larger A-REITs have a 
greater proportion of debt, indicative of greater information flow and transparency to 
the market, a lower probability of bankruptcy, and an ability to obtain debt at lower 
cost relative to smaller A-REITs. After GFC onset, smaller A-REITs appear to 
struggle in raising equity, taking advantage of shorter term debt financing where 
possible.  
A-REITs with a greater proportion of tangible assets have a higher debt ratio, 
with a higher collateral base enabling a reduction in interest premiums. After the 
GFC onset, asset values fall, reducing any discount in premiums. More profitable A-
REITs tend to prefer debt over equity, but this preference reverses for A-REITs 
facing increased volatility. There is evidence of A-REIT aversion to insolvency in 
reducing debt levels when facing earnings volatility, but tax deductions play little or 
no part in the gearing decision. A-REITs that are not stapled are not as averse to risk 
because they do not engage in development activity which would otherwise magnify 
any volatility. After the GFC onset, A-REITs experiencing higher volatility have 
more difficulty attracting equity capital.  
Growth opportunities are not typically funded with debt, providing evidence 
of engaging in above average risky activity without the added restriction of being 
monitored by debt holders. Non-stapled A-REITs in contrast, use more debt, 
verifying that their growth opportunities carry less risk compared to stapled A-
REITs, and are signaled as such to the market. There is generally no evidence of A-
REITs deliberately timing equity issues to coincide with higher equity prices, 
indicating that they do not take advantage of information asymmetry when equity is 
overvalued. After GFC onset, however, there is some evidence of this behaviour. 
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1.3.2 Fiduciary Remuneration 
 
Non executive directors (NEDs), CEOs and other top management are 
compensated for results which are both within and outside of their control. NEDs are 
compensated generally according to the state of the economy and their scope of 
responsibility, including the degree of vigilance and monitoring that they need to 
provide. Their fees rise upon onset of the GFC, reflecting a more critical 
responsibility, whilst they also tend to be more self-interested when their CEO holds 
less power. 
Base salary should not be based on rewarding performance, but the largest 
determinant of CEO base salary is past systematic returns. This links base salaries to 
overall market performance, despite individual CEOs not being able to control 
systematic returns. Base salary also rewards the scale and difficulty of tasks CEOs 
undertake, particularly when facing larger risk factors. Base salaries and bonuses 
tend to increase when CEOs have more power, demonstrating the presence of agency 
issues and influence over the board. After the GFC onset, there is further evidence of 
agency issues, with base salaries seemingly increased to offset any reduction in 
bonuses. Bonus payments are driven by increases in profitability and the reduction of 
volatility. Systematic reduction of risk in the A-REIT industry also has a large 
impact on individual bonuses, implying that there are similar underlying criteria 
throughout the industry that are linked to bonus payments. Long-term equity 
incentive payments (LTIs) tend to rise when market values exceed book values. After 
GFC onset, equity pay falls as it is no longer as effective an incentive given the 
stagnation in A-REIT unit prices. More powerful CEOs tend to substitute LTIs for 
other types of pay, showing a desire to minimize own-pay volatility over non-vesting 
periods. 
Top managerial base salaries are expected to compensate individual 
responsibilities, but they extend beyond this by compensating value added to 
unitholder wealth, which is traditionally the ultimate executive responsibility of 
CEOs. As is the case with CEOs, top management base salary inflates to compensate 
for loss of bonuses when systematic volatility is inflated, and also increases in 
response to the successful reduction in debt levels after the GFC onset. Base salaries 
also compensate top managers for the magnitude of responsibility they face, with 
larger A-REITs offering greater base salary to both top management and CEOs.  
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Short-term bonus payments reward increased profitability and tend to replace 
a portion of long term equity incentives after GFC onset, where immediate 
motivation is required to improve dwindling performance. Bonuses also increase in 
larger A-REITs which inherently enjoy greater opportunities, and where top 
management is under the instruction of more experienced CEOs who are currently 
directors of other entities. The GFC has no significant impact on top managerial LTIs 
as opposed to those of CEOs, supporting findings that greater fiduciary power tends 
to run contrary to the incentive alignment required to reduce agency issues. 
 
 
1.3.3 Institutional and Large Non-Institutional Investment 
 
Institutions tend to have a shorter term focus on their investment in A-REITs, 
relative to non-institutional large top twenty investors, who do not face competitive 
pressure in the funds management industry. Institutions do however, exhibit some 
monitoring behaviour. The divergence between both of these large investors is more 
prominent after GFC onset, highlighting a panic driven focus and a disregard for 
potential long term returns. There appears to be a trade-off between managerial 
experience and potential for collusion. Institutional investors are attracted to A-
REITs which have experienced management after GFC onset for both private 
placements and in general trading, but prefer to minimize their exposure to board 
collusion by investing in A-REITs that have either a long serving board or CEO, but 
not both. Longer-term, entrenched management is particularly favoured where A-
REITs are stapled, highlighting a preference for experience in managing riskier 
ventures. 
Large non-institutional investors tend to accept lower yields and have a 
higher ownership after GFC onset, providing further evidence of a longer term 
relationship in the absence of competitive pressure. They are also less concerned 
with potential misuse of funds from operations than are institutional investors, 
preferring to support growth through development opportunities, although they do 
become averse to this risk factor after GFC onset. 
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1.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis complements the well documented presence of both agency and 
shareholder wealth maximization tactics on part of fiduciary management. It analyses 
changes in fiduciary behaviour after the GFC onset to scrutinise the balance between 
self-serving and equityholder-serving motives which can be inherently distorted 
when facing volatility and uncertainty in own wealth. Focus on the unique A-REIT 
industry is essential because it forms a large part of the contemporary investment 
subset. It is subject to tax rules which are different to those of corporations, and it is 
also subject to rules which uniquely govern the managed funds industry. The 
contribution of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
Firstly, it contributes to the literature on capital structure by isolating managerial 
decision making over both stable and volatile periods, and by analysing financial 
determinants that lead to dynamic capital structure fluctuations. 
Secondly, it contributes to the literature by isolating managerial decision making in 
riskier, stapled A-REITs in a volatile environment. 
Thirdly, it contributes to the literature through evidence that individual levels of 
management are compensated for both unique responsibilities and also for the 
systematic state of the industry. 
Fourthly, it contributes to the literature by attributing base salary, short term bonus 
and long term incentive compensation to specific financial outcomes. 
Fifthly, it contributes to the literature with evidence that economic volatility 
exacerbates the agency problem in its trade-off with incentive alignment in fiduciary 
compensation. 
Sixthly, it contributes to the literature by determining financial and board attributes 
of A-REITs that attract large amounts of investment by self-interested professionals. 
Seventhly, it contributes to the literature by verifying agency issues amongst 
institutional investors and providing evidence that these issues distort the investment 
timeframe when compared to large, non-institutional investors, who do not face 
identical competitive pressures. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
27 
 
1.5  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presents the background, motivation, findings, contribution, and 
structure of the thesis. It is a compilation of three essays that predominately 
investigate agency issues within A-REITs. It is structured as a three-tiered analysis 
investigating managerial decisions involving capital structure in a volatile 
environment, the determinants of compensation awarded to management for making 
financial decisions, and investment decisions made by powerful equity holders in 
response to the way management has performed and structured their respective A-
REITs. 
Australia has the second largest REIT market in the world behind the United 
States and has its own specific regulations similar to other REITs globally. Literature 
investigating capital structure is voluminous, but there is little written about A-
REITs, considering it is such a large market, and there is virtually no research linking 
in the GFC. In comparison to capital structure, there is considerably less literature 
studying managerial remuneration and institutional investment, but when it is 
studied, it is predominately linked to U.S corporations. This thesis aims to expand 
upon previous narrower research conducted over larger, mainly stable periods and to 
expand it into a more comprehensive body of knowledge, highlighting distortions 
over what is arguably the largest negative global economic event. 
The findings of this thesis are significant because they provide evidence 
following on from legislative changes and recommendations, with respect to 
information flow and unit holder power. They are also significant because they 1) 
analyse what is expected to be diligent practice by fiduciaries in maximizing 
unitholder wealth and in minimizing the threat of insolvency, 2) the compensation of 
these wealth-maximizing outcomes in a way which increases motivation and aligns 
incentives, and finally, 3) the powerful unit holder evaluation that both monitors and 
punishes the presence of managerial self interest and suboptimal performance.  
The findings will contribute some new determinants to the A-REIT literature 
which may benefit managers in navigating future crises. It may also assist regulators 
in further disclosure enforcement with respect to fiduciary contracts and will provide 
knowledge to less powerful investors regarding certain A-REIT attributes, which are 
viewed favourably by more experienced professional investors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The global Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry is based on the 
concept of incorporating property investment as the principal business activity. It 
stems from the notion of Massachusetts Trust, which were state laws enacted in 
1930’s United States to prevent property from being owned by corporations for non-
core activities. The Australian REIT market has a long history, pioneered by the 
listing of General Property Trust in 1971. Its founder, Dick Dusseldorp, engineered 
the property trust structure, which allowed rental income to be passed through to 
investors without being prone to the double taxation rules prevalent prior to reforms 
by the Australian government in 1985. The following chapter provides an overview 
of the literature surrounding the three research areas in this thesis, capital structure, 
fiduciary remuneration, and institutional investment. All academic literature has been 
broadly predicated upon corporate finance, with analysis focusing on agency issues. 
 
 
2.2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
Until the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Australian real estate 
investment trusts (A-REITs) were substantially geared, owing to their high 
ownership of tangible property assets (Booth et al., 2001), and their better ability to 
offer these assets as loan collateral relative to non-A-REIT corporate entities. Debt as 
a proportion of assets hovered at 43 percent just prior to onset of the GFC. Capital 
structure is the proportion of debt and equity used to finance the purchase of assets in 
view of creating returns for an entity. Debt may include loans and debentures, whilst 
equity may include ordinary shares, preference shares, and securities that are a 
hybrid of both. Hybrid securities can be issued as debt and repaid to the lender as 
shares at a later stage. Internationally, firm leverage is found to be very similar 
across G7 countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995), but it can also be diverse using market 
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measures (McClure et al., 1999), with its determinants being consistent amongst both 
developed and developing countries (Booth et al., 2001). Differences in leverage 
amongst companies are difficult to isolate, but country-specific factors such as 
macroeconomic indicators and stakeholder protection regulations have an impact 
across European countries (Antoniou et al., 2002), and generally on a global scale 
(de Jong et al., 2008). 
REITs differ from non-REIT entities in several ways. Internationally, there 
are variations in REIT-specific regulations, but the major difference regarding capital 
structure is centered on tax deductibility of interest expenses. Global REITs are 
required to pay out most of their earnings (EPREA, 2012). If they conform to this 
requirement, they receive tax exempt status, and as such, the incentive of a discount 
on debt does not apply to them. The cheaper cost of debt relative to equity still 
provides an incentive to gear, but it is not as attractive as it is for non-REIT 
companies. However, the propensity for entities to take advantage of high-risk 
growth opportunities using debt is more costly for non-REITs. REITs on the other 
hand, have a better ability to offer security and render any agency costs of ‘asset 
substitution’ virtually redundant. Asset substitution, according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) occurs because equity holders may yield very high returns from 
good risky investment; whilst their liability is limited should they suffer large losses. 
Debtholders are therefore exposed to losses over and above that which is secured by 
company assets. Debtholders can reduce this risk by better predicting the risk taking 
nature of managers and subsequently including certain restrictive covenants within 
debt contracts. Diamond (1989) asserts that the asset substitution effect can be 
mitigated through longer previous contractual associations between firms and 
debtholders. This leads to better information flow and knowledge of managerial risk 
taking. 
REITs have the ability to use virtually all of their non-current assets as 
collateral for borrowing. In most jurisdictions, minimum property ownership 
regulations specify that the overwhelming majority of assets must include tangible 
property. Compared to non-REIT companies, REITs tend to avoid the capitalization 
of non tangible assets such as research and development, and goodwill, enabling 
them to gear at a higher level (Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012), with a lower cost of debt 
(Morri & Beretta, 2007). The theories pertaining to capital structure also appear to 
apply to REITs in a different way relative to non-REITs. REITs tend to conform to 
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pecking order theory, whereas non REITs follow trade-off theory (explained in 
subsections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 respectively). This is apparent in the interaction of 
variables as explained by Morri and Beretta (2007). 
 
2.2.1 Capital Structure in Perfect Capital Markets 
 
Capital structure has been asserted as both relevant and irrelevant throughout 
the literature as a driver for the maximization of issued security value. In perfect 
capital markets, there are three prerequisites (Berk & DeMarzo, 2010) that need to be 
met in order for capital transfers to be most fluid and efficient. The first is that 
investors are able to buy and sell securities at the same value as the present value of 
all future cash flows generated. If this is the case, there is no mispricing of securities 
and investors receive the rate of return they have anticipated prior to making the 
decision to enter into their investment. The second prerequisite is that there are no 
transaction and issuance expenses in the trade of securities, as well as no taxes. 
Taxes ultimately erode total returns ex-post, whilst costs of issuing shares and 
transaction brokerage both act to reduce net returns. Issuing costs ultimately add to 
the cost of equity faced by the firm because they are covered by the equity issued. 
These costs are expendable and cannot be capitalized into a meaningful asset that 
will generate future returns. Therefore, a newly purchased asset is not only expected 
to generate returns to cover its own purchase, but also that of all costs associated 
with future equity issues. Brokerage costs reduce the rate of return to investors 
because not all of their capital outlay is directed to the purchase of securities. In a 
similar fashion, any returns can only pertain to the target investment, not to the 
investor’s total outlay, which includes the additional cost of brokerage. The third 
prerequisite is that the source of capital, whether it is debt or equity, should not 
impact upon any future generation of cash flow from financed assets, nor should it 
imply signaled information about them. 
  Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) research into corporate finance hypothesized 
through Proposition one, that capital structure has no impact upon the value of the 
firm, given perfect capital markets, no taxes, bankruptcy, nor transaction costs. 
Individual shareholders are perfectly capable of obtaining personal leverage 
themselves, such that there is no advantage to a corporate entity of issuing debt on 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
31 
 
shareholders’ behalf. If the capital structure of two otherwise identical companies is 
different, potential for arbitrage is possible if the law of one price is violated and 
those companies have different values. Due to uniform mandatory interest 
repayments and higher ranking claims for capital in the event of liquidation, debt 
holders face lower risk compared to shareholders and companies face a lower cost of 
debt capital. However, an increasing proportion of debt can put a company at risk of 
not meeting interest repayments, and subsequently force an entity closer to 
bankruptcy. According to Proposition two, this should not have an effect on 
company share price because the lower cost of debt will offset the risk-induced 
increased cost of equity, and higher earnings per share from utilizing debt will offset 
any additional volatility. Modigliani and Miller (1958) then show that imperfect 
capital markets result in capital structure having an impact on share values. They 
introduced corporate taxes in their second proposition and showed that firm value 
and its degree of leverage is positively correlated (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). 
Miller (1977) subsequently introduces the impact of both corporate and personal 
taxes to show that despite tax deductibility, the value of a firm and its structure are 
independent.  
 
 
2.2.2 Capital Structure in Imperfect Capital Markets 
 
There has been a plethora of studies conducted since Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958) seminal research, many with conflicting results. In the real world, capital 
markets are not perfect, particularly when market failures result in financial crises. 
Efficiency is compromised by the presence of arbitrage. Security prices inherently 
cannot perfectly reflect the present value of all future earnings. In defiance of 
prerequisite one, transmission of information between entities and investors is 
inhibited by imperfect information flows and agency. Prerequisite two also does not 
hold in the presence of transaction and equity issuing costs. It is clear that brokerage 
costs are fundamental in maintaining trading intermediaries, and that entities must 
expend resources to formally provide highly regulated information to investors. 
There are some instances, however, where these costs are kept to a minimum through 
the offer of private placements. Varying taxes exist universally for investors, 
depending on their level of income. Corporate entities pay company taxes that are 
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then adjusted at the personal level in Australia to reflect unique individual marginal 
tax rates, whereas with REITs, taxes are paid by investors at the individual level. The 
literature on capital structure is currently based on the primary theories of pecking 
order, trade-off, and agency theories.  
 
 
2.2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
 
Pecking order theory, an alternative to trade-off theory, states that an optimal 
debt level does not exist. Based on the findings of Donaldson (1961), choices on the 
types of capital depend on their cost, with internal funds being preferred to debt 
finance, then hybrid securities, with equity issues being last preference (Myers, 1984; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984). The choice to engage in any of these financing options 
relates to the costs of asymmetric information, with external capital being priced 
more highly than internal capital. The reason behind this is that external investors 
face a higher risk of securities being mispriced. They further believe that the type of 
financing sought by a firm signals certain information. They also hypothesize that 
shareholders are skeptical of equity being issued when its price is overvalued and 
will thus react negatively. Managers anticipate this reaction, preferring to avoid 
discounting equity by issuing debt instead. Therefore, debt should only be issued in 
the absence of acceptable internal cash flow, and should always be issued ahead of 
new equity. 
In practice, there is an expectation regarding the accuracy of pecking order 
theory. In times of high profitability, retained earnings are expected to be utilized 
before the issue of debt and share equity, resulting in a lower debt ratio (Allen, 
1993). Dividend policies however, have the potential to thwart pecking order 
expectations. In the case of REITs, management does not have the discretion to 
retain earnings when funding growth opportunities. Despite the possible achievement 
of high profitability, REITs would have to resort to debt as first preference over the 
issue of equity in order to conform to pecking order predictions. In line with some 
findings not entirely supportive of pecking order theory, Frank and Goyal (2003) find 
that the majority of U.S. listed companies have relied on external capital, suggesting 
that retained earnings, if any, may not be sufficient to fund potential opportunities. 
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2.2.4 Trade-Off Theory 
 
The trade-off model developed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) states that 
every firm maximizes value by choosing an optimal debt to equity ratio. Stulz (1990) 
also contends that the correct trade-off between costs and benefits of debt leads to an 
optimal capital structure. This model extends Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
hypothesis by relaxing the assumption of markets being perfect. Miller and Scholes 
(1978), and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) contribute an association with tax, 
whereby as the firm increases leverage, the trade-off occurs when attaining tax 
deduction benefits on interest paid and having access to additional capital without 
diluting the shareholder base. Altman (1980) adds that decisions regarding the 
proportion of debt are relevant because increasing corporate tax rates and declining 
non-debt tax shields will lead to greater tax deductibility, and therefore higher use of 
debt relative to equity.  
On the other hand, the firm assumes a greater risk of insolvency and 
bankruptcy costs by being less able to cover interest repayments.  The point of 
optimality is where the present value benefits of tax deductibility and the lower cost 
of debt equal the present value of expected insolvency. This is the point where firm 
value is maximized. Costs of expected bankruptcy are defined by Barclay et al. 
(1995) and Warner (1997), and are generalized by Myers (2001), who terms these as 
any cost resulting from the issue of further debt beyond a firm’s current gearing. The 
differential between personal tax rates and the corporate tax rate can enhance firm 
value. The theory predicts that larger, more profitable firms are more likely to take 
on debt because they are financially healthier, with a lower probability of becoming 
bankrupt. They can also command lower rates of interest due to the greater quantity 
of collateral (Rajan & Zingales, 1995).  
Miller (1977) incorporates a second trade off whereby debt ratios are costly 
to adjust. This is evidenced by firms utilizing a lower level of debt than is deemed 
optimal to maintain spare borrowing capacity. Therefore, this trade off occurs when 
evaluating benefits of adjusting the optimal debt ratio and its associated costs. If 
corporate taxes are higher than individual tax rates, there will be a net tax advantage 
(Taggart, 1985), such that the rate of deductibility will be higher at the firm level, 
relative to the ultimate personal rate of tax paid at the investor level. Different 
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personal tax rates based on different levels of personal income, as is prevalent in the 
Australian tax system, makes any net tax advantage difficult to gauge if the ultimate 
tax rate of every individual investor is not considered. Where firms are permitted to 
gain future tax credits from current negative profitability, Ashton (1989) highlights 
the advantages to firms of the U.S. system over the U.K., with Adedeji (1998) 
pointing to U.S. debt levels being higher on average.  
Further market imperfections are specified by Tong and Green (2005), who 
further build upon the trade-off model. They assert that there are agency costs 
prevalent between owners and managers. Firms with substantial debt levels are 
formally monitored to a greater extent by lenders and may have restrictive covenants 
placed upon them. This enhances external monitoring and allows owners to free-ride, 
given that additional monitoring costs are borne by debt holders. It ultimately allows 
more efficient use of borrowed funds under increased prudential supervision. It does, 
however, create additional agency issues between managers and debt holders.  
 
 
2.2.5 Agency Theory and Asymmetric Information 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Easterbrook (1984) hypothesize that there is 
conflict between firm owners and both managers and debt holders. In particular, 
managers strive to maximize their own gains by using company resources, whilst not 
expending the type of effort that is in the best interests of their principal equity 
holders. Harris and Raviv (1990) add that managers should be disciplined in this 
case, and cite an example of trying to avoid liquidation even if it is the best outcome 
for shareholders. When interests diverge, it is optimal for the firm to pay out all of 
their free cash flow in dividends as to avoid any risky and inefficient investment by 
managers. Consequently, it is more beneficial to fund expansion using debt such that 
its use can be formally monitored by debt providers and shareholders also indirectly 
gain the benefit of this type of monitoring (Jensen, 1986).  
There is a further asymmetric information problem whereby firms can reduce 
outside stakeholder scrutiny by using mainly internal, and to a lesser extent, new 
equity funding. As opposed to the trade-off theory, capital structure is a function of 
an entity’s investment opportunities. The market timing theory, first investigated by 
Taggart (1977), then developed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) also suggests that there 
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is no optimal capital ratio. Rather, firms will choose the type of capital that is 
mispriced to a greater extent. In terms of equity, a firm would be expected to make 
an issue to the market when their existing share price is unsustainably overvalued. 
The reasoning is to fund projects with a positive net present value whilst minimizing 
the cost of equity and causing the least negative impact to existing shareholders. Tax 
incentives targeted specifically at property trusts mandating certain minimum 
earnings payouts directly address the free cash flow agency problem by eliminating 
the use of less monitored retained cash flows. 
 
 
2.2.6 General Empirical Development 
 
With regard to previous empirical work determining capital structure, 
Bradley et al. (1984) find that certain debt ratios depend on the industry that firms 
belong to. The A-REIT market is an industry in its own right and competes with 
other entities for property investment funding, whilst assets are generally tangible 
and illiquid. Geltner and Miller (2001) assert that given the higher net tangible asset 
values in REITs, they can afford to be more highly geared than non-property related 
companies by offering greater collateral, whilst Myers (1985) concludes that the net 
tax gain to corporate borrowers is negative if their net marginal tax rate is zero. Fama 
and French (1998) agree with Miller (1977) that debt offers no net tax benefits, and 
find a positive relationship between dividends and firm value, whilst there is a 
negative relationship between firm value and debt levels. Given A-REIT tax rules, 
this implies that there is little incentive to use debt. Capozza and Seguin (1999) find 
that externally managed REITs have a higher debt ratio because external managers 
are frequently compensated according to the size of assets under management. This 
gives them incentive to gear up as much as possible to maximize their own personal 
remuneration, whilst internal managers are more concerned about escalating interest 
expenses.  
Harrison et al. (2011) state that regulatory mandates restricting REITs from 
investing in non property assets tend to limit diversification and tend to also increase 
the probability of financial distress. It can be argued that this isn’t necessarily the 
case because rental property can be seen as a vehicle in which other types of 
commerce function. As long as there is diversification across different property 
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types, the core function of REITs isn’t expected to be significantly riskier, all else 
being equal. 
The trade-off, pecking order, agency, and market timing theories are assessed 
using the impact of certain independent variables upon capital structure. There has 
been no unequivocal evidence of the optimal structure, but the following studies 
show mixed results internationally using common independent variables which both 
support and refute the various theories at different points in time. 
Harrison et al. (2011), in their contemporary study of U.S. REITs find that as 
the size of an entity increases, the debt ratio also increases. The positive entity size 
relationship with the debt ratio is also found by Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Booth et al. (2001), Pandey (2001), Prasad et al. (2003), 
Ariff and Hassan (2008), in their study of the Asian Financial Crisis, and by 
Chikolwa (2009) who studies a sample of 34 A-REITs just prior to the GFC. These 
results support components of both pecking order and static trade-off theories. 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) also find a positive relationship between size and gearing, 
and state that managers tend to make different decisions on capital structure 
internationally where there are different country considerations. They also find that 
the impact by explanatory variables is slightly, but not significantly altered in 
Australia by the Asian financial crisis. 
Profitability has been found to mainly have a negative impact on the debt 
ratio in support of pecking order and trade-off (bankruptcy costs) theories (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988;  Rajan & Zingales, 1995;  Booth et al., 2001; Fama & French, 2002;  
Zoppa & McMahon, 2002; Cassar & Holmes, 2003; Hammes & Chen, 2004; Morri 
& Berretta, 2008; Westgaard, 2008; Chikolwa, 2009; and Harrison et al., 2011. This 
confirms a preference to use larger retained earnings ahead of debt. Smith and Watts 
(1992), and Barclay et al. (2001) find the relationship between debt and profitability 
to be positive, supporting agency and general trade-off theories. 
Asset tangibility mostly has a positive impact on the debt ratio, supporting 
agency and trade-off theories as per Prasad et al. (2003) and Suto (2003) for 
Malaysian entities, Harrison et al. (2011) for U.S. REITs, Ariff and Hassan (2008), 
and Deesomsak et al. (2004), who find a positive relationship among Australian 
firms. Higher levels of tangible collateral reduce the risk to debtholders and reduce 
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the subsequent cost of debt capital, making its issue more enticing. There are some 
deviations from expectations, with no significant relationships found by 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) and a negative one found by Booth et al (2001), both 
studying Thai firms.  
Earnings volatility or operating risk mainly has a negative impact upon the 
debt ratio, supporting trade-off theory. A high degree of operating risk can ultimately 
put mandatory interest repayments in doubt, increasing expected costs of bankruptcy. 
Amongst numerous others, Booth et al. (2001), Morri and Beretta (2008), and 
Chikolwa (2009) achieve this result, whereas Wiwattanakantang (1999) finds mixed 
results. 
According to Harrison et al. (2011), REITs with high growth opportunities 
have a lower debt ratio and tend to use debt with a shorter maturity to avoid 
underinvestment. This supports agency and trade-off theories as per Kim and 
Sorensen (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), Ariff and Hassan (2008), and 
Chikolwa (2009) in Australia. Managers may want to avoid the additional debtholder 
scrutiny of risky growth opportunities by issuing equity to fund them. Feng et al. 
(2007) find that high growth REITs have a larger debt ratio when significant in their 
models. They also state that transactions of illiquid property assets increase 
monitoring costs which exacerbates the cost of equity and makes debt preferable 
despite the inability to claim tax deductions. Positive relationships between the debt 
ratio and growth opportunities are also found by Deesomsak et al. (2004), Morri and 
Berretta (2008) and Giambona et al. (2008). These are found to support pecking 
order theory and refute agency theory, as REITs don’t seem to be concerned with 
additional monitoring. It also sends a signal to the market that their growth 
opportunities do not carry excessive risk. 
The presence of revenue generated outside Australia by A-REITs has 
generally shown a positive relationship with the debt ratio (Ooi, 1999; Newell, 2006; 
Giambona et al., 2008; Chikolwa, 2009). This is expected to occur because the 
geographical diversification of risk reduces the cost of debt.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Ooi et al. (2010), and Li 
et al. (2007) all find that managers tend to issue equity during times when equity is 
overvalued, supporting market timing theory. The latter authors also find that REITs 
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differ from corporate entities by timing equity releases to reduce the impact of 
adverse selection. Howe and Shilling (1988) find that there is generally a positive 
market reaction to debt issues close to the announcement date, supporting the view 
that the market rewards greater monitoring and reduction in information asymmetry. 
Chapter 4 extends previous literature by finding the determinants of capital 
structure of A-REITs between 2006 and 20012 and by doing so, tests the existing 
theories in a contemporary, volatile environment. Chapter 4 also examines the impact 
of the GFC on each of the determinants to find how such a crisis alters the 
relationship between leverage and its explanatory variables. Inclusion of the GFC is 
unique relative to all the existing literature because it has the potential to change the 
traditional expectations of both pecking order and trade-off theories. Firstly, the 
credit shortage after GFC onset puts a premium on debt. With the absence of retained 
earnings, is this premium large enough for A-REITs to prefer issuing equity, which is 
traditionally the last funding preference according to pecking order theory? 
Secondly, with declining (and negative) profits, coupled with erosion of collateral 
property assets, A-REITs find themselves further along the continuum approaching 
bankruptcy. Do the prescriptions of trade-off theory therefore hold, given the inflated 
expected present value of bankruptcy costs, and by implication, is there additional 
weight placed upon these expected costs when deciding on an appropriate capital 
structure? 
 
 
2.3 FIDUCIARY REMUNERATION 
 
The response of A-REITs in navigating the negative effects of the GFC 
depends upon the skill of fiduciary management. Much has been written in the 
literature about the mix of both short and long term incentives to best motivate 
fiduciaries in maximizing the wealth of shareholders. The GFC threat has however 
created urgency for A-REITs to avoid the worst possible outcome of bankruptcy. 
This has arguably created the need for a different mix of incentives to not only 
reward profit targets, but to minimize exposure to risk by radically changing capital 
structure and a move away from bankruptcy over a short period of time.  
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2.3.1 Introduction to Agency Issues of Compensation 
 
The bulk of remuneration literature has so far centered on executive 
remuneration within companies, and to this point, there has been no contemporary 
research conducted on A-REIT fiduciary compensation pertaining to the GFC. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that compensation structures are a primary tool 
used to incentivize optimal performance under agency theory. They find that 
reductions in managerial ownership tend to increase monitoring and bonding costs 
monotonically and thus, appropriate compensation structure is the primary tool used 
to mitigate a widening gap between manager-shareholder incentives. Monitoring 
costs involve effort and expenditure in the supervision of fiduciaries to ensure firstly 
that actions are being evaluated, and secondly, that fiduciaries are aware that their 
actions are being scrutinized. Bonding costs involve expenditure on incentives to 
ensure fiduciary actions are in the best interests of both themselves and 
equityholders. A mix of both delivers a stick and carrot approach to aligning 
interests of all stakeholders as much as is financially possible such that their marginal 
costs to not exceed nor fall short of the marginal benefits of incentive alignment.  
 
2.3.2 Pay-For-Performance 
 
 From a theoretical perspective, Baumol (1959) initiates the hypothesis that 
sales results are often reflected in the level of executive compensation, and this is 
confirmed by Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), who find that firm profits significantly 
increase CEO pay. Murphy (1985) agrees that a significant association between 
performance and remuneration exists. Jensen & Murphy (1990a; 1990b) conclude 
that the weak incentive pay reward due to both internal and external political forces 
is akin to CEOs being paid flatly like bureaucrats, whilst pay-performance sensitivity 
has been steadily decreasing since the 1930’s. They find a positive association 
between stock options and share returns, but the reward to CEOs is very small, 
weakening the effect of targeted incentives. This is evidence of a corporate culture of 
diminished responsibility for performance.  
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Firm size and growth opportunities available to companies reflect the 
magnitude of both current and future opportunities. It is important that fiduciaries of 
both are awarded adequate incentives to nurture this potential. Lambert et al. (1991) 
study incentive effects of compensation, both with and without options but find that 
there is only a weak relationship between pay and firm size. Smith and Watts (1992) 
find that stock based pay is more prominent in firms with a high rate of growth, 
where Chopin et al. (1995) and Hardin (1998) examine how measures of 
performance impact upon executive compensation. The former find that revenue and 
firm size positively correlate with executive compensation, whilst the latter finds that 
firm size, the number of years since the initial public offering, dividends awarded, 
and percentage shareholding by senior executives influences senior executive 
compensation. Griffith and Najand (2007) find that lagged performance does not 
affect the change in salary of a CEO because bonuses and incentives are typically 
used to assess these variables. However, riskiness of the firm, duration as CEO and 
ownership level does impact upon base pay. Performance measures such as market 
value added, prior returns and tobins Q all have a significant positive impact upon 
CEO bonuses, which is also consistent with Scott et al. (2001), but firm size has no 
effect. 
 
 
2.3.3 Remuneration and Incentives within REITs 
 
Hardin (1998) is the first to analyze performance measures specific to REITs. 
He finds that REIT size and stock percentage ownership by CEOs is significant in 
determining the magnitude of senior management pay. He asserts the need for 
compensation models that are specific to individual industries because of differences 
in volatility, the degree of competition and other environmental factors. Scott et al. 
(2001) study the incentive component of cash compensation by separating base pay 
from total pay. In their model, bonuses are influenced by performance, which is 
expected, given that bonuses are specifically awarded for reaching pre-determined 
performance benchmarks. Entity size is significant to a lesser degree, whilst in 
contrast to Hardin (1998), a REIT’s age does not influence compensation. Hall and 
Liebman (1998) study U.S. companies between 1980 and 1994 and find that the 
majority of pay-performance sensitivity is in stock options, and they also state that to 
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improve pay-performance sensitivity, some portion of pay should be based upon the 
market index to compensate results that managers have control over.  
Core et al. (2001) find that stock prices are a noisy measure of performance 
and executives need to be paid a premium over an acceptable level of fixed cash pay 
to compensate for the risk posed by equity incentives. Share prices have the 
propensity to include systematic elements that are not necessarily within the control 
of managers (Hall & Liebman, 1998), such as widespread and persistent financial 
crises. Managerial response to these negative elements may be priced into long-run 
share valuation, but investors with a short-term outlook may wish to sell out of an 
industry entirely and en-masse, penalizing the value of managerial equity 
compensation. This kind of investor exodus tends to diminish the incentive effect 
that was intended of equity-based remuneration. 
Pennathur and Shelor (2002) examine relationships between the change in 
CEO cash compensation and performance measures, including those determined by 
the market such as stock returns, between 1994 and 1999. Their variables appear to 
have no significance up until 1996. Thereafter, they find that stock returns from 
previous periods positively influence the change in compensation, the age of a CEO 
has a negative effect and the earnings per share performance measure has no 
influence, although prior performance significantly influences future changes in pay. 
Pennathur et al. (2005) extend the study of Pennathur and Shelor (2002) to 
incorporate pay for performance CEO share-based compensation. CEOs appear to 
receive larger option rewards when REITs have larger growth opportunities and 
earnings per share. If a REIT’s operations are riskier due to the variability of returns, 
option awards tend to increase. However, stock performance has a negative impact 
on option awards, which they attribute to the need for greater motivation in periods 
of high growth potential. In contrast to their 2002 outcome, they find that CEO age 
no longer has an impact on option awards.  
Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) introduce elements of power via board 
composition and monitoring on REIT performance. They find that a greater number 
of independent directors tends to reduce the agency problem and increases 
performance. In their 2005 paper, they find that CEO compensation is higher when 
the board is weak and that board structure is impotent in monitoring CEO activities. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that CEO employment contracts are a product of 
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managerial power, which leads to pay being too high and incentives too low. Core et 
al. (2004) however, disagree on this agency implication, finding that CEO vesting 
and realizing of stock is declining and contracts are more optimal than that which 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) assert. Grifith and Najand (2011), discover mixed 
evidence with managerial power, finding that it does not seem to play a part in 
determining cash bonuses. They also find that prior stock returns positively impact 
upon the value of stock options, but that CEO power does affect their magnitude.  
 
 
2.3.4 Director Agency Issues 
 
Issues surrounding the board relate primarily to a lack of director 
independence such that the monitoring function over executives is not efficiently 
discharged. Jensen (1993) asserts that highly paid directors may compromise their 
independence, especially if appointed by an incumbent CEO. Core (1997) finds that 
agency issues exist for CEOs who also act in the position of board chairs, where 
there is a positively significant power relationship with own remuneration. Both of 
these issues centre upon a conflict of interests. Brick et al. (2006) find a relationship 
between director and CEO pay due to the complexity of requiring higher skills and 
effort. They find that director pay increases inversely with the value of shares owned 
by the CEO, consistent with a monitoring premium. Feng et al. (2007) focus on REIT 
director compensation. They find that better performance is associated with higher 
equity incentives, whereas CEO longevity, board size, CEO ownership levels and the 
use of external board members has no impact. 
In chapter 5, this thesis extends prior research in two ways, by examining 
non-executive director remuneration and its variable interaction after onset of the 
GFC. Not only do non-executive directors have a monitoring function, but they are 
also responsible for compensating themselves through a remuneration committee of 
which a CEO is not typically a member. This creates the potential for own agency 
issues. I classify external board members as being independent non executive 
directors, and in contrast to Feng et al. (2007), this group is structured as a dependent 
variable. Top management are delegates of the CEO and are responsible for their 
own unique portfolios. Previous literature primarily focuses on CEOs and does not 
collectively investigate the unique role of each level of management and the 
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incentives offered as a whole, to maximize shareholder wealth. The literature also 
does not study remuneration during volatile crises, which is arguably an even more 
important time to consolidate incentives and the drivers of compensation. 
 These interactions are an important focus of investigation in this thesis 
because each level of management needs to contribute and to be offered appropriate 
incentives based on their area of responsibility. I also examine determinants of non-
executive director, CEO, and top management compensation over the most volatile 
period in decades in order to gain deep insight into their dynamic interaction when 
faced with volatility and potential bankruptcy. The results will show the past 
performance, risk, and board factors that A-REITs deem to be important in setting 
appropriate remuneration to maximize performance and to remain solvent. 
 
2.4 INSTITUTIONAL AND LARGE NON-INSTITUTIONAL   
      INVESTMENT 
 
The various strategies that A-REITs put into place to maximize shareholder 
wealth are best evaluated by investors with the professional knowledge and sufficient 
motivation to make the best investment decisions. Thus far, capital structure 
decisions are made in an attempt to maximize shareholder wealth, whilst fiduciary 
remuneration decisions are made to reward and to incentivize the same goal through 
managerial actions. Coupled with superior knowledge and investment experience, 
institutional and large investors find themselves in a powerful position where they 
are best able to evaluate individual performance and stewardship of A-REITs. After 
evaluation, they are able to exert their power by either trading and indirectly 
influencing the market value of securities, or directly being able to influence 
stewardship by imposing their monitoring influence. The literature thus far is 
centralized upon firm characteristics that drive institutional trading decisions and 
invite influential monitoring. 
 
 
2.4.1 Board Characteristics 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983), in one of the earlier streams of research on agency, 
interpret a firm as a nexus of contracts that focus on a firm’s decision process, 
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residual claims, and the control of potential agency issues within the decision making 
process. They state that boards with multiple directors not typically entitled to 
sharing firm wealth effects, are vital in providing a control mechanism that reduces 
managerial collusion and increases accountability. The motivation for board 
members to monitor, rather than collude with management is derived from an 
external market for directors that values reputation. 
There has been debate in the literature as to whether board composition is 
related to firm performance. Demsetz (1983), and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) debate 
that ownership structure does not have an impact on firm performance, however 
Morck et al. (1988), Stulz (1988), Wruck (1989), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
document that performance initially increases with managerial ownership, but then 
decreases past a point. Friday and Sirmans (1998) analyse the impact of outside 
directors upon firm market value and find that this additional independence factor 
adds greater value to firm perceptions, but this changes as the proportion of 
independent directors grows to over 50%. Their findings demonstrate that the value 
of external monitoring diminishes at a certain point. They also find that increasing 
levels of board ownership tends to send a signal to the market that monitoring is 
more intensive, leading to increases in market value. 
Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) analyse two alternative effects of high 
managerial ownership, namely the convergence effect that aligns manager and 
shareholder interests, and the entrenchment effect which occurs when powerful 
managers structure boards in a way that reduces resistance to their own self interests. 
They find that there is no monotonic relationship with managerial share ownership. 
At low levels of ownership, the convergence effect is present, and then the 
entrenchment effect takes its place temporarily thereafter. At ownership levels of 
over 25%, the convergence effect returns. 
Campbell et al. (2001) speculate that hostile takeovers assist in the 
monitoring function, but their prevalence has been severely reduced among REITs 
due to specific U.S. regulations which restrict concentrated ownership by a few large 
investors. This leads to board structure and monitoring capability being even more 
important. Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), and Han (2004) identify that the UPREIT 
structure in the United States allows for cross-holdings where accountability may be 
compromised and agency costs are increased. Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) further find 
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that with difficulties in undertaking hostile takeovers, the presence of independent 
directors weakly enhances REIT performance. Institutional block ownership does not 
seem to succeed as an alternative source of monitoring, yet is linked to somewhat 
better performance. CEO power, through increased equity ownership and tenure by 
CEOs adversely affects performance by reducing the number of outside directors. 
This provides evidence of the importance of independent monitoring in regulating 
the actions of CEOs.  
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) find that CEOs have the propensity to select, and 
then influence larger, older, and busier REIT boards, and to redistribute shareholder 
wealth toward themselves through higher pay. Larger boards have a diminished 
ability to confer often and reach a unanimous consensus, whilst busy boards face 
time constraints in monitoring, and older boards may have developed a relationship 
with the CEO. They therefore show that REIT boards are not effective in their 
monitoring function. Han (2006) contends that performance issues arise when insider 
ownership grows. At low levels of insider ownership, he finds that the tobins q value 
measure is positive, supporting alignment of incentives, but this relationship 
becomes negative when insider ownership becomes too high. This further indicates a 
trade-off effect between incentive alignment and entrenchment. Vafeas (2003) 
analyses the tenure of directors, and finds that long serving board members tend to 
award CEOs higher salaries, and those with over twenty years of service are signs of 
CEO entrenchment. He posits that board members should face maximum terms in 
order to reduce any detriment to shareholders resulting from entrenchment. 
Hermalin (2005) posits theoretical prescriptions for boards, which practice 
vigilant governance. He finds that these boards should appoint CEOs that are 
external to the firm. Post appointment, their tenures would be shorter on average than 
internal appointments because they would be less entrenched, whereas their effort 
level would be higher. Given greater board diligence, if a new CEOs ability to 
adequately manage is not as well known, downside risk would further lean toward 
tenures being shorter. 
Feng et al. (2005) analyse the structure of REIT boards and their relationship 
with performance. They classify a good board as one that is small, has a majority of 
outside directors, and is not chaired by a CEO. Board structure is only related to 
superior performance where boards have been scaled as best to worst, linking 
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increased monitoring capability to superior performance. Board quality over the mid 
range of their scale has no relationship with performance, indicating that CEOs may 
be attempting to negate superior monitoring with personal influence. Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2006) further find that board structure and monitoring effectiveness also 
assists in determining dividend payout levels. Despite the minimum regulated payout 
ratios of REITs, managers are still perceived to potentially waste resources at their 
disposal.  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that busy boards are associated with weak 
corporate governance, despite the presence of outside directors. In particular, weaker 
return on assets, lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, and lower 
market to book value are found to be prevalent amongst busy boards. The 
appointment of a busy director usually increases market sentiment where there are no 
existing busy incumbents, but the opposite occurs when the busyness of remaining 
directors is also high, seemingly compromising optimal monitoring ability. Field et 
al. (2012) in contrast to Fich and Shivdasani (2006), find that busy boards create 
value, but this is related to younger firms close to IPO because they tend to bring 
more experience. This takes place in a predominately advisory capacity, where its 
benefits are seen by the market to exceed the costs of reduced monitoring capacity. 
Similar to Linck et al. (2008), this effect however, does not hold with established 
firms, demonstrating a trade-off between advising and monitoring as firms mature. 
Board structure is found to be vital during the initial growth stages of recently 
listed companies. Boone et al. (2007) examine the boards of firms within ten years of 
initial public offering and find that board size and independence tend to increase with 
the growth and diversification of firms over time and only firm size represents a 
trade-off between costs and benefits of monitoring. A firm’s management and 
competitive environment tend influence the variation in board size and composition. 
Firms with smaller boards tend to also enable managerial influence with little 
constraint. Linck et al. (2008), in their study of the development and determinants of 
board structure, find that boards on average become smaller and more independent 
approaching the end of the twentieth century. Board size and its degree of 
independence tend to differ across large and small companies. Smaller firms tend 
toward greater board independence, whilst larger firms show a reduction in board 
size. The costs and benefits of monitoring play a large role in the selection of boards. 
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Linck et al. (2008) complement Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) in finding a 
substitution effect between better external monitoring related to larger and more 
independent boards, and insider monitoring related to high managerial ownership. 
The latter type may also be a sign of more powerful managers structuring a board for 
self interest. 
 
 
2.4.2 Institutional Investor Influence 
 
There has been much research done about the influence of institutional 
investors on firm strategy and board structure. Dowen and Bauman (1986) find that 
by combining firm size, institutional ownership and other financial variables into 
beta models, it enables managers to improve performance of their portfolios. 
Badrinath et al. (1989) support Dowen and Bauman (1986) in finding that beta is an 
important determinant of institutional investment. Hessel and Norman (1992) affirm 
that the level of debt, return on assets, research expenditure and firm size dictates 
institutional involvement. Institutional investors are attracted to high profitability, 
financial stability and the presence of growth opportunities, and these are all factors 
that would be attractive to smaller investors who entrust their capital to these large, 
competitive institutions. Chan et al. (1998) document that institutional investment in 
REITs is very low compared to non-REIT firms prior to 1990, but this has reversed 
after 1994, with institutions greatly increasing their diversified holdings of REITs. 
Large non-institutional shareholders provide a monitoring role, much like that 
of institutional investors. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) contend that large shareholders 
are integral in influencing firm efficiency. Evidence has been uncovered globally of 
large shareholders influencing board decisions and managerial actions. Kaplan and 
Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that managers in Japan 
displaying substandard performance are more likely to be replaced if firms are 
owned by large block holders. Shivdasani (1993) finds that takeovers in the United 
States are more probable with the presence of large shareholders, whilst Denis and 
Serrano (1996) find that there is greater managerial turnover in the presence of large 
block holders after a poorly performing firm has defended a takeover attempt. 
Stein (1988; 1989), and Shleifer and Vishny (1990; 1997) find that the threat 
of takeovers imposes a short-term outlook onto corporate managers. Barton (2011), 
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after discussions with over 400 business and government leaders, states that short-
termism is the predominant focus of business in Western society. This infiltrates 
investment decisions by both, businesses and institutional investors. He states that 
taking a more long-term approach needs to begin with institutional investors. Boards 
need to also become more proactive in their influence over firm strategy. Barton 
(2011) suggests that this take the form of more time spent attaining greater 
experience and industry knowledge, which is specific to their company in order to 
better identify critical opportunities and threats. Non executive committee structures 
need to become more specialized and focused in order to be more informed and to 
engage in collaboration with top management without the risk of any power 
imbalance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) perform a substantial survey of corporate 
governance. They find that large concentrated investment assists in reducing the 
agency problem, but their presence can also lead to negative outcomes when 
resources are inefficiently redistributed to them instead of smaller shareholders. 
Grossman and Hart (1988), and Harris and Raviv (1988) argue that this may be the 
case when large investors have control rights that exceed their cash flow rights. 
Eakins et al. (1998) investigate institutional ownership and the firm-specific 
factors that have an impact upon it. They find that institutions try to avoid investing 
in firms that display both high or low extreme measures, and that ‘prudent man 
behaviour’ (PMB) provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(1974) influence institutions in avoiding more volatile securities. PMB is a test of 
fiduciary due care and diligence, where investment managers make decisions based 
in part on financial ratio quality. The test focuses on individual asset characteristics, 
rather than the marginal effect of an asset on an entire portfolio. Below et al. (2000) 
examine institutional investor demand for REIT stocks, and whether their decisions 
are influenced by financial ratios. They find that their results are consistent with 
PMB. They also find that REIT size is the largest determinant of institutional 
investment and that REITs have the ability to tailor their financial characteristics to 
suit certain institutional requirements. Institutional preferences tend to also change 
over time, with both growth and value REITs being interchangeably demanded over 
different periods. Frank and Ghosh (2012) analyse the impact of a range of financial, 
board and CEO characteristics on the degree of institutional investment. Consistent 
with Ciochetti et al. (2002), high liquidity is desirable, but other characteristics such 
as larger size (Hessel & Norman, 1992), greater free cash flow, lower debt, busy yet 
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less entrenched directors, and lower CEO ownership tend to attract institutional 
investors.  
Ciochetti et al. (2002) analyse institutional ownership in REITs and their 
portfolio investment. Their interest lies in factors that drive institutions to invest in 
listed REITs as opposed to private property equities. They find that institutions prefer 
to invest in larger and more liquid REITs, particularly as their own current liabilities 
increase. Hartzell and Starks (2003) study the relationship between institutional 
investment and executive compensation. They find that that the degree of 
institutional ownership concentration impacts upon subsequent incentive 
compensation, showing that the degree of institutional monitoring does influence 
incentive alignment and pay-performance sensitivity within firms. Both external 
monitoring and internal alignment policies therefore tend to work in tandem with 
each other to reduce agency issues. Parrino et al. (2003) similarly look into resulting 
board actions after a change in institutional ownership levels by examining the 
reaction of institutional investors around times of involuntary CEO turnover. They 
find that a change in the ratio of ownership between institutional and other investors 
influences subsequent board decisions. Where a substantial change in institutional 
ownership has taken place, an outsider is more likely to be appointed after an 
involuntary termination of a CEO from their position. 
Yermack (2004) studies the performance incentives of outside directors. He 
cites several anecdotal cases when institutional investors have tried to enforce certain 
standards of corporate governance, resulting in the replacement of directors and 
amendments to board structure. Director incentives are dominated by financial 
benefits associated with share performance, and the chance to obtain new 
directorships on the back of good firm performance. He also finds that financial 
incentives are significant, but not as motivating as those offered in CEO contracts. 
Directors in the A-REIT industry don’t tend to receive incentive compensation 
however, making their reputation even more valuable on the fiduciary market. 
Chapter 6 extends the literature by also analysing the determinants of large 
non-institutional investment and comparing it to previously well researched 
institutional investment. Large non-institutional investors can be differentiated from 
institutional investors in two ways. Institutions have the primary purpose of investing 
funds in a competitive funds management market. They are themselves, fiduciaries 
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of large amounts of investment capital and are under pressure to maximize their own 
income by making investment decisions in firms that maximize their own fiduciary 
agent wealth, as well as the wealth of the smaller initial providers of capital that they 
oversee. Large investors on the other hand are also powerful and either trade on their 
own behalf and do not act in a fiduciary capacity, or alternatively do trade in a 
fiduciary capacity where trading in other entities is not their primary mode of 
operations, as is prevalent, otherwise, in a competitive funds management industry.  
Chapter 6 aims to further add to the literature by identifying A-REIT 
characteristics that influence both types of powerful investors, and to find any 
differences between both that can be attributed to the competitive environment and 
primary fiduciary role of institutions. Chapter 6 also brings together financial, board, 
and CEO characteristics and analyses their impact on institutional and large 
investment over the GFC and the subsequent recovery period to test for greater 
expected vigilance and risk management. It tests the hypothesis that institutional 
investors, in their fiduciary capacity, focus on short term returns to be competitive in 
a volatile funds management industry affected by the GFC. Another gap in the 
literature is filled by analysing the uptake of private equity placements by 
institutional investors. In particular, urgent re-capitalization by A-REITs after the 
GFC onset is primarily made possible by these equity placements. Given that A-
REITs have an urgency to avoid insolvency by recapitalizing, there is potential for 
institutions have a greater balance of power, and to exert greater control over boards 
to restructure in a way that better fits the criteria of institutional investors. Chapter 6 
also investigates A-REIT attributes that attract billions of dollars of institutional 
equity funding, despite A-REITs appearing to be extremely volatile, loss-making 
ventures subsequent to the GFC onset. Investigation after GFC onset is compared to 
determinants over the entire period, and gives insight into how a major crisis 
influences large, risky equity placement decisions. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter presents the evolution and development of corporate finance 
theories as they apply to REITs and non-REIT companies. REITs are part of a 
specific industry that is bound by unique trust regulations. Whilst agency theory can 
be applied almost uniformly across all industries, pecking order and trade-off 
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theories need to be amended slightly when applied to the REIT industry to 
accommodate for differences in dividend pay-out rules and tax issues. The literature 
shows that managers make decisions that aim to maximize equityholder wealth, but 
managers also tend to look after their own interests when they are more powerful and 
monitoring is not as efficient as it could be. It is shown that the minimization of 
agency issues requires a trade-off between shareholder-manager incentive alignment 
and persistent efficient monitoring, both internally and externally. In equilibrium, 
any inefficiency of agency would be minimized for both equityholders and 
debtholders.  
Prior literature has contributed to the formal recognition of agency problems 
in government inquiries and corporate law. For example, the Australian Productivity 
Commission (2009) has investigated the magnitude of executive remuneration, 
whilst the Corporations Act (2001) has made several provisions for the protection of 
shareholders, including the enforcement of board spills and the mandating of specific 
information disclosure related to trading by large shareholders. The findings in this 
chapter will contribute to future research in the REIT industry for capital structure, 
fiduciary remuneration and institutional investment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST SECTOR 
IN AUSTRALIA 
 
3.1 DEFINING A-REITs 
 
Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) are indirect investment 
vehicles. From the perspective of investors, they are entities that purchase property 
assets and pool them to derive regular income (Block, 2002; Chan et al., 2003). They 
are securitised by directly funded underlying assets, and as such, investors own 
securities rather than the real assets within them. According to Liang and McIntosh 
(1998), the returns of both direct and indirect property investment have performed 
significantly differently from each other and should be categorised into separate asset 
classes. However, Mei and Lee (1994), and Ling and Naranjo (1999) continue their 
study more rigorously and conclude that direct property factors do contribute in 
explaining indirect property returns. A-REITs inherently contribute some advantages 
over direct property investment. According to Barkham and Geltner (1995;1996), 
and Seiler et al. (1999), indirect property reflects information on prices faster than 
traditional direct property appraisal, and can be aptly used as a short term market 
timing device (Stevenson, 2001a).  
The A-REIT industry is classified according to the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS tier 3) and is a classification in its own right; primarily 
separate from the equity investment market. This classification was formalised upon 
introduction of the 10 GICS sectors in July 2002 by Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI), and its inclusion as one of two further sector indices, split into 
property trust and non property trust financials (Standard & Poor’s Dow Jones 
Indices, 2012). The GICS classification system ‘differentiates itself from other 
statistical, pragmatic and economic based systems by focusing on the microstructure 
of companies, whilst taking a consumer-oriented approach’ (MSCI, 2013). It further 
allocates companies into sub-categories based on their primary core business 
activities. Figure 3.1.1 shows the major GICS classifications, and how they lead to 
the narrowest REIT category. 
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Figure 3.1.1: GICS Classification Leading to REITs 
 
CODE     SECTOR       SUBCODE     INDUSTRY SECTOR 
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from the Morgan Stanley GICS (2013). 
 
All equity investments generally have the goal of maximising returns. A-
REITs are no different, but are focused on income and capital growth derived 
specifically from providing real estate in which other forms of commerce take place, 
and income is usually distributed quarterly or semi-annually.  
A-REITs list on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) to gain more 
exposure and access to capital. By listing and being bound not only by the 
Corporations Act, but also by ASX listing rules, there is greater information flow to 
investors. This transparency promotes the raising (and reduction) of capital during 
future times when it is prudent to restructure balance sheets. A-REITs can be 
classified into several sub-categories based upon their purpose and geographical 
location of commerce. These categories, which were extracted from the core 
investment activities of the A-REIT sample in this thesis, include office, retail, 
residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, diversified and overseas. A-REITs 
that invest in overseas properties do so through a mix of different property types. 
10  ENERGY 
15  MATERIALS 
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Table 3.1.1 displays all A-REITs currently listed on the ASX. Tables 3.1.2 through 
to 3.1.9 show whether currently listed A-REITs are stapled (explained in Section 3.2) 
or stand alone units, along with their book investment, as measured by total assets. In 
each table, total investment by core activity is expressed as a percentage of the total 
book investment of all A-REITs listed on the ASX as of 30 June 2012.  
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Office A-REITs invest in office buildings, which are usually situated in major 
commercial hubs. Table 3.1.2 displays all dedicated office A-REITs that are listed on 
the ASX.  
 
Table 3.1.2: Office A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TOTAL ASSETS 
BROOKFIELD PRIME PROPERTY FUND BPA No $     843,400,000 
COMMONWEALTH PROPERTY OFFICE FUND CPA No $ 3,713,800,000 
INVESTA OFFICE FUND IOF Yes $ 2,502,600,000 
TRAFALGAR CORPORATE GROUP TGP Yes $       97,435,000 
  TOTAL $ 7,157,235,000 
  % TOTAL 5.07 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. 
Retail A-REITs invest in property used for general shopping and retail-
associated entertainment. Table 3.1.3 displays all listed retail A-REITs. 
 
Table 3.1.3: Retail A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TOTAL ASSETS 
CARINDALE PROPERTY TRUST CDP No $      673,480,000 
CENTRO RETAIL GROUP CER Yes -a 
CFS RETAIL PROPERTY TRUST GROUP CFX No $   8,434,100,000 
CHARTER HALL RETAIL REIT CQR No $   1,944,600,000 
FEDERATION CENTRES FDC Yes $   5,097,490,000 
SHOPPING CENTRES AUSTRALASIA  SCP Yes -b 
WESTFIELD GROUP WDC Yes $ 33,669,800,000 
WESTFIELD RETAIL TRUST WRT Yes $ 13,340,300,000 
  TOTAL $ 63,159,770,000 
  % TOTAL 46.98 % 
aIt is important to note that shares in Centro Retail Group (CER) were suspended from quotation after lodging court order documents with the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), approving a scheme of arrangement to aggregate its assets with Centro Australia 
Wholesale Fund and Centro DPF holding Trust. bShopping Centres Australasia Properties Group was listed after 30 June 2012, therefore its figures 
are not available. 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. 
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Residential A-REITs invest in housing, both general and retirement living 
complexes, as well as apartments, estates and their related infrastructure. Table 3.1.4 
displays all listed residential A-REITs. 
Table 3.1.4: Residential A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED             TOTAL ASSETS 
INGENIA COMMUNITIES GROUP INA Yes  $ 458,460,000 
  TOTAL  $ 458,460,000 
  % TOTAL 0.32 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. 
Commercial A-REITs include temporary holiday and resort accommodation, 
healthcare and education facilities, pubs and general entertainment complexes. Table 
3.1.5 displays all listed commercial A-REITs.  
Table 3.1.5: Commercial A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TOTAL ASSETS 
ALE PROPERTY GROUP LEP Yes $   847,760,000 
AUSTRALIAN EDUCATION TRUST AEU No $   357,530,000 
AUSTRALIAN SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE FUND AZF No $   102,950,000 
BWP TRUST BWP No $1,335,170,000 
GENERATION HEALTHCARE REIT GHC No $   207,680,000 
LANTERN HOTEL GROUP LTN No $   238,944,000 
  TOTAL $ 3,090,034,000 
  % TOTAL 2.19 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. 
Industrial A-REITs include property for warehousing and the production 
process, including offices within industrial parks. Table 3.1.6 displays all listed 
industrial A-REITs. 
Table 3.1.6: Industrial A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TOTAL ASSETS 
GOODMAN GROUP GMG Yes $ 8,219,900,000 
360 CAPITAL INDUSTRIAL FUND TIX No -a 
  TOTAL $ 8,219,900,000 
  % TOTAL 6.04 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. a360 Capital Industrial Fund was not listed as 
of 30 June 2012. 
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Agricultural A-REITs include land used for the production of organic 
material. This includes the primary production of wine, forestry, and other land based 
horticulture. Table 3.1.7 displays all listed agricultural A-REITs. 
Table 3.1.7: Agricultural A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TOTAL ASSETS 
AGRICULTURAL LAND TRUST AGJ No $ 87,142,000 
CHEVIOT KIRRIBILLY VINEYARD PROPERTY  CKP Yes -a 
COONAWARRA AUSTRALIA PROPERTY TRUST CNR No -a 
  TOTAL $ 87,142,000 
  % TOTAL 0.06 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. aBoth Cheviot Kirribilly Vineyard Property 
and Coonawarra Australia Property Trust were suspended from trading. 
 
It is important to note that serious issues surround both Cheviot Kirribilly 
Vineyard Property (CKP) and Coonawarra Australia Property Trust (CNR). At its 
own request, CKP shares were suspended from ASX quotation as of 23 February 
2010 under ASX Listing Rule 17.2 due to financing problems, and CKP resolved to 
appoint administrators on 22 March 2013. CNR also requested that their units be 
suspended from quotation under ASX Listing Rule 17.2 after voluntarily appointing 
administrators on 28 March 2012. Creditors of the trust voted to liquidate assets on 5 
September 2012 and the process has not yet been finalised (Australian Shareholders 
Association, 2013). 
Many A-REITs are diversified into several of the above categories to benefit 
by spreading risks developing within individual categories, geographic regions and 
economic regimes (Mueller & Ziering, 1992; Mueller, 1993; De Wit, 1997; Lee & 
Byrne, 1998), and to improve portfolio performance (Liang & McIntosh, 1998; 
Stevenson, 2001; Newell & Tan, 2003). Table 3.1.8 displays all diversified A-REITs. 
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Table 3.1.8: Diversified A-REITs 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TOTAL ASSETS 
ABACUS PROPERTY GROUP ABP Yes $  2,106,820,000 
ASPEN GROUP APZ Yes $     587,420,000 
AUSTRALAND PROPERTY GROUP ALZ Yes $  3,983,550,000 
BLACKWALL PROPERTY FUNDS LIMITED BWF No $       11,135,000 
CHALLENGER DIVERSIFIED PROPERTY GROUP CDI Yes $     880,380,000 
CHARTER HALL GROUP CHC Yes $     877,780,000 
CVC PROPERTY FUND CJT No $       33,171,470 
CROMWELL PROPERTY GROUP CMW Yes $  1,837,600,000 
DEXUS PROPERTY GROUP DXS Yes $  7,364,110,000 
GPT GROUP GPT Yes $   9,343,200,000 
GROWTHPOINT PROPERTIES AUSTRALIA GOZ Yes $   1,607,080,000 
MACARTHURCOOK PROPERTY SECURITIES FUND MPS No $        61,033,000 
MIRVAC GROUP MGR Yes $   8,410,600,000 
P-REIT PXT No $      121,852,000 
STOCKLAND SGP Yes $ 14,533,900,000 
TRINITY GROUP TCQ Yes $      124,256,000 
  TOTAL $ 51,883,887,470 
  % 
TOTAL 
36.73 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. 
These benefits were found to have been caused by differences in indirect 
property performance over continents (Eichholtz & Koedijk, 1996), large diversions 
in performance amongst emerging and developed markets (Barry et al., 1996), and 
lower correlations with international property compared to those of domestic share 
and bond returns (Eichholtz, 1996). There were also no long run co-integration 
effects found between Australian, U.S., and U.K. property markets (Wilson & 
Okunev, 1996;1999) and no linkages found between Australia, Japan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong in the Asia-Pacific region (Garvey et al., 2001).  
Table 3.1.9 displays A-REITs that invest in property, all of which is located 
overseas. 
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Table 3.1.9: A-REITs with 100% Overseas Investment 
A-REIT ASX 
CODE 
STAPLED INDUSTRY TOTAL ASSETS 
ASTRO JAPAN PROPERTY GROUP AJA Yes DIVERSIFIED $ 1,321,630,000 
GALILEO JAPAN TRUST GJT No DIVERSIFIED $    791,691,000 
MIRVAC INDUSTRIAL TRUST MIX No INDUSTRIAL $    227,437,000 
MULTIPLEX EUROPEAN PROPERTY FUND MUE No DIVERSIFIED $    336,971,000 
REAL ESTATE CAPITAL PARTNERS USA  RCU No DIVERSIFIED $    268,288,000 
RNY PROPERTY TRUST RNY No OFFICE $    478,530,000 
US MASTERS RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY  URF No RESIDENTIAL -a 
   TOTAL $3,424,547,000 
   % TOTAL  2.61 % 
Source: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database and 2012 annual reports. aURF was listed after 30 June 2012. 
 
Figure 3.1.2 shows a comparison of total combined listed A-REIT gross asset 
values with total net asset values and total market capitalisation. On average, the 
listed A-REIT sector trades at a discount to net asset value. 
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Figure 3.1.2: Relative A-REIT Size by Total Assets, Net Assets and 
Market Capitalisation 
  
 
 
 
Note: These figures are from the DatAnalysis Premium Database and are current as of 30 June 2012. They do not include A-REITs listed 
after 30 June 2012. 
TOTAL ASSETS ($137.48 Billion) Office $7.16 Billion 
Retail $63.16 Billion 
Residential $458 Million 
Commercial $3.09 Billion 
Industrial $8.22 Billion 
Agricultural $87 Million 
Diversified $51.88 Billion 
Overseas $3.42 Billion 
NET ASSETS ($82.096 Billion) Office $4.93 Billion 
Retail $36.83 Billion 
Residential $151 Million 
Commercial $1.74 Billion 
Industrial $5.17 Billion 
Agricultural $21 Million 
Diversified $32.57 Billion 
Overseas $681 Million 
MARKET CAPITALISATION ($79.594 Billion) Office $4.29 Billion 
Retail $40.44 Billion 
Residential $86 Million 
Commercial $1.66 Billion
Industrial $5.89 Billion 
Agricultural $11 Million 
Diversified $26.90 Billion 
Overseas $317 Million 
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In most A-REITs, there is a large discrepancy between the book value of 
equity and the market value of equity. When the market value of equity is lower than 
the book value of equity within any individual A-REIT, units or shares are being 
traded at a discount. If the situation reverses, they are being traded at a premium. 
Since the onset of the GFC in December 2007 (Dimovski, 2009), the A-REIT market 
has persistently traded at a discount, with only a handful of exceptions. Nearer 
towards the end of the 2012 financial year, a larger proportion has been trading at a 
premium. Current market value is largely determined by the present value of future 
earnings and how these stand relative to similar investments. Table 3.1.10 breaks 
down the market to book equity ratios by sector and shows the number of A-REITs 
trading at a premium for the 2012 financial year. 
    Table 3.1.10: A-REIT Market to Book Equity Values by Sector as of 30 June 2012 
SECTOR MARKET TO BOOK 
EQUITY RATIO 
PROPORTION OF A-REITs 
SELLING AT A PREMIUM 
OFFICE 0.8357 0 / 4 
RETAIL 0.9399 1 / 6 
RESIDENTIAL 0.5689 0 / 1 
COMMERCIAL 0.8300 2 / 6 
INDUSTRIAL  1.1384 1 / 1 
AGRICULTURAL 0.5153 0 / 1 
DIVERSIFIED 0.7748 2 / 16 
OVERSEAS 0.4671 0 / 6 
AVERAGE 0.7529 6 / 41          (14.63%) TOTAL 
Note: Calculated by the author using the DatAnalysis premium database and 2012 annual reports. Averages are 
weighted by number of A-REITs in each category, rather than by size, therefore the average market to book ratio 
is more conservative relative to the same ratio calculated from total dollar amounts in figure 3.1.2. A-REITs listed 
after 30 June 2012 are not included.  
Only the industrial sector appears to be trading at a premium as of 30 June 
2012, showing that investors are, on average, more optimistic about its future 
performance. Issues with agricultural A-REITs reflect market opinion, and overseas 
property is also reflecting stagnating conditions in Europe, the United States and 
Japan. It also appears that diversifying property investment presently does not 
necessarily assist with improving outlook, and the benefits of risk reduction may not 
hold much weight. Diversified A-REITs however, slightly exceed the average market 
to book equity ratio.  
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Investors providing equity are always assessing the likely performance of a 
potential investment, and potential lenders providing debt financing do the same. In 
the real world, A-REITs compete not only against each other for funds, but also 
against every other choice in the entire investment market. If the market is out of 
equilibrium, for example, demand for investments is low or the supply of 
investments is high, competition amongst A-REITs intensifies and there is pressure 
on the cost of capital to increase. Alternatively, if the value of assets falls and the 
cost of interest rises relative to earnings, the cost of capital needs to fall from an A-
REIT’s perspective. This mechanism was present during the GFC. Not only did A-
REITs have to try to appease investors’ expectations, but they also had to incorporate 
solvency and survival as their top priority. Due to this, the pressure outlet manifested 
itself in the tremendous decline in equity values. 
 
 
3.2 STRUCTURE OF A-REITs 
 
A-REITs are structured in two different ways. A stand alone trust uses its 
capital to invest in underlying property and the income and capital gains (or losses) 
are passed directly on to unitholders. Stapled trusts are combined into one vehicle 
with associated companies that provide specialist funds management or property 
development. Investors cannot trade the units in these trusts separately. The trust 
retains the property assets on its balance sheet whilst the related company engages in 
specialist activities. Both stapled securities are jointly quoted on the ASX and must 
be traded together as a bundle. The stapled security is owned in the same proportions 
by each investor. Distributions are paid either quarterly or semi-annually and the 
subsequent sale of listed units operates through brokerage services in the same way 
that shares are disposed of in a liquid way.  
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Figure 3.2.1: Distribution of Stapled and Unit Based A-REITs 
 
Note: Compiled by the author using the DatAnalysis Premium database as of 29 April 2013. 
 
A-REITs and other public trusts are not permitted to control an entity that 
carries out ineligible trading activities (European Public Real Estate Association 
Index, 2012). Thus by being stapled, the entity allows for internal management of the 
A-REIT. In this way, both the trust and corporate entities are owned by unitholders, 
and therefore, owners have a greater degree of control over the management of the 
trust itself. However, this type of blanket ownership-management has been 
counteracted to an extent, by responsible entities of A-REITs with underlying assets 
located offshore, tending to appoint external managers more frequently. This is, in 
itself, more efficient when the external manager may have contributed the initial 
asset base, or has superior knowledge concerning a property market offshore. 
 
 
3.3 DIVERSIFICATION 
 
A primary advantage of A-REIT investment from the perspective of unit 
holders is that it enables significant diversification across property types, tenants and 
their associated industries, and geographic locations, including in Australia and 
overseas. The stapling of securities has also enabled property investment to become 
diversified in terms of risk and returns. The securities of a development company 
may be stapled to a trust, exposing investors to both passive rental income and more 
risky entrepreneurial ventures.  
The rising diversification encompassing both development and offshore 
investment has been exacerbated by a scarcity of investment-grade Australian 
property and a great injection of capital from compulsory superannuation 
contributions. This has provided an opportunity for managers to search for foreign 
A-REIT BY TYPE 
Stapled 24 
Units 23 
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property to boost their current holdings. However, this also poses a risk, and requires 
thorough due diligence, given the perilous position of some economies, particularly 
in the euro zone. There also exist some inherent uncertainties on the international 
market, such as fluctuating exchange rates, taxation differences, and political 
uncertainty (Worzala & Newell, 1997). Despite these uncertainties and lack of 
regulatory harmonisation overseas, some studies have specified that diversification is 
the predominant factor for holding international property (Newell & Worzala, 1995; 
Worzala & Newell, 1997). In addition, the deregulation, economic integration and 
globalisation of property service providers have all increased information flow to 
investors, reducing any costs of uncertainty (McAllister, 1999). Figure 3.3.1 broadly 
shows the location of Australian listed property assets.  
Figure 3.3.1: Location of A-REIT Property Assets 
 
Note: Compiled by the author from the geographical location of A-REIT assets cited in the 2012 annual reports. 
 
Out of 47 A-REITs, 25 possess property only in Australia, and 40 A-REITs 
possess at least some of their assets in Australia. 22 A-REITs own a proportion of 
property overseas, whereas 7 A-REITs operate with all their property exclusively 
overseas. Figure 3.3.2 shows the number of A-REITs with property assets in 
Australian states and territories, whilst Figure 3.3.3 shows the number of A-REITs 
with property assets in various locations overseas. New Zealand and the US are 
foreign countries which have the largest portion of A-REIT assets. New Zealand has 
primarily Centro Retail, whilst Westfield Retail is largely based in the US. 
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Figure 3.3.2: Breakdown by State of Listed A-REIT Property in 
Australia
 
Note: Compiled by the author from the locations of A-REIT assets cited in the 2012 annual reports. 
Figure 3.3.3: Breakdown by Location of A-REIT International Property  
 
Note: Compiled by the author from the locations of A-REIT assets cited in the 2012 annual reports. 
 
 
3.4 RETURNS 
 
The ability of A-REITs to act as an inflation hedge is a contentious topic. 
Newell (1996) finds that vacancy rates reduce the ability of property to hedge against 
inflation, and this has become evident in the 10 year returns up to December 2011. 
The gross returns of direct residential investment property exceeds inflation by 5.1%, 
whereas global REITs fall short of inflation by 1.1% and A-REITs fall even shorter 
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by 2.5%. Figure 3.4.1 shows these results in comparison with other Australian 
investment classes. 
Figure 3.4.1: 10 Year Returns to 31 December 2011 
 
Source: ASX (http://asx.com.au) accessed 29 April 2013. 
 
Figure 3.4.2: Global REIT Returns 2008-2013 
 
Note: This figure is compiled using period average return data during 2008-2013 from the ASX and the Property Funds 
Association (accessed 29 April 2013). 
 
Figure 3.4.2 shows that the All Ordinaries Index (2.31%) (not shown) has 
out-performed the A-REIT Index (-3.71%) and Australian unlisted property trusts 
(UPTs) (1.55%) between 2008 and 2013. Growth in both has been steady, but the 
initial drop in prices after the GFC shock was the catalyst for this discrepancy. It is 
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argued that greater tangibility of assets within the property sector permitted greater 
borrowing. This led to a more urgent need for restructuring and re-capitalisation once 
the ability to pay interest obligations was compromised (Zarebski & Dimovski, 
2012). The magnitude of new equity issues, shareholder base dilution, and falls in 
asset values affected the initial depreciation of A-REIT securities to a greater extent. 
On an international basis, all other major REIT markets outperformed the A-REIT 
Index over 2008-2013. The Asia Pacific REIT Index (7.91%) 5 year annual return 
has performed best, with U.S. REITs (5.67%), and the Global REIT Index (3.87%), 
all exceeding the ASX A-REIT Index (-3.71%). 
On a more condensed three year annual return basis. A-REITs (12.65%) and 
A-UPTs (8.45%) performed better, but were still outperformed by the Asia Pacific 
REIT Index (21.23%), U.S. (17.42%) and global (16.75%) REIT indexes with no 
immediate impact of the GFC. 
On a short-term international comparison of one year returns, Asia Pacific 
REITs (41.39%) still outperformed the rest of the world, but A-REITs (32.98%) 
improved dramatically and have been outperforming global REITs (19.87%), U.S. 
REITs (15.14%), and A-UPTs (7.80%), which have all slowed in comparison. 
Overall, A-REITs were initially hit hardest by global instability, but after five years, 
have now managed to commence outperforming most global property indices. 
 
 
3.5 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE A-REIT SECTOR 
 
A-REITs have grown substantially since their formal introduction as a direct 
property investment alternative in 1971, with the introduction of General Property 
Trust, which was first listed for this purpose on the then ‘Australian Stock 
Exchanges’. A-REITs were previously invented by former Lend Lease founder, Dick 
Dusseldorp (Parker, 2011), predicated upon an idea known as the Massachusetts 
Trust (Chan et al., 2003), upon which the general REIT structure, globally, is based. 
The Massachusetts Trust came about because state laws at the time prevented 
corporations from owning property that was not directly related to core business 
operations. Favourable tax status was removed by the Supreme Court in 1935, which 
led to the death of REITs in that particular form. In 1960, U.S tax laws were 
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amended with the Real Estate Investment Trust Act (Simontacchi & Stoschek, 2011) 
to bring REITs into line with other funds. Prior to being mandated by the 
Corporations and Tax law, upon their introduction A-REITs were governed by the 
equitable principles of trust law (Parker, 2011).  
Until the collapse of the UPT sector in the early 1990’s, listed property trusts 
(LPTs) were considered inferior because UPTs bore the advantage of negative 
gearing tax concessions and liquidity. The share market crash in October 1987 
decimated market equity values and coaxed unitholders into the unlisted sector, 
where equity values were not as volatile. It was not long before the recession and 
associated property market crash were creating difficulty for the UPT market. UPT 
trust laws mandated that direct property assets be turned into cash within a 60 day 
redemption period. Finding themselves unable to comply, UPTs subsequently 
attempted to restructure and list on the ASX to create liquidity (Brenchley, 2001). 
The subsequent economic recovery, compulsory superannuation laws and capital 
provided by large life insurance companies created the catalyst for a new wave of 
growth (Brenchley, 2001).  
The Asian financial crisis created another boost for A-REITs in late 1997. 
With volatility increasing, large institutional investors were substituting much of 
their current investment for A-REITs, which were more tangible and perceived to be 
a safer option. Combined with debt-funded expansion on the back of relatively low 
interest rates, the listed property sector index jumped by 16% in mid 1998 
(Brenchley, 2001). Listed A-REITs were termed LPTs until March 2008, when the 
terminology was changed to bring them in line with the rest of the global real estate 
market. Currently, A-REITs comprise over 12% of the listed global property market. 
The listed A-REIT market is dynamic, with a large turnover of both listings and 
delistings relative to its size. Figure 3.5.1 shows the listing duration for all currently 
listed A-REITs. The median listing duration is 7.5 years as of 30 June 2013. 
 
Chapter Three: The Real Estate Investment Trust Sector in Australia 
70 
 
Figure 3.5.1: Breakdown of Listing Longevity as of 30 June 2013
 
Note: Compiled by the author using the DatAnalysis Premium database as of 29 April 2013.  
 
3.6 MERGER AND TAKEOVER LEGISLATION 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are an important element in any financial market 
because they create competition between company fiduciaries for the most efficient 
management of resources and assists in reducing agency issues (Jensen & Ruback, 
1983). Australia has regulatory bodies such as the Takeovers Panel, which aims to 
resolve disputes, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC), which prevents the significant gain of market power by merging entities. 
Unlike shareholders of corporate entities, prior to 2000 A-REIT unitholders were not 
protected from the power imbalance caused by creeping increases in other 
unitholders’ individual significant ownership.  
Specific takeover rules for managed investment schemes (MISs), which 
include listed A-REITs were enforced in March 2000 to reconcile laws applicable to 
companies. Any member is prohibited from gaining more than a 20% stake in a listed 
A-REIT without initiating a formal takeover offer or obtaining unitholders’ approval 
(Corporations Act 2001, s. 606). Substantial holders of units, owning greater than 5% 
total units issued, must disclose their interest publicly. When a scheme of 
arrangement is entered into, the trust constitution needs to be amended. In the case of 
a stapled entity, the scheme must be formally approved in court to satisfy the legal 
requirements for company ownership transfer. 
 The introduction of this legislation is important because it elicits greater 
disclosure of unitholders’ investments. Greater transparency ultimately increases 
investor confidence and promotes growth in the listed property market, which is seen 
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to be less risky to non controlling owners from an information perspective. 
Competition issues also have the potential to affect A-REITs. For example, two A-
REITs may consider merging. If they both invest in shopping centres that are 
geographically close, the merger may be expected to increase market power and 
subsequently increase leasing costs. In this case, businesses leasing the shopping 
centre space would be considered consumers (demanders of real estate), and a 
sufficient concentration of real estate supply could trigger objection to a merger. If 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) decide to disallow 
this merger, then it would have flow on benefits. One of these would accrue to the 
renters of the property, who would avoid probable rental increases, whilst an indirect 
benefit would accrue to the final consumers of goods and services, who would avoid 
having the cost of the increased rent passed on to them through higher prices. 
The A-REIT industry has been financially consolidated, with a high number 
of permitted mergers and acquisitions occurring. Tables 3.6.1 to 3.6.4 detail former 
publicly listed A-REITs that were delisted from the ASX since 2001.  
 
Table 3.6.1: A-REITs Delisted from the ASX 2001-2013 via Wind up, Liquidation or 
Deregistration 
A-REIT CODE TYPE LISTED DELISTED 
APN EUROPEAN RETAIL PROPERTY GROUP AEZ RETAIL 28 JULY 2005 4 SEPTEMBER 2012 
AUSTRALIAN HEALTHCARE INVESTMENT FUND AHF COMMERCIAL 30 APRIL 1970 14 DECEMBER 2001 
BROOKFIELD AUSTRALIAN OPPORTUNITIES FUND BAO DIVERSIFIED 8 JULY 2003 30 OCTOBER 2012 
CHIERON HOLDINGS LIMITED CHG COMMERCIAL 15 MAY 1986 30 AUGUST 2002 
CNPR GROUP CNP RETAIL 22 AUGUST 1997 1 FEBRUARY 2013 
FORESTECH LIMITED FOR N/A 31 OCTOBER 1988 30 AUGUST 2002 
GPT SPLIT TRUST GSTIN DIVERSIFIED 16 JULY 1993 12 OCTOBER 2005 
LV LIVING LTD LVL RESIDENTIAL 8 JULY 1993 30 OCTOBER 2010 
MACATHURCOOK ASIAN REAL ESTATE SEC FUND MSA DIVERSIFIED 11 APRIL 2007 16 APRIL 2009 
PRIME RETIREMENT AND AGED CARE TRUST  PTN RESIDENTIAL 3 AUGUST 2007 30 AUGUST 2012 
RUBICON AMERICA TRUST RAT COMMERCIAL 6 DECEMBER 2004 23 DECEMBER 2009 
RUBICON EUROPE TRUST GROUP REU COMMERCIAL 9 DECEMBER 2005 23 DECEMBER 2009 
RUBICON JAPANESE TRUST RJT COMMERCIAL 31 OCTOBER 2006 23 DECEMBER 2009 
TIMBERCORP PRIMARY INFRASTRUCTURE FUND TPF AGRICULTURAL 14 DECEMBER 2006 30 AUGUST 2010 
TISHMAN SPEYER OFFICE FUND TSO OFFICE 1 DECEMBER 2004 29 JUNE 2012 
Note: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database as of 20 March 2013. 
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Table 3.6.2: A-REITs Delisted from the ASX 2001-2013 via Removal by Own Request 
A-REIT CODE TYPE LISTED DELISTED 
BAKEHOUSE QUARTER FUND BQF DIVERSIFIED 30 OCTOBER 2002 15 JUNE 2007 
RCL GROUP RLG RESIDENTIAL 30 JUNE 2006 30 AUGUST 2012 
CENTRAL EQUITY LIMITED CEQ RESIDENTIAL 13 OCTOBER 1988 5 JULY 2006 
CHALLENGER KENEDIX JAPANESE TRUST CKT RETAIL 30 APRIL 2007 9 FEBRUARY 2010 
ESPLANADE PROPERTY FUND EPF INDUSTRIAL 20 SEPTEMBER 1993 19 FEBRUARY 2009 
KIWI INCOME PROPERTY TRUST KIT DIVERSIFIED 12 JANUARY 1998 12 SEPTEMBER 2003 
RECORD REALTY RRT OFFICE 20 DECEMBER 2002 1 SEPTEMBER 2009 
VALAD OPPORTUNITY FUND NO 11 VOF INDUSTRIAL 6 JULY 2004 13 JULY 2007 
Note: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database as of 20 March 2013. 
 
Table 3.6.3: A-REITs Delisted from the ASX 2001-2013 via Merger, Demerger, 
Acquisition or Scheme of Arrangement 
A-REIT CODE TYPE LISTED DELISTED 
AMP DIVERSIFIED PROPERTY TRUST ADP DIVERSIFIED 19 OCTOBER 1972 1 SEPTEMBER 2003 
CENTRO PROPERTIES GROUP CEP RETAIL 30 OCTOBER 1985 18 MARCH 2005 
COLONIAL FIRST STATE PROPERTY TRUST GROUP CFT DIVERSIFIED 20 DECEMBER 1999 8 OCTOBER 2002 
COLONIAL FIRST STATE INDUSTRIAL PROP TRUST CIP INDUSTRIAL 9 MARCH 1972 8 OCTOBER 2002 
COLONIAL FIRST STATE RETAIL PROPERTY TRUST CMF RETAIL 8 NOVEMBER 1984 8 OCTOBER 2002 
COLONIAL FIRST STATE COMMERCIAL PROP TRUST COC COMMERCIAL 31 MAY 1999 8 OCTOBER 2002 
CHARTER HALL OFFICE REIT CQO OFFICE 9 DECEMBER 1993 1 MAY 2012 
CENTRO SHOPPING AMERICA TRUST CSF RETAIL 24 OCTOBER 2003 31 OCTOBER 2007 
CHALLENGER WINE TRUST CWT AGRICULTURAL 2 JULY 1999 14 FEBRUARY 2011 
ING INDUSTRIAL FUND IIF INDUSTRIAL 28 NOVEMBER 1991 31 MARCH 2011 
INVESTA PROPERTY GROUP IPG DIVERSIFIED 28 MAY 1992 14 SEPTEMBER 2007 
JAMES FIELDING GROUP JFG DIVERSIFIED 11 DECEMBER 1979 17 FEBRUARY 2005 
LEND LEASE PRIMELIFE GROUP LLP RESIDENTIAL 6 JUNE 1991 24 DECEMBER 2009 
MACQUARIE GOODMAN INDUSTRIAL TRUST MGI INDUSTRIAL 5 JULY 1995 9 FEBRUARY 2005 
MACQUARIE GOODMAN MANAGEMENT LIMITED MGM INDUSTRIAL 25 JUNE 1987 9 FEBRUARY 2005 
MACARTHURCOOK INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY FUND MIF INDUSTRIAL 5 DECEMBER 2007 8 OCTOBER 2010 
MACQUARIE PROLOGIS TRUST MPR INDUSTRIAL 26 JUNE 2002 16 JULY 2007 
MIRVAC REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST MRZ DIVERSIFIED 23 AUGUST 1996 11 DECEMBER 2009 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE FUND POF OFFICE 8 APRIL 1993 16 JULY 2004 
PELORUS PROPERTY GROUP LIMITED PPI RETAIL 20 JULY 2006 10 JANUARY 2011 
TOURISM & LEISURE TRUST TLT COMMERCIAL 7 AUGUST 1997 1 FEBRUARY 2007 
VALAD PROPERTY GROUP VPG INDUSTRIAL 13 DECEMBER 2002 31 AUGUST 2011 
WESTFIELD AMERICA TRUST WFA RETAIL 3 JULY 1996 12 AUGUST 2004 
WESTFIELD TRUST WFT RETAIL 1 JULY 1982 2 JULY 2004 
WESTPAC OFFICE TRUST WOT OFFICE 14 SEPTEMBER 2009 5 AUGUST 2010 
WESTFIELD HOLDINGS LIMITED WSF RETAIL 1 JANUARY 1960 2 JULY 2004 
Note: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database as of 20 March 2013. 
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Table 3.6.4: A-REITs Delisted from the ASX 2001-2013 via Compulsory Acquisition 
A-REIT CODE TYPE LISTED DELISTED 
ADVANCE HEALTHCARE GROUP LIMITED AHG COMMERCIAL 21 MAY 1997 1 JULY 2004 
AUSTRALIAN HOTEL FUND AHO COMMERCIAL 2 OCTOBER 1996 14 NOVEMBER 2007 
AMP INDUSTRIAL TRUST AIP INDUSTRIAL 16 MARCH 1994 9 OCTOBER 2003 
AMP SHOPPING CENTRE TRUST ART RETAIL 7 NOVEMBER 1997 7 AUGUST 2003 
EDT RETAIL TRUST EDT RETAIL 26 NOVEMBER 2003 6 SEPTEMBER 2011 
GRAND HOTEL GROUP GHG COMMERCIAL 12 AUGUST 1996 9 MAY 2007 
IPOH LIMITED IPH RETAIL 21 JULY 1988 8 JULY 2003 
LIVING AND LEISURE GROUP LLA COMMERCIAL 14 MAY 1999 19 APRIL 2012 
MTM ENTERTAINMENT TRUST MME COMMERCIAL 16 MARCH 1999 27 SEPTEMBER 2007 
MULTIPLEX GROUP MXG DIVERSIFIED 2 DECEMBER 2003 19 DECEMBER 2007 
OAK HOTELS AND RESORTS LIMITED OAK COMMERCIAL 3 JANUARY 2006 10 OCTOBER 2011 
ONYX PROPERTY GROUP ONX OFFICE 10 DECEMBER 1996 13 DECEMBER 2004 
PRINCIPAL AMERICA OFFICE TRUST PAO OFFICE 14 DECEMBER 1999 25 NOVEMBER 2004 
PRUDENTIAL INVESTMENT COMPANY  PIA DIVERSIFIED 22 JULY 1970 19 NOVEMBER 2003 
RABINOV PROPERTY TRUST RBV DIVERSIFIED 12 AUGUST 2003 8 AUGUST 2011 
S8 PROPERTY TRUST SPR COMMERCIAL 12 JULY 2005 6 JULY 2007 
SEA WORLD PROPERTY TRUST SWD COMMERCIAL 6 FEBRUARY 1986 24 APRIL 2002 
THAKRAL HOLDINGS LIMITED THG COMMERCIAL 17 JUNE 1994 19 OCTOBER 2012 
Note: Compiled by the author from the DatAnalysis Premium database as of 20 March 2013. 
 
Figure 3.6.1 shows a breakdown of delisted A-REITs into those that merged 
(or demerged), were removed from listing, or subsequently liquidated. 
 
Figure 3.6.1: Fate of A-REITs after Delisting 
 
Note: This figure is compiled from DatAnalysis Premium and the Australian Shareholders Association website at delisted.com.au as 
of 30 June 2013. 
 
There appears to be a distinct separation between motivations for delisting. 
Prior to the GFC, a relatively stable and high-growth economy had spurned 
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13 between 2008 and 2013. This is expected since mergers tend to be synonymous 
with a boom period (Combs, 2009) to consolidate rising earnings and eliminate 
duplicated fixed costs. The economic recovery since 2010 again saw the rise of 
mergers as very low unit prices became good value to bidders. The opposite trend is 
seen with liquidations. There were only 4 of these between 2001 and 2007, whereas 
there were 11 between 2008 and 2013. Figure 3.6.2 shows the duration between the 
listing and delisting of all A-REITs delisted between 2001 and 2013. A total of 53% 
of delisted A-REITs were listed for at least nine years compared to 21% for the ASX, 
whilst 36% of delisted A-REITs were listed for at least 15 years (14% for the ASX), 
and 7% of delisted A-REITs were listed for at least 30 years (6% for the ASX).  
There were 5,952 delistings from the ASX between 1975 and 2004 (Lew & Ramsay, 
2006), making the turnover of A-REITs between 2001 and 2012 relatively 
conservative. As a percentage of the average number of A-REITs listed between 
2001 and 2012, 119% were delisted, whilst the figure was 150% for the entire ASX. 
Of total ASX delistings, 61% occurred within the resources, miscellaneous industrial, 
and banks, investment and financial Sectors.  
When put into context, listed entities provide liquidity for investors to readily 
buy and sell. This reduces an element of investment risk compared to unlisted 
entities. As seen in Table 3.6.1, delisting is a natural progression following the stated 
broad events, but it is the underlying cause that can have both positive and negative 
effects on equity holders. The worst scenario is the failure of an A-REIT upon which 
investors may lose all of their capital, and the best case is a takeover which could 
result in a large premium for target equityholders selling their stake. Nevertheless, 
both scenarios cause volatility and it is important for potential investors to be aware 
of the typical survival rates in the industry before choosing to purchase units. For 
example, risk averse investors would prefer liquidity, proven capability and 
longevity. A long listing period also shows that A-REITs have been able to adapt to 
changing economic conditions. On rare occasions, radical restructuring may have 
taken place, with heavy resulting losses to unitholders (e.g. the CNPR Group), but 
listing longevity generally indicates an ability to remain profitable and large enough 
to warrant expending annual recurring listing costs. 
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Figure 3.6.2: Listing Duration of Delisted A-REITs 
 
Note: Compiled by the author using the DatAnalysis Premium database as of June 30 2013. 
 
The median listing duration for this cohort of A-REITs is 11 years. There also 
appears to be somewhat of a legacy of inability to maintain profitability and 
solvency, as explained in the following section. 
  
 
3.7 GFC 
 
3.7.1 The Increase in Risk 
 
The A-REIT sector has experienced some significant changes over the last 
decade. One of these has been the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), mandated for reporting periods commencing in 2005 (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2004). These changes allowed companies to report 
unrealised gains to assets as income, leading to the semblance of higher A-REIT 
profitability, on the back of increasing property revaluations. Relatively low interest 
rates at the time also enabled A-REITs to increase debt levels. They were also 
pursuing nontraditional income streams such as mezzanine lending, development and 
funds management. 
Due to the favourable financial conditions, an increase in property purchases 
overall led to inflated values and enabled A-REITs to secure further debt against 
their inflated property values. Without serious consideration of contrary economic 
conditions, these unsustainable practices were developing into a risky status quo, 
leaving the industry exposed to high risk. Table 3.7.1 shows the movement in debt 
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ratios for all listed A-REITs after the GFC’s onset, whilst Table 3.7.2 shows the 
average post GFC debt ratios by A-REIT sector.  
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Table 3.7.1: Debt Ratios of Currently Listed A-REITs 
A-REIT Code 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ABP 43.8 31.5 26.7 31.7 47.4 
AGJ 63.3 69.9 69.3 68.7 75.5 
LEP 69.8 70.5 63.6 60.7 63.1 
APZ 41.8 35.4 39.9 34.6 57.8 
AJA 63.6 73.5 79.6 79.0 80.4 
ALZ 48.6 35.6 37.6 42.7 42.7 
AEU 54.5 59.1 50.4 41.5 40.5 
AZF N/A N/A N/A 39.2 37.4 
BWP 34.8 26.7 22.8 20.6 27.0 
BPA 67.1 80.3 70.3 59.5 72.8 
BWF N/A N/A N/A 13.9 17.1 
CDP 12.8 13.7 14 20.5 33.7 
CER 40.8 76.4 70.4 43.4 N/A 
CFX 30.4 32.0 34.3 31.3 30.6 
CDI 38.8 43.9 24.9 30.3 33.4 
CHC 38.7 5.7 16.7 18.4 13.8 
CQR 34.0 47.2 43.2 18.3 13.8 
CKP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CJT 72.5 78.6 87.8 80.4 69.0 
CPA 31.6 32.5 26.8 29.9 27.0 
CNR 55.5 62.9 81.0 86.5 N/A 
CMW 47.7 58.7 55.4 54.2 57.1 
DXS 37.6 38.4 36.4 33.6 32.0 
FDC N/A N/A N/A 39.3 34.3 
GJT 62.8 79.7 83.7 87.3 88.7 
GHC 69.5 73.0 61.1 62.1 64.7 
GMG 51.5 56.0 37.9 33.7 37.0 
GPT 47.7 27.2 28.7 26.9 26.4 
GOZ 61.0 82.6 58.2 59.8 54.4 
LTN 60.5 66.4 73.4 57.4 56.6 
IOF 34.7 39.0 19.9 19.5 23.0 
INA 52.8 72.0 77.7 72.7 67.0 
MPS 33.8 40.6 37.7 32.3 13.5 
MGR 41.1 33.9 30.8 38.8 31.6 
MIX 62.7 84.5 89.5 83.4 70.2 
MUE 66.3 87.6 82.6 79.4 92.1 
RCU 66.3 74.9 72.4 63.0 65.6 
RNY 10.8 3.2 76.3 78.9 69.3 
PXT N/A N/A N/A N/A 62.6 
SCP N/A N/A N/A N/A 34.7 
SGP 42.1 39.9 38.8 39.6 43.4 
TGP 47.3 57.3 52.8 31.2 35.8 
TCQ 42.5 70.2 78.5 61.0 38.6 
TIX N/A N/A N/A N/A 69.0 
URF N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.4 
VLW 61.0 62.0 55.5 38.4 42.0 
WDC 55.4 48.5 53.3 53.8 53.7 
WRT N/A N/A N/A 22.3 22.0 
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Table 3.7.2: Average Debt Ratios, by Sector, of Currently Listed A-REITs, 
2008-2012 
SECTOR 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
OFFICE 38.3 42.5 49.2 43.8 45.6 
RETAIL 34.7 43.6 43.0 32.7 31.8 
RESIDENTIAL 56.9 67.0 66.6 55.6 54.5 
COMMERCIAL 51.7 59.1 54.3 46.9 48.2 
INDUSTRIAL 57.1 70.3 63.7 58.6 58.7 
AGRICULTURAL 59.4 66.4 75.2 77.6 75.5 
DIVERSIFIED 49.8 52.1 50.9 47.7 48.4 
INTERNATIONAL 55.4 67.2 80.7 78.5 77.7 
AVERAGE TOTAL 48.7 53.1 52.8 47.0 46.1 
Note: Compiled by the author from A-REIT annual reports. 
 
Figure 3.7.1: Average Debt Ratios across All A-REIT Sectors, 2008-2012 
 
Note: Compiled by the author from A-REIT annual reports 
 
One of the first events that signaled trouble in the A-REIT industry occurred 
in late 2007, when Centro Properties Group issued an announcement that they were 
about to experience increased financing costs, and were renegotiating an overdue 
$1.3 billion loan. This was prohibiting payment of a distribution to unitholders for 
the second half of the year ending 31 December 2007. Dimovski (2009) and 
Cummins and Zochling (2011) assert that this signal greatly changed the risk profile 
of A-REITs and therefore had major implications for the cost of capital to the sector. 
Chikolwa (2008a;2008b) also points out that the commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS) market was a vital debt funding option for A-REITs. However, 
the sub-prime mortgage market catastrophe in the United States catalysed a 
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significant credit crunch to the global financial system and the perception of 
significantly increased risk in lending to REITs, including A-REITs. 
Figure 3.7.1, shows that despite all sector debt ratios increasing up to 2009, 
A-REITs were actively trying to reduce debt, not only in terms of reducing interest 
repayments in the face of declining earnings, but also due to the availability of credit 
diminishing after 2007 and the prospect of creditors making calls on borrowings. The 
value of property assets was decreasing, obscuring the debt policies that A-REITs 
were putting into place, and indeed, the debt ratios themselves. After 2010, the entire 
industry commenced growing once again, but debt levels remained relatively steady. 
The larger capitalised pool of A-REITs in the retail sector seems to have managed 
debt well, and maintained their place as the lowest geared sector. A major reason for 
this was their ability to attract equity funding. In particular, 2009 was a year in which 
A-REITs were issuing securities en-masse after realising the impact of the GFC on 
their assets, as well as debt funding. On a global scale, current A-REIT debt levels 
are relatively conservative compared to debt levels of commercial property in 
general. Figure 3.7.2 shows international commercial property debt levels at the 
height of the GFC outfall in 2009, and then again at the end of 2011. 
 
Figure 3.7.2: Commercial Property Debt Levels Internationally 
  
Note: Extracted from UBS Global Asset Management, Global Real Estate Research and Strategy as of 3 July 2013. 
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3.8 RAISING EQUITY 
 
In Australia, listed entities were restricted to issuing no more than 10% of 
issued capital in any 12 month period but this was increased to 15% for all listed 
companies since 1998. Shareholder approval is required if more than 15% is sought 
to be raised by private placement (Dimovski & O’Neill, 2012).  
 A prior discounting limit of 10% for placements by registered schemes was 
also relaxed to enable greater flexibility in raising capital. Previously, an A-REIT’s 
constitution had to be amended to discount proposals larger than 10% (ASIC, 2009). 
ASIC justified its proposal by noting that individual entities were in a better position 
to find equilibrium between any dilution effects of discounting and the benefits of 
urgent capital injection. An efficient market is then able to fairly price an issue, 
especially when pricing is time sensitive within a volatile environment. The 
constitution of a listed A-REIT must provide for the consideration payable in the 
purchase of units, which can be independently verified (Corporations Act. 2001, 
Section 601GA (1) (a)). However, discretionary pricing may be permitted for 
placements that are not offered to a responsible entity or its associates. It may also be 
permitted for rights issues and distribution reinvestment plans when a proposed 
discount does not exceed that specified in the constitution. Tables 3.8.1a and 3.8.1b 
show a breakdown by year of A-REIT equity capital issues, public offers, private and 
institutional placements, and issues for any other investment type between 2001and 
2012, not including dividend reinvestment schemes subsequent to listing.   
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Figure 3.8.1 shows currently listed A-REITs and their equity issues after 
listing between 2001 and 2012. Data were originally extracted from announcements, 
both on the ASX and DatAnalysis. Issues include rights issues, private and 
institutional placements, public issues, and other issues used as consideration for any 
type of investment. Issues intended to act as incentives for management and staff, 
and dividend reinvestment schemes (DRS) are not included to separate ongoing 
earnings distribution decisions from isolated equity raising events. 
 
    Figure 3.8.1: Existing A-REIT Equity Issues Post Listing, 2001-2012 
 
 
 
Note: Compiled by the author from DatAnalysis Premium Database. 
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3.8.1 Private Placements 
 
ASX Listing Rules 7.1 and 7.2 broadly restrict listed entities from making 
placements of more than 15% of the amount of capital that an entity can issue 
privately in any one year without shareholder approval. It is suggested that private 
placements show a positive wealth effect for existing shareholders (e.g. Wruck 1989, 
Hertzel and Smith 1993, Krishnamurthy et al. 2005, and Wruck and Wu 2009). 
Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) explore whether there are positive share price effects, 
and suggest that there are no significant positive wealth effects for the existing 
shareholders, but rather existing A-REIT shareholders, A-REITs and investment 
banks associated with these placements are not on average significantly worse off in 
terms of wealth (and share price) in the short term. During the last decade to June 
2009, there were 27 private placements, 11 during the GFC and 16 before it. The 
process of private placement is faster than that of formal rights issues, and is 
expected to reduce the wealth of non-participating unitholders through dilution and 
the discount offered. 
 
 
3.8.2 Rights Issues 
 
Rights issues are offers of equity made by companies to existing shareholders 
at a discount to the prevailing price, according to the proportion already owned by 
them. The issues can be renounceable or non renounceable, the former containing a 
valuable option to be sold to a third party. The latter can only be exercised by 
existing shareholders. If the offer is not taken up, the issues subsequently lose some 
value due to the dilution of their proportional ownership in the company after other 
shareholders have increased theirs.  
During the previous decade to 2009, rights issues raised approximately $22 
billion of capital (Dimovski, 2011), of which A-REITs represented 85% of the 
issuing listed property entities. Over this period, A-REITs averaged an offer price 
discount of 9.5% (Dimovski, 2010), which is half the discount offered by mining and 
industrial companies, and also exhibited three quarters of the underwriting costs 
compared to these two sectors (Owen & Suchard, 2008). ASIC granted class order 
relief so that members are permitted to further subscribe to any shortfall in rights that 
other members have not taken advantage of. This seems to align with ASX listing 
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rule 10.11, which exempts member approval in issuing securities to underwriters 
when necessary. 
 
3.9 CORPORATIONS LAW AND A-REITs 
 
3.9.1 General Responsible Entity Obligations 
 
A listed A-REIT must be registered as a managed investment scheme (MIS). To be a 
scheme, the following criteria must be fulfilled: 
-The listed A-REIT requires an RE, which must be a registered Australian public 
company to manage the scheme (Corporations Act 2001, S 601FA). The RE must act 
as both trustee and manager. It remains liable for the actions of any agents it appoints 
in its role of overseeing the MIS. The RE must hold an Australian Financial Services 
Licence and as a condition of this licence, control a minimum of $5 million worth of 
net tangible assets or hold a guarantee such that this amount is attained (SIS Act 
1993, s26, 123). Net tangible assets in this context amount to total assets, less total 
liabilities and intangible assets. An RE can be appointed or removed by ordinary 
unitholder resolution. 
-A compliance plan and constitution needs to be lodged with ASIC. The constitution 
must outline the rules and regulations of the scheme, whilst the compliance plan 
outlines the ways in which the RE will comply with the Corporations Act and 
constitution. 
-A compliance committee must be established to monitor the scheme and report to 
the RE and occasionally to ASIC. The committee must be assembled if the majority 
of RE directors are not considered external. 
-A plan for holding scheme property must be drawn up. This property must be held 
in trust for scheme members by the RE if it complies with the minimum asset 
requirements test. Otherwise, it has an option to appoint an alternative custodian that 
does meet this criterion. 
-Managers must act in the best interests of unitholders and for a proper purpose. The 
RE must also have procedures in place to deal with conflicts of interest and give 
preference to investors over itself if conflicts happen to arise. 
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-A product disclosure statement (PDS) is required that provides disclosures 
mandated by the Corporations Act, including the material benefits, risks, dispute 
resolution procedures, and tax implications of entering into the investment. This 
applies to an offer made to retail investors under an initial public offer. The PDS 
must include a prescribed fee template, financial forecasts, historical information, 
and any other material facts readily understandable by investors. If a PDS does not 
contain the required information, and the RE has not taken reasonable steps to ensure 
compliance, they could be liable to prosecution. 
As a legitimate MIS, A-REITs need to undertake a ‘substantial’ proportion of 
their investment activities in Australia, using Australian assets. The word 
‘substantial’ is not quantified in the Corporations Act, but investments in specific 
properties need to adhere to the trust deed, and must be fully disclosed to investors. 
Public, listed A-REITs must also satisfy an activity test to show that their primary 
purpose is to derive rent. This is further quantified in the Income Tax Assessment 
Act (1936) by means of the Safe Harbour Rule, which allows up to 25% of income to 
be derived by non-passive rental means. This was introduced to remove uncertainty 
regarding previously unquantified non-passive investment activity. Satisfying this 
test is one eligibility criterion to avoid the withholding of corporate taxes. Another 
criterion involves the payment of earnings to unitholders and is explained in Section 
3.11. 
A-REITs must not be closely held by their unitholders, such that more than 
75% of its units must not be owned by 20 or less individuals within a retail trust. It is 
common for A-REITs to be majority owned by institutional investors, where 
ownership is technically widely distributed, albeit controlled by only a handful of 
institutional fund managers. 
 
 
3.9.2 Foreign Investment in A-REITs 
 
In cases where there is substantial foreign interest in Australian land, an 
urban corporation or a trust, a notice must be given to the Foreign Investment 
Review Board, which is mandated by the Foreign Acquisition and Takeovers Act 
1975 (Cth) (FATA). The term ‘substantial’ here is defined in Section 9A as meaning 
15% or more for a single foreigner, or 40% or more in aggregate for several 
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foreigners or their associates. There are several exemptions broadly pertaining to 
prior approval from developers, residential purchases within integrated tourist 
resorts, direct purchases from the government, and to special family court orders. 
Approval by the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) is generally not necessary 
for foreign purchases of agricultural land, which can be distinguished from approval 
needed for purchases of urban land. A private bill imposing restrictions on the size of 
agricultural land purchases by foreigners has presently not been enacted. 
A-REITs owning property in Australia are adversely affected by these rules 
because they effectively inhibit a portion of foreign demand and therefore have the 
potential to decelerate price appreciations in the secondary market. Placements to 
private foreign consortiums may also be hindered. Given Australia’s better economic 
performance relative to the rest of the world during the GFC, and the increased 
inflow of foreign capital, the mass equity raisings by A-REITs in 2009 may not have 
been fully efficient. A reduction in foreign ownership restrictions over this period 
would have permitted the A-REIT sector to take full advantage of all sources of 
capital. Most critical, however, was the need to restructure and attract equity capital 
when debt finance was scarce. Higher realised foreign investor demand may have 
resulted in less excessive underpricing and therefore a lower cost of equity capital.  
 
 
3.10 ASX LISTING RULES AND A-REITs 
 
Currently, 47 A-REITs are listed on the ASX, including three that have been 
suspended. The primary benefit in listing is to enable liquidity in buying and selling 
units by members. An active secondary market also acts as incentive for initial 
purchasers of units. The ASX has prescribed the following rules and tests that must 
be met prior to listing: 
-A spread test whereby an A-REIT must have at least 400 unitholders with a 
minimum of $2,000 each;  
-An assets test whereby assets must total at least $15 million, of which at least half is 
committed to investment; 
-A listed A-REIT must be registered as an MIS; 
Chapter Three: The Real Estate Investment Trust Sector in Australia 
88 
 
-A listed A-REIT must not be able to allow its investors to withdraw from the 
scheme, effectively redeeming an interest; 
-A listed A-REIT’s structure and operations will be scrutinised by the ASX, 
particularly management and ownership arrangements with pre-emptive rights; 
-Co-ownership arrangements must be disclosed in the PDS, including any rights a 
co-owner has to acquire assets, which must have the ability to be exercised at market 
value; 
-A listed A-REIT is able to employ a separate manager in cases where material assets 
or specific expertise is brought by them to an initial public offering. Although the 
ASX imposes limits on the longevity of this management, an ASX draft paper has 
proposed greater flexibility, albeit mandated by greater disclosure requirements 
(ASX, 2007b). 
In addition, rules that apply to presently listed A-REITs are construed as follows: 
-No more than 15% of a listed A-REIT’s securities may be issued in any 12 month 
period without unitholder approval. Some exemptions apply for issues under 
distribution reinvestment plans and for pro rata issues. This prohibits an entity from 
excessively diluting its unitholder base and causing the loss of existing unit value; 
-Interests to any related party may not be issued without the approval of unitholders. 
Related parties are also not permitted to acquire or dispose of an asset in a 
transaction with the entity if the asset is considered to be material by exceeding 5% 
of the entity’s equity value, as reported in the most recent accounts; 
-A listed A-REIT is prevented from significantly changing the nature or magnitude 
of its operations without informing the ASX, where unit holder approval may need to 
be sought; 
-Fees and performance bonuses may be payable using units as consideration. This 
should be specified in the constitution and may require an ASX waiver; 
-Voluntary delisting is not permitted by the RE without unitholder approval; 
-Revised Corporate Governance Principles, effective 1 January 2008 have focused on 
disclosure, such as director independence and internal control mechanisms. These are 
not mandatory, but listed A-REITs must include a statement in their annual reports 
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disclosing how these principles have been adhered to. If they have not been followed, 
an explanation must be provided detailing the reasons (ASX, 2007a). 
 
 
3.11 A-REIT TAXATION 
 
Despite stapled units being treated as one whole when trading, an A-REIT 
and its associated company otherwise retain their individual legal status. When 
considering the tax issues of individual unitholders, any dividends or distributions 
received are recorded separately, as are the capital gains events created from the sale 
of units. A-REITs have a high proportion of tangible assets and are able to expense 
depreciation to a large extent. Subsequent tax concessions are awarded to unitholders 
such that a large proportion of any tax liabilities, anywhere between 15% and 100% 
may be deferred to a time when units are sold. The effect will be a reduction in the 
cost base for capital gains tax purposes. Although this will inflate any future capital 
gains, it has the advantage of maintaining the time value of money such that annual 
tax obligations that are usually foregone will be retained when their purchasing (or 
investing) power is highest for unitholders.  
When determining the cost base of a stapled security, A-REITs provide 
information regarding the original apportionment between the trust and the company 
of the issuing price. In the case of a merger or takeover, there are generally no capital 
gains tax implications when a scrip for scrip transaction is initiated. If the scrip being 
received contains stapled securities, these must be replacing equity that has been 
forfeited by unitholders. In this sense, a rollover can occur without an immediate tax 
obligation being imposed. 
A-REITs are required to pay 100% of earnings out to unitholders in order to 
avoid paying corporate taxes. If any earnings from the trust structure are retained, the 
highest marginal tax rate of 45% is payable on them. Stapled A-REITs that also carry 
on a business such as property development must pay corporate tax, and they must 
also withhold a tax of 30% on distributions from the company which has been 
stapled to the trust, to be received by non Australian residents on Australian 
investments. In contrast, typically UPTs that are not classified as MISs or public 
entities can still retain the benefit of earnings flow through and not have corporate 
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tax withheld, despite engaging in trading activities such as property development.  If 
an investor has recorded an overseas address, and is not in an information exchange 
country, then the Australian Taxation Office will be able to claim the tax withheld. 
However, a foreign resident has the right to request a refund from the full amount 
withheld if residency is within an information exchange country, of which there are 
presently 60 (Commonwealth Consolidated Regulations, 2013). In this case, the tax 
liability will be 15%, having increased on 1 July 2012 from 7.5%. Otherwise, the 
withholding tax rate is currently 30%. 
At the state level, generally, no duties are currently payable for the transfer of 
units in listed A-REITs, but in cases where units consist of property sourced in a 
particular state, duties may be applied at individual state’s rates. With respect to 
unlisted trusts, duties of up to 6.75% must be paid for any unit transfers. 
 
 
3.12 A-REIT INDEXATION 
 
The A-REIT-specific index was launched in July 2002; approximately a year 
after Standard & Poor’s took over indexing responsibilities from the ASX. The 
industry was previously included within the financials sector, but this was divided 
into property trust and non-property trust financials. Only entities classified as being 
domestic are included. To be considered domestic, A-REITs need to be: 
-Incorporated in Australia and traded on the ASX; or 
-Incorporated overseas but have an exclusive listing on the ASX; or 
-Incorporated overseas and traded on overseas markets, but with most of the   
trading occurring on the ASX (ASX, 2013). 
It is indexed according to Standard & Poor’s ASX 200 A-REIT Index and the 
ASX 300 A-REIT Index, is a GICS tier 3 classification with ASX ticker codes XPJ 
and XPK respectively, Bloomberg ticker codes AS51 Prop and AS52 Prop, and 
Reuters ticker codes AXPJ and AXPK. 
As of 30 June 2012, the ASX 200 A-REIT Index had an index value of 
877.11 points, which is modest in comparison to its peak of 2,489 points on 11 
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October, 2007. At its lowest point, the index figure was 546 points on 9 March 2009. 
There are 13 A-REITs currently included in the EPREA and A-REITs make up 
9.36% of the global REIT market (EPREA, 2012). 
 
 
3.13 UNLISTED AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY TRUSTS 
 
UPTs are an alternative investment to A-REITs with certain advantages, such 
as reduced volatility. Since UPTs are not securities exchange traded, they are 
significantly less susceptible to short-term market price movements, and are priced 
according to underlying assets. The two types of UPTs are open-ended funds (OEF) 
and fixed-term close ended trusts (FTCET). Both types are able to issue debt, whilst 
having a structure that limits any liability to the value of the units (or the underlying 
property). OEFs may continually offer units to assist the purchase of underlying 
property. Since they lack the market liquidity of listed A-REITs, they may have cash 
resources consisting of cash reserves and new investors’ funds to pay out exiting 
investors. Managers have the option of selling properties to make cash available for 
unitholders selling units. In addition, OEFs also have the advantage of stamp duty 
exemptions when units are transacted, although stamp duty is generally deducted 
from distributions when properties are purchased. The GFC, however, diminished 
their liquidity, whereby exiting investors could not be guaranteed cash in exchange 
for their units. Another pitfall is that the trust manager has discretion over the types 
of property purchased. 
FTCET are syndicated investments that have a finite life. At expiry, 
unitholders have the option to continue the life of the investment, otherwise it is 
liquidated and capital is returned. Any volatility is limited to underlying property 
values, making FTCETs a good alternative to LPTs during volatile economic 
periods, giving investors full control over the type of property purchased. However, 
FTCETs are also highly illiquid, which likens them to purchases of direct property. 
Unlike in the purchase of A-REIT units on an exchange, UPTs must specifically 
disclose the following eight principles that allow investors to freely compare UPTs:  
-Gearing ratio; 
-Interest cover ratio; 
-Scheme borrowing; 
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-Portfolio diversification; 
-Related party transactions; 
-Distribution practices; 
-Withdrawal arrangements, and; 
-Net tangible assets (ASIC, 2012) 
 
 
3.14 GLOBAL REIT MARKETS  
 
The REIT market in Australia is unique because it faces competition for 
investment funds from those developing in the Asia-Pacific. After the onset of the 
GFC, a survey of REIT managers in this part of the world identified several concerns 
regarding the prosperity of REITs. Adverse taxation developments, changes in 
regulatory process, and low yields have been implicated as current issues (Baker & 
McKenzie, 2011). In particular, governments are concerned that tax revenue from 
REIT earnings will not reach its maximum potential. Under international withholding 
tax agreements, dividend income streams are usually taxed at a lower rate (Newell & 
Sieracki, 2010). This issue has, in turn, been considered by jurisdictions formulating 
REIT regulations from around the time of the GFC up until the present. 
  Globally, REITs are, however, converging with respect to transparent 
governance, despite some divergence in regulation and REIT models (Parker, 2011). 
Approximately one third of global property transactions were cross border in 2007, 
amounting to $320 billion (Newell & Sieracki, 2010), magnifying the importance of 
understanding international property regulations. The following outlines the 
regulatory features in both major and developing REIT markets as a comparison to 
A-REITs. The average performance of Asia-Pacific REITs in particular has been 
superior to that of the rest of the world and regulatory structure plays a part in 
forming the basis of this performance given non-systematic and geographically-
specific factors. 
 
UNITED STATES 
REITs in the United States were created by U.S congress in 1960 for much 
the same reasons as elsewhere in the world, to make costly property investment 
accessible in unit form and to offer diversification. As of 30 June 2012, U.S.-REIT 
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market capitalisation was USD$527.58 billion (AUD$517.69 Billion at the 
prevailing exchange rate at the time). This made up 59.31% of the global REIT 
market and consisted of 189 REITs, with the largest REIT, Simon Property valued at 
AUD$50 billion. Recent enactment of legislation H.R 5746 enforced rules that are 
arguably more stringent than those in Australia. This law enables U.S.-REITs to sell 
up to 20% of their property in a single year, allows a certain ownership of debt 
securities in other REITs, and treats royalties from mineral resources found on their 
land as passive, non-trade income. Currently, 95% of a REIT’s income and 75% of 
its assets must be derived from passive and property related investment respectively, 
otherwise its REIT status can be removed for up to five years. There are no minimum 
capital requirements for unlisted U.S.-REITs, but listing mandates at least 100 
shareholders, with no fewer than five individuals allowed to own, combined, more 
than 50% of the capital, with no restrictions on foreign shareholders.  
The distribution rules are slightly more flexible in the United States, with at 
least 90% of earnings (excluding capital gains) needing to be distributed, and a 
punitive excise tax of 4% if at least 85% of earnings are not paid out in a given 
financial period. At the shareholder level, income and capital gains are taxed at a rate 
of up to 39.6%. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The Finance Act in 2006 enabled the first U.K.-REITs to be registered on 1 
January 2007. As of 30 June 2012, there were 21 U.K.-REITs, with only two not 
listed on the FTSE, and making up 4.41% of the global REIT market. Market 
capitalisation is approximately AUD$41.85 billion, the largest U.K.-REIT being 
Land Securities with a capitalisation of AUD$9.91 billion. To be considered a UK.-
REIT, the REIT must have a parent entity that is listed and close-ended, owns at least 
75% of the REIT, and resides in the United Kingdom for tax purposes. The minimum 
capital requirements for listing are GBP 50,000, which must occur on any recognised 
securities exchange for consideration as a U.K.-REIT. In terms of ownership, 
individual corporate stakes are restricted to 10% of the REIT, and cannot be 
controlled by five or fewer shareholders, and in contrast to Australia, there are no 
restrictions on foreign ownership. Consistent with the U.S. and many other REITs, at 
least 75% of assets must be property related, whereas at least 75% of profits must be 
generated from property assets. Active development is counted in the 75% property 
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assets test, but it must be sold within three years of completion. A U.K.-REIT’s 
uptake of debt is limited such that property income before interest is no less than 
1.25 times the amount of financing costs. Similar to the United States, in the United 
Kingdom 90% of profits must be distributed, but these do not need to include capital 
gains. A penalty tax rate of 26% is currently applicable for non-compliance. 
Recently, the Finance (No. 3) Act of 2010 permitted the issue of equity in place of 
cash distributions without breaching the minimum payout rule. A stamp duty of 
between 1% and 5% is payable on all transactions 
 
FRANCE 
Taxation rules were introduced for French REITs via Article 11 of the 
Finance Act of 2003. As of July 2012, there were 40 French REITs (F-REITs), with 
a market capitalisation of AUD $52.87 billion, making up 5.91% of the global REIT 
market. The largest F-REIT is Unibail-Rodamco, with a capitalisation of AUD 
$17.37 billion. F-REITs must belong to a parent company, which need not be either 
incorporated or a French resident for tax purposes, and have a minimum share capital 
of 15 million euro. Both entities must be listed on a securities exchange regulated by 
the European Union. The principal activity must be passive rental of property and 
development is not permitted to exceed 20% of gross asset value. Corporate tax is 
levied on development activities. At least 85% of profits from passive activities and 
50% of capital gains must be distributed. As with most other REITs, a tax of 34.43% 
is levied on any shortfall in distributions. To reduce ownership concentration, at least 
15% of an F-REIT parent entity’s capital must be owned by shareholders with 
individual holdings of less than 2%. 
 
GERMANY 
German REIT (G-REIT) laws were retroactively enacted on 1 January 2007. 
As of July 2012, four G-REITs were listed with a combined capitalisation of AUD 
$1.3 billion, making up a modest 0.21% of the global REIT market. The largest G-
REIT is Alstria Office at AUD$828.86 million. To be classified as such, G-REITs 
must be registered jointly with another entity that has a minimum share capital of 15 
million Euros, has its management headquarters in Germany, is listed, and at least 
15% of its shares are widely held after an initial public offering. Within this 15%, at 
least six shareholders must own a maximum of 3% each. Individual shareholders 
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may not own more than 10% of capital. Prior to registration, such an REIT is known 
as a Pre-REIT. During this period, registration is required with the Central Federal 
Tax Office and the REIT must demonstrate annually that it complies with G-REIT 
standards. G-REITs must have an asset base consisting of 75% property and 75% of 
its income must be derived from passive leasing, although G-REITs are prevented 
from investing in German residential property constructed before 1 January 2007. 
Debt levels cannot exceed 66.25% of tangible property assets and 90% of income 
needs to be distributed to shareholders. Penalties for non compliance can be as much 
as 30% of the difference and loss of tax-exempt status. 
 
MALAYSIA 
The first Malaysian REIT (M-REIT) was listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange in 1989. The regulatory framework is overseen by the Malaysian 
Securities Commission via the Securities Commission Act of 1993. State authority 
approval may not necessarily be required for foreign land ownership when units in an 
M-REIT are purchased by foreigners. The rationale is that investors do not own 
underlying properties, and so restrictions are relaxed compared with direct land 
purchases. M-REITs must be managed by a Securities Commission-approved 
management company, and at least 90% of profits must be paid out or else a tax of 
25% is levied. Evidence from the Malaysian market suggests that M-REITs generally 
underperform the stock and commercial property markets, whilst exhibiting higher 
risk characteristics. Restrictive investment guidelines and unfavourable tax treatment 
have contributed to this result (Newell et al., 2002). 
 
JAPAN 
The Japanese REIT (J-REIT) market was established in November 2000 
under the Law on Investment Trust and Investment Companies. Unlike A-REITs, all 
publicly listed J-REITs are incorporated, close ended, and subject to Tokyo Stock 
Exchange listing rules. They are operated by asset management companies and have 
no employees. Managers must therefore be external and licensed by the Financial 
Services Agency. Tax laws for J-REITs have recently changed from a 90% minimum 
payout rule to being forbidden from accumulating retained earnings. There are no 
restrictions on foreign ownership, but at least 50% of REIT shares must be held by 
domestic investors. Convertible bonds are currently not permitted to be held, J-
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REITs may not hold more than 50% of another corporate entity, and a single entity 
may not hold more than 50% J-REIT ownership. 
 
SINGAPORE 
The first Singapore REIT (S-REIT) was listed in 2002 after an unsuccessful 
attempt to launch a year earlier due to uncompetitive pricing. The industry is 
regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which was established in 1999. S-
REITs can be established as either a business trust or an authorised collective 
investment scheme. Business trusts are not subject to operational restrictions or 
borrowing limits and will have a single trustee manager, which is a domestic 
company. Collective investment scheme S-REITs must have their trust deeds 
approved by the Monetary Authority and have restrictions on their investment 
decisions by the Code on Collective Investment Schemes. A collective investment 
scheme must have a manager and an independent trustee. Some foreign ownership 
restrictions apply to residential property. Distributions to domestic investors are not 
taxed, but non-resident entities are taxed at a rate of 10%. Further tax concessions are 
being offered on foreign sourced income through 31 March 2015. 
 
HONG KONG 
The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission introduced the REIT 
code in July 2003 and there are currently nine Hong Kong REITs (HK-REITs), all of 
which are listed on the exchange, with a market capitalisation of AUD $17.83 billion 
as of July 2012. HK-REITs comprise 2% of the global REIT market, Link REIT 
being the largest with a capitalisation of AUD $9.34 billion. Regulation is abundant, 
with the REIT code setting out rules for the establishment and operation of HK-
REITs. There are no minimum capital requirements, but KH-REITs must be listed on 
the Hong Kong Securities exchange. Trustees are permitted to be part of the same 
corporate group, but must be functionally independent. The Securities and Futures 
Ordinance regulates authorisation and licensing matters, and listed HK-REITs must 
conform to Hong Kong Securities Exchange listing rules when dealing with 
acquisitions, as well as the special Takeovers Code which was extended from 
companies to REITs in June 2010. There are currently no restrictions on foreign 
ownership, but activity must not include purchases of vacant land, nor development, 
whilst assets must usually be held for two years, 90% of which must be income-
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generating. A total of 90% of profits must be paid to unitholders, and leverage is 
limited to 45% of gross total assets. In terms of management, both internal 
management and external management are permitted. Taxation, is however, 
structured differently from that of A-REITs. Listed HK-REITs are exempt from a 
profits tax, but if they hold property directly, a 15% property tax applies. When 
property is held through a special purpose vehicle, a profits tax of 16.5% applies. In 
contrast, any profits or capital gains derived from foreign investment are not taxed. 
 
INDONESIA 
The Indonesian regulatory regime was introduced by the Capital Markets and 
Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency in December 2007. Indonesian real estate 
investment funds (I-REIFs) must be listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange and are 
permitted to invest only in Indonesian real estate assets, cash or cash equivalents. I-
REIFs must operate through a special purpose company and investment in property 
assets must account for at least 50% of the fund’s net asset value, with the additional 
restriction that cash does not exceed 20% of the net asset value. Restrictions on land 
ownership require that I-REIFs acquire land only through special purpose companies. 
Only individuals or Indonesian legal entities may hold title on land. Foreigners may 
own up to 100% of a property, but must do so through an Indonesian limited liability 
company. Managers of I-REIFs must be licensed by Bapepum LK and be external 
and independent of the I-REIF. Unlike A-REITs, there is no taxation pass through 
and normal tax treatment usually applies. 
 
CHINA 
The listed property industry in China is currently in development. Pilot 
schemes of Chinese REITs (C-REITs) were announced by the government in 2008 
and shortly after, a working group led by the central bank was established to develop 
the scheme. Legislation is currently being developed, and will focus on separate 
securitised products offered to both institutional and retail investors. With respect to 
land ownership, foreign companies are no longer permitted to directly acquire 
investment property, whereas foreign investors are subject to strict regulations. The 
tax regime is expected to operate much as for A-REITs, with no special concessions 
or direct taxation pass through to investors. 
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INDIA 
An established Indian REIT (I-REIT) regime does not currently exist, but the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India drafted regulations in 2007. Under the 
Mutual Fund Amendment Regulations of 2008, real estate mutual funds may invest 
in property assets and real estate investment management companies may manage 
schemes under a trust structure. Schemes will need to apply for a credit agency rating 
and units will have to be publicly listed. Future schemes will not be permitted to 
invest more than 15% of capital in any single project and will be required to 
distribute at least 90% of profits back to unitholders. The Foreign Exchange 
Management Act of 1999 currently restricts foreign ownership of immovable 
property and potential managers must be registered under mutual funds regulations 
and be incorporated under the Indian Companies Act of 1956. Management of future 
I-REITs and their associated management companies will have to be independent of 
each other, and at least 50% of the I-REIT directors will need to be independent. Tax 
regulations are yet to be prescribed. Table 3.14.1 displays a concise version of the 
REIT regulations of selected international REITs. 
 
Table 3.14.1: Condensed REIT Regulations 
COUNTRY MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
ASSOCIATED 
COMPANY 
REQUIRED 
MINIMUM LEVEL OF 
PROPERTY 
FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 
RESTRICTIONS 
MINIMUM 
DISTRIBUTION 
AUSTRALIA Internal/External No Primarily land ownership Yes 100% 
U.S Internal No 75% No 90% 
U.K Internal/External Yes 75% No 90% 
FRANCE Internal/External Yes 80% Yes (tax) 85% 
GERMANY Internal/External Yes 75% No 90% 
MALAYSIA External Yes 75% Yes 90% 
JAPAN Internal Yes 75% No 90%+ 
SINGAPORE External Yes 70% Yes 100% 
HONG KONG Internal/External Yes 90% No 90% 
INDONESIA External Yes 50% No N/A 
CHINA N/A N/A N/A Yes N/A 
INDIA External Yes N/A Yes 90% 
Note: Compiled by the author from EPREA (2012). 
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Table 3.14.2 shows global listed REITs and their associated market 
capitalisation in Australian dollars as of June 2012. Some jurisdictions have no listed 
REITs as yet, but a formal legal structure exists for their incorporation. It is 
important to view the A-REIT market in a global context because it must compete 
for capital against REITs in other countries and regions. Australia has the second 
largest REIT market in the world by market capitalisation, yet makes up 9.36% of 
global capitalisation, behind only the United States. It is part of the Asia-Pacific band 
of global jurisdictions, and is expected to face greater competition for capital in the 
near future from the fast-emerging markets of China and India. 
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Table 3.14.2: Global REITs 
EUROPE    ASIA-
PACIFIC 
   
 Market Cap 
AUD (B) 
% 
Global 
Number 
Listed 
 Market Cap 
AUD (B) 
% 
Global 
Number 
Listed 
BELGIUM   7.19 0.76 15 AUSTRALIA 79.59  9.36 47 
BULGARIA   0.39 0.04 22 UAE   0.00 0.00 0 
FINLAND   0.00 0.00 0 HONG KONG 18.90  1.99 9 
FRANCE 56.04 5.91 40 INDIA   0.00 0.00 0 
GERMANY   1.38 0.21 4 JAPAN 46.25  4.88 35 
GREECE   0.36 0.04 3 MALAYSIA   6.30  0.66 15 
ISRAEL   0.00 0.00 0 NEW ZEALAND   2.50  0.26 5 
ITALY   0.58 0.06 2 PAKISTAN   0.00 0.00 0 
LITHUANIA   0.00 0.00 0 PHILIPPINES   0.00 0.00 0 
LUXEMBOURG   0.00 0.00 0 SINGAPORE 35.81  3.78 26 
NETHERLANDS   8.29 0.87 5 SOUTH KOREA   0.43  0.04 8 
SPAIN   0.00 0.00 0 TAIWAN   2.46  0.26 8 
TURKEY   7.35 0.78 23 THAILAND   4.57  0.48 36 
U.K 41.85 4.41 21     
TOTAL 123.43 13.08 135 TOTAL 196.81 21.71 189 
        
AMERICAS    AFRICAS    
 Market Cap 
AUD (B) 
% 
Global 
Number 
Listed 
 Market Cap 
AUD (B) 
% 
Global 
Number 
Listed 
BRAZIL   11.41 1.20 71 SOUTH AFRICA  5.95  0.63 5 
CANADA   48.27 5.09 37     
CHILE     0.00 0.00 0     
COSTA RICA     0.00 0.00 0     
PUERTO RICO     0.00 0.00 0     
U.S.A 562.02 59.31 189     
TOTAL 621.70 65.60 297 TOTAL 5.95 0.63 5 
        
        
Note: Compiled by the author from EPREA data, and converted into Australian dollars as of 30 June 2012. 
 
The growth in global REITs has been vast, and great potential still remains to 
further capitalise on real estate. Figure 3.14.1 shows the major zones of real estate 
Chapter Three: The Real Estate Investment Trust Sector in Australia 
101 
 
activity and growth experienced between 2005 and 2010. A large slice of this rests 
with commercial real estate, where globally, 90% of this is located in jurisdictions 
where formal REIT structures exist (Newell & Sieracki, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.14.1: Global Investable Real Estate Stock 
 
Note: Extracted from UBS Global Asset Management, 10 July 2013. 
 
The remainder of this thesis concentrates on A-REITs, with a central focus on 
the GFC, and progresses as follows. Chapter 4 discusses the determinants of capital 
structure, Chapter 5 discusses the determinants of fiduciary remuneration, Chapter 6 
discusses the determinants of institutional investment, and Chapter 7 provides 
summary conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A-REITs AND THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Research on capital structure has yielded many varying results. Drawing on 
the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the diversity of research outcomes is not 
surprising given their assertion that capital structure is irrelevant in maximising the 
value of a company. Many studies have confirmed the presence of deliberate capital 
structure decisions, primarily through the pecking order, trade-off and agency 
theories, and later, the market timing theory, (e.g. Titman & Wessels, 1988; Smith & 
Watts, 1992;  Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Barclay et al., 
2001; Booth et al., 2001; Pandey, 2001; Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Fama & French, 
2002; Zoppa & McMahon, 2002; Cassar & Holmes, 2003; Prasad et al., 2003; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004; Feng et al., 2007; Li et al., 2007; Giambona, 2008; 
Chikolwa, 2009; Ooi et al., 2010; and Harrison et al., 2011).  
This chapter attempts to find the contemporary determinants of the capital 
structure of Australian real estate investment trusts (A-REITs) between 2006 and 
2012, also examining the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on each of these 
determinants to determine how such a crisis alters the relations between leverage and 
its explanatory variables. The financial years 2005/06 and 2006/07 are included to 
represent the height of prosperity in the A-REIT market just prior to the onset of the 
GFC, whilst financial years 2007/08 to 2011/12 are included to capture the GFC and 
its after-effects. Further, stapled A-REITs are examined. The process of stapling 
involves linking an A-REIT with its associated management company and offering 
securities that are a hybrid of both. An advantage of this is to internalise management 
such that its costs are not expended externally. Another advantage is that it allows A-
REITs to engage in development opportunities, which are not usually pursued under 
a pure trust structure. Unitholders thus obtain greater information efficiency and 
liquidity than with direct property development (Yong et al., 2011). There are, 
however, disadvantages. Packer and Riddiough (2012), assert that externally 
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managed REITs tend to be more transparent and that property development creates 
risk in excess of that in non stapled A-REITs. This chapter also isolates and models 
stapled A-REITs separately from the rest of the sample to gauge whether capital 
structure decisions vary between the two different types generally or in light of their 
increased risk profile and the effects of the GFC. 
Studying capital structure is important because it gives insight into the 
combination of debt and equity that management believe maximises firm value. This 
can assist future management in aiming for a structure based on prevailing financial 
variables, and that shares consensus over many entities within specific industries. 
Extending this study over the GFC may assist future managers replicate successful 
strategies in maintaining solvency over future crises. Successful navigation of crises 
and communication of such to stakeholders can also lead to improved market 
confidence, meaning that investor fear will not precipitate market collapse, and 
equity values can be better maintained. Since roughly 16% of global REIT value is 
held in Australia (Dimovski, 2010), managerial capital decisions are very important 
and have the potential to hugely impact the wealth of many unitholders. 
Capital structure, namely the proportion of debt and equity, is expected to be 
balanced to maximise firm value. Each comes at a cost, whereby a unique 
equilibrium minimises the total cost of both to the firm through deliberate structural 
decisions. Various firm characteristics are hypothesised to influence equilibrium to 
the benefit of shareholders in so-called legitimate ways, through the pecking order, 
trade-off, and market timing theories, whereas other decisions to benefit shareholders 
are made to the detriment of other stakeholders under the umbrella of agency theory. 
These theories, as applied to REITs require modification because the preference of 
one type of capital over another differs from the behaviour of non-REIT corporate 
entities. REITs do not have the luxury of retaining the bulk of their earnings to avoid 
paying mandatory interest or increasing their unitholder base. In particular, 
Australian REITs, unlike other corporate entities, are not required to pay tax if they 
pay out all earnings to their unitholders. If they choose to do this, there is a greater 
underlying financial benefit in foregoing retained earnings and certain tax deductions 
in exchange for not having to pay current tax liabilities.  
There is, however, a financial disadvantage in having to attract costly external 
debt capital when earnings are not retained. Trade-off theory clarifies that 
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continually increasing debt to fund new projects eventually leads to default and 
bankruptcy costs. The known cost of debt and the expected cost of bankruptcy need 
to be weighed against the known higher cost of equity capital in the absence of 
retained earnings. In non-REIT entities, retained earnings would usually be the first 
preference when funding profitable projects because they are freely available and 
there is no obligation to pay dividends, expend formal prospectus costs, or dilute the 
shareholder base. 
A-REITs that have their securities stapled to corporate entities pay tax on 
corporate entity profits, although the magnitude and direction of these trade-offs 
appear to be trust-specific and may play a part in determining the need for debt. 
Stand alone REITs tend to have a high proportion of tangible assets, with an absence 
of goodwill and capitalised research. This gives them a greater degree of useable 
collateral to enable a greater degree of secured borrowing. Even in the absence of 
valuable tax deductions from taking on debt, the desire to maximise earnings per unit 
(EPU) makes debt more attractive than equity at certain capital costs and earnings 
levels, according to EBIT-EPS analysis, and when unit issues could substantially 
dilute the unitholder base, holding back desired EPU growth.  
The GFC has exposed the failures of many highly levered entities and urgent 
restructuring has placed doubt upon the ability of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) 
seminal work to remain robust over the vagaries of the global economic system. 
Determining the appropriate capital structure is not always possible in a dynamic 
world. Through past events such as the 1987 share market crash and the Asian 
financial crisis, the financial world has been shown to be susceptible to events that 
change the course of decision making for years to come, and every manager makes a 
decision when there is a trade-off of one benefit or cost for another, even given the 
most accurate expectations possible.  
The most recent tumultuous event to affect the corporate world was the GFC. 
At the height of the economic cycle, liquidity was at its peak, and the abundance of 
funding impacted disciplined lending, re-financing, and underwriting by many 
financial institutions, particularly in the evaluation of borrowers’ capacity to pay off 
loans. Further compounding this effect was a reliance on rising asset values and 
persistently low interest rates. Once the property bubble burst in the United States, 
asset values fell, followed by defaults amongst over-leveraged borrowers. The 
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opaqueness of the underlying financial instruments and their trading on over-the-
counter markets both nationally and internationally made the losses hard to locate. In 
terms of structural issues, there was an over-reliance on self-regulation, especially 
with the dramatic rise of non-bank financial institutions, and risk management was 
trivialised with the increasing use of synthetic products and collateralised debt 
obligations. In summary, there was a trade-off between the expected higher 
efficiency of financial intermediation and the stability of the financial system, 
particularly with the lack of due diligence emanating from compensation for 
excessive managerial risk taking. This phenomenon ultimately spread via transaction 
cost reduction, the subsequent rise in cross-border operations, and a lack of co-
ordinated global regulation.  
The GFC had a large impact on the Australian listed property sector, with 
market values in 2008 down by an average of 65% from its peak a year earlier. 
Returns also suffered, dropping from an average of 20% just prior to the GFC to -
50% in 2008-2009 (Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012). A-REITs have traditionally been 
highly levered, with debt levels rising from 30% in 2001 to 52% in 2009 in pursuit of 
growth opportunities. Thus the scarcity of capital post GFC and the cost of debt 
remaining on offer created much doubt about how to continue operating when it 
came time to re-finance. As a result, over $21 billion worth of capital was raised in 
the entire listed A-REIT market between September 2008 and June 2010 in an 
attempt to reduce exposure to debt and reduce downward pressure on asset 
valuations. With a drop in asset values, the likelihood of breaching debt covenants is 
increased, making equity issues even more critical. Table 4.1.1 shows the raisings of 
both equity and debt for the sample of 31 A-REITs over the 2005/06 to 2011/12 
financial years. The figures are from formal public A-REIT announcements made on 
the Australian Securities Exchange. Equity figures include open market offers, rights 
issues, and institutional and private placements. The totals are gross of any unit 
buyback arrangements. The debt figures include new note issues, loans and 
successful refinancing of existing debt. To be included in a specific period, raisings 
must have been finalised by the end of the relevant financial year.
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The post GFC credit crunch led to prohibitive debt pricing, especially since 
Australian banks had over $46 billion of exposure to A-REITs (BDO Corporate 
Finance, 2010). The decline in collateralised asset values and, rental income and an 
increase in borrowing costs created doubt about the viability of A-REITs that needed 
refinancing. With foreign banks exiting this sector after the initial shock, the $4 
billion Australian Investment Business Partnership was developed to support high 
quality Australian assets in need of funding. Lumsden et al. (2009) state that the 
turbulent environment was likely to make many features of the previous model 
difficult to replicate and almost inevitably led to a substantial review of the A-REIT 
structure. The subsequent recovery of the market after the GFC shows that debt 
issues again increased, with lenders and investors exhibiting a less conservative 
stance relative to the 2008/09 period.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 addresses the methodology 
and, hypotheses and describes the variables and their rationale for inclusion in the 
model. The hypotheses presented are based on theory and other expectations unique 
to the Australian market. Section 4.3 explains the data and presents the regression 
results. Section 4.4 provides a discussion and full interpretation of the findings. 
Section 4.5 provides a concluding overview of this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 METHODOLOGY, HYPOTHESES, AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
To find the determinants of capital structure, each A-REIT’s leverage ratio is 
set as a function of relevant trust-specific financial ratios. Using the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable Model, a panel equation is estimated as follows: 
yit = αi + βXit + vit 
where yit  represents the debt ratio, subscript i denotes the cross sectional 
dimension and subscript t indicates the time-series dimension; 
α is a scalar; 
Xit contains the set of explanatory variables in the estimation model; 
β is a column matrix of the partial regression coefficients, and;. 
vit represents the remaining disturbances in the regression that vary with 
individual firms and time. 
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In an alternative model, yit also represents an A-REIT’s debt per unit measure 
within a supporting regression to add robustness to the results. Rather than use 
averaged variables over time, as per Deesomsak et al. (2004), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), and Pandey (2001), this chapter adopts a panel structure to rectify a small 
sample issue caused by the relatively small number of A-REITs continuously listed 
on the ASX around the time of the GFC. Using a panel methodology has certain 
advantages in this case. It is unbalanced, allowing for more data and degrees of 
freedom, which reduces the risk of collinearity among explanatory variables and 
increases the efficiency of estimates. The panel format reduces any effects of omitted 
and unobserved variables that are correlated with explanatory variables. In addition, 
using fixed effects does not require the assumption of no correlation between 
individual effects. All regressions are tested for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, and corrected where necessary, using the appropriate Eviews 
regression options. The panel format required testing for both fixed and random 
effects using the likelihood ratio and Hausman tests. The appropriate effect is 
reported, along with its cross sectional probability.  
The A-REIT-specific independent variables include trust size, profitability, 
tangibility, operating risk, growth opportunities, and unit price performance. The 
systematic independent variable dummy is the GFC, introduced in the 2007/08 
financial year. These variables have been previously used with various degrees of 
success in the literature, both in Australia and abroad, except for the GFC. This is the 
first time the impact of the GFC has been explored with respect to capital structure 
decisions involving Australian REITs.  
The dependent variable, leverage, can be expressed in three different ways. 
One of the most common ratios used is Total Liabilities to Total Assets (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995). This variable suffers from inaccuracy for two reasons. First, when 
assessing capital structure decisions, REITs should consider interest obligations in 
changing economic environments. During inflationary periods, higher interest rates 
will contribute to increased risk by increasing the likelihood of the entity defaulting 
on their obligations. Only interest-bearing liabilities (debt) in the numerator are 
therefore used. As a result, using total assets in the denominator is inappropriate 
because the converse of this debt ratio does not become the equity ratio. Rather, the 
converse becomes equity plus non interest bearing liabilities divided by total assets. 
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To avoid this inconsistency, total assets are replaced with Interest Bearing Liabilities 
plus Equity, eliminating non interest bearing liabilities entirely from the ratio.  
Most previous studies use size, growth opportunities, operating risk, 
tangibility, and profitability as variables due to their ability to test a large body of 
capital structure theory (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Chikolwa, 2009). This chapter also 
uses these variables and adds unit (share) price performance as per Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) to add further insight. A dummy variable is also included in an 
attempt to capture the impact of the GFC on capital structure. Table 4.2.1 displays a 
summary of theories mentioned in the literature review, including the expected signs 
of the variables related to capital structure theories from past literature. 
 
Table 4.2.1: Capital Structure Theories and Variable Signs Related to 
Leverage 
Variables Expected theoretical 
relationship 
Mostly reported in the 
empirical literature 
Theories 
Firm Size + + Trade-off theory: Bankruptcy 
costs/tax. Agency theory: 
Agency costs of debt. Other 
theories: Access to the 
market, economies of scale. 
Pecking Order Theory 
 -  Other theory: Information 
asymmetry. 
Profitability - - Pecking Order theory. Trade-
off theory: Bankruptcy costs. 
Other theory: Dilution of 
ownership structure 
 +  Trade-off theory: Tax. Free 
Cash Flow theory. Signalling 
theory. 
Tangibility + + Agency theory: Agency cost 
of debt. Trade-off theory: 
Financial distress/business 
risk. 
Earnings Volatility/ Operating 
Risk 
- - Trade-off Theory: Financial 
distress. 
 +  Agency theory. 
Growth Opportunities - - Agency theory: Agency cost 
of debt. Trade-off theory: 
Financial distress. 
 +  Signalling theory. Pecking 
Order theory. 
Share Price Performance - - Market Timing Theory. 
Note: Pecking order theory as applied to capital structure first postulated by Myers and Majluf, (1984); trade-off theory by 
Kraus and Litzenberger, (1973); agency theory in this context by Spence and Zeckhauser, (1971); market timing theory by 
Baker and Wurgler, (2002). 
 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the natural log of total assets. Larger entities 
are expected to have greater sources of revenue and therefore face lower risk of 
bankruptcy and as such, lower expected costs of bankruptcy. Large firms are subject 
to a greater number of debt covenants and scrutiny and, therefore face lower internal 
monitoring costs and agency costs generally. Large entities also tend to have less 
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variation in cash flows, cheaper access to the credit market, and higher tax shields for 
consolidated stapled A-REITs, or those that do not meet minimum earnings 
distribution requirements. Trade-off and pecking order theories therefore both 
postulate that larger entities will borrow more due to their lower cost of debt, making 
this relationship likely positive. 
Profitability-(Net profit after tax divided by equity) (NPATE) can be 
measured in several ways. It is used due to its low correlation with other independent 
variables. According to pecking order theory, managers prefer to fund projects using 
retained earnings because this is generally cheaper than using external finance. If this 
preference strictly holds true and there is no legal obligation to pay a fixed return to 
providers of external finance, then reportable profits would be higher. Thus a 
negative relationship between profitability and the debt ratio is expected. Reducing 
the use of external funds in turn reduces the external monitoring of the entity, 
magnifying the perils of the agency relationship. From this perspective, management 
has every incentive for this scenario to occur, again eliciting a negative relationship 
between the variables. Trade-off theory predicts that greater retained earnings are 
preferred in funding internal projects and paying off debt because alternatively 
increasing the use of debt would move the entity closer towards bankruptcy. A 
negative relationship is predicted by this theory. 
 Alternatively, trade-off theory also postulates that the increased use of debt 
allows greater tax deductibility for entities that are integrated with the tax system. 
However, the unique tax rule applicable to A-REITs provides a large disincentive to 
retain earnings, therefore this aspect of the theory does not apply as fluidly as one 
would expect it to be applied to standard tax-paying companies. The major trade-off 
of unstapled A-REITs thus appears to be the cost of imposed taxes if earnings are 
retained, versus the cost of debt and equity if these earnings are paid out. Since half 
of the sample includes A-REITs that have been stapled to tax-paying corporations, a 
somewhat negative relationship is expected because these corporations do have the 
ability to use retained earnings at cheaper cost without being penalised via the 
highest marginal tax rate. 
Tangibility is defined as the ratio of tangible property assets to total assets. 
Agency theory prescribes that entities with a high degree of borrowing are more 
inclined to invest inefficiently and transfer wealth from debtholders to equity 
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holders. In return, lenders require tangible collateral to hedge their own lending risk 
if they are to continue. Therefore, as risky lending increases, the proportion of 
tangible assets should also increase to maximise entity liquidation value should 
bankruptcy occur. The alternative is that A-REITs that have intangible assets and 
cannot match the collateral requirements must borrow at a higher cost or raise more 
equity (Scott, 1977). Neither of these latter two options would be preferred, thus the 
debt ratio and asset tangibility are always expected to have a positive relationship 
under both trade-off and agency theories. A-REITs can be differentiated from 
corporate entities on another level with respect to tangibility. A-REITs have very 
little reason to capitalise either goodwill or research expenses, so their degree of 
tangibility is usually higher than that of non-REIT companies that do. This relation is 
reflected by the propensity of A-REITs to gear up at a higher level and also indicates 
larger falls in unit values in comparison to company shares after the onset of a 
negative financial event. Some A-REITs do however invest heavily in indirect 
property, which lowers their levels of tangibility and ability to borrow. 
Operating risk is defined as the standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total 
assets. If an entity’s earnings become uncertain, then so does their ability to repay 
debt obligations. Management is consequently expected to reduce debt as a priority 
to avoid mandatory interest obligations that may precipitate financial distress, and 
the relationship between the debt ratio and operating risk is expected to be negative 
under trade-off theory. Under agency theory, a firm is expected to borrow more as it 
approaches financial distress. Directors have a fiduciary responsibility to owners and 
may redirect borrowed funds towards them as a priority to ensure that short-term 
wealth is maximized, even at the expense of creditors. This may occur because 
debtholders should be relying on a network of contracts and are not in a fiduciary 
relationship with directors and, thus are not legally advocated for in the absence of 
specific contractual provisions. This type of activity is likely undertaken when recent 
dividend payments need to be maintained to give an impression that an entity is not 
diminishing in profitability, or as a last resort and when the entity is no longer 
financially viable. Delaware case law in the United States, however, is the exception, 
where extra-contractual fiduciary duties have been specifically constructed to benefit 
creditors under circumstances where insolvency is approached (Rutheford & Frost, 
2007).  
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Growth opportunities are usually measured in two ways: First, as the ‘book 
value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, 
divided by book value of total assets’. Another option is ‘market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity’. Market value of equity to book value of equity is 
used arbitrarily in these models because, as expected, they are highly correlated with 
each other and yield similar results. Under agency theory, higher growth 
opportunities provide incentives for management to invest sub-optimally by 
accepting risky projects with a high risk to return ratio (or have a high coefficient of 
variation) that may put debt holders at higher risk. This is known as the asset-
substitution effect (Morri & Beretta, 2008). This raises the cost of debt such that the 
use of internal funds or equity is preferred, subject to taxation costs and the 
prevailing cost of equity. However, this effect is expected to be greatly diminished in 
A-REITs because of the high rate of asset tangibility, which allows the employment 
of collateral to reduce associated costs of debt. Under trade-off theory, intangible 
growth opportunities place the ability of managers to service additional debt at risk. 
As a result, a negative relationship is expected. Alternatively, legitimate low-risk A-
REIT growth opportunities may need to be funded with debt if the cost of debt is 
lower than taxation obligations triggered by using retaining earnings. In this instance, 
a positive relationship is expected. Under pecking order theory, A-REITs in 
particular are expected to use debt before equity in the absence of retained earnings 
because it is cheaper. Debt is less costly because of the high expected discounting of 
equity and the ability of debtholders to stake claims on assets prior to shareholders in 
the event of liquidation. Under signalling theory, an entity may wish to signal 
confidence in its legitimate growth opportunities, thus seeking further monitoring by 
borrowing more funds. Both of the above theories postulate a positive relationship 
with the debt ratio. 
Unit price performance is defined as the percentage change in average annual 
unit price. The variable unit price performance (UPP) has been included to test 
market timing theory and to measure the expected impact on leverage of dramatic 
falls in market capitalisation after GFC onset. Theory-wise, new equity is expected to 
be issued at a discount, given the information asymmetry between managers and 
potential investors. Entities are expected to prefer delaying the issue of new equity 
until unit prices are relatively high to minimize the impact of discounting on the 
amount of capital A-REITs raise. This hypothesis stems from market timing theory 
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(Baker & Wurgler, 2002), therefore, when UPP increases, the debt ratio should 
decrease. Alternatively, further equity issues will dilute the unitholder base and EPU, 
so if these concerns dominate, there may be a positive or no significant impact. 
 
 
4.3 DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
4.3.1 Data 
 
For financial A-REIT data, the finance section of The Australian newspaper 
was initially consulted to extract all A-REITs currently listed on the ASX. As of 7 
April 2010, there were 59 listed A-REITs, whereas by 7 April 2013, there were only 
43. The aim was to initially collect data for four years on either side of the GFC to 
gauge the differences in results that an unstable financial period might evoke. It was 
found that, over these years, there was a large turnover of listed A-REITs on the 
ASX. Continuous ASX listing over the GFC period is needed to gauge any changes 
that might have occurred. Consequently, only 32 A-REITs could be used. After 
further omitting Centro Property Trust due to severe data fluctuations and outliers, 
the study settled on a sample size of 31. The sample of A-REITS used over the 
period 2006-2012 appears in the appendix to this chapter, whilst Table 4.3.2.1 
provides descriptive statistics for the two dependent and six independent variables, 
including a breakdown of both stapled and non-stapled A-REITs. Due to instability 
brought about by the GFC, several individual A-REIT observations lay slightly over 
three standard deviations away from their means. However, they are included to 
maintain minimum sample size integrity. Consolidated financial statement data are 
taken from the DatAnalysis Premium database of company reports. Various ratios 
using these data are then calculated. Table 4.3.2.2 shows all of the non-dummy 
independent variables and their correlation coefficient relationships. If a correlation 
lower than -0.6 or greater than +0.6 is recorded between any two variables, only one 
of these is included in any given regression to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Capital Structure of A-REITs and the Global Financial Crisis 
114 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
The results are separated into determinants of overall capital structure using 
the dependent variables ‘debt divided by debt plus equity’, or (DDE) (Table 4.3.2.3) 
and ‘debt divided by number of units outstanding’, or (DPU) (Table 4.3.2.4). The 
variable DDE has the potential to provide dubious results because it relies on the 
underlying equity value being stable. During volatile financial periods, A-REIT asset 
values may need to be downgraded to reflect their market value. Significant 
valuation decreases may ‘increase’ a debt ratio and be an unintended consequence, 
not reflecting managerial capital structure intentions. The results are therefore 
supplemented with a further regression using the number of units on issue in the 
denominator to ascertain their validity. The number of units outstanding is not 
affected by volatility in asset values, or volatility in market value. In fact, the DPU 
dependent variable is naturally magnified negatively only when A-REITs 
deliberately issue further equity. It can be argued that it is therefore a better measure 
of managerial capital structure decisions despite it being a capital structure proxy 
(Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012). In terms of financial crises affecting capital structure, 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) analysed the impact of the Asian financial crisis on 
Australian companies but also stated that the crisis itself had no impact on Australia 
in general. In light of this information, this chapter presents the first study on capital 
structure of A-REITs incorporating the effects of a large and relevant financial crisis 
in Australia. It represents an extended version of a research paper originally 
published by this author in 2012, using a limited sample size.  
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Table 4.3.2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
       
Descriptive statistics     
 
 Variables Mean  Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
       
 DEPENDENT      
       
 Entire DDE (%) 40.7907 38.4838 1.3835 81.2252 17.6265 
 Stapled DDE  41.5129 39.7506 13.1673 78.5457 14.6263 
 Non-Stapled DDE  39.6518 36.1352  1.3835 81.2252 21.5846 
       
 Entire DPU ($ per unit) 1.3648  0.8283 0.0088 10.7147  1.6646 
 Stapled DPU 1.5465  0.9112 0.0492 10.7147  1.9963 
 Non-Stapled DPU 1.0782  0.7848 0.0088   3.7628  0.8644 
       
 INDEPENDENT      
       
 SIZE (Log total assets) 20.7995 20.6316 16.4990 24.7470 1.6194 
 Stapled 21.1638 20.7747 18.3947 24.7470 1.5445 
 Non-Stapled 20.2249 19.9864 16.4990 22.8623 1.5766 
       
 NPATE (%)  -6.6795 5.9192 -327.8101 39.1585 47.2609 
 Stapled -8.2070 5.5210 -302.8210 34.9023 47.3730 
 Non-Stapled -4.2707 7.1825 -327.8101 39.1585 47.2882 
       
 NTATA (%) 91.2795 96.9243    7.1297 100.0000 13.2419 
 Stapled 89.6400 95.3722 40.9024 100.0000 12.2011 
 Non-Stapled 93.8649 98.2407   7.1297 100.0000 14.4402 
       
 OPRISK   0.1138   0.0758    0.0033   0.6845   0.1195 
 Stapled   0.1235   0.0791    0.0059   0.6845   0.1307 
 Non-Stapled   0.0985   0.0685    0.0033   0.5062   0.0981 
       
 MVBV    0.8179   0.7997    0.1006   2.4221   0.3973 
 Stapled   0.8597   0.8016    0.1006   2.4221   0.4572 
 Non-Stapled   0.7521   0.7937    0.1428   1.3958   0.2676 
       
 UPP (%)   0.2138   1.7668 -95.5880 233.3333 41.2661 
 Stapled   2.4699   1.7668 -95.5880 233.3333 45.5715 
 Non-Stapled  -3.3439   1.6638 -87.4970 115.9836 33.3420 
       
Note: The variable DDE represents the ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to interest-bearing liabilities plus equity, DPU represents the ratio of 
interest-bearing liabilities to the number of equity units outstanding, SIZE represents the natural log of total assets and proxies for the size of an A-
REIT, NPATE is net profit after tax divided by book equity and represents profitability, NTATA is net tangible assets divided by total assets and 
represents tangibility, OPRISK is the standard deviation of earnings before interest and tax scaled by total assets and represents operating risk, 
MVBV is the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity and represents growth opportunities, UPP is the percentage change in the 
average annual unit price and represents unit price performance. The variables NPATE, NTATA, and UPP are expressed in raw percentages, and 
dummy variables are excluded. 
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Table 4.3.2.2: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENTS 
      
 SIZE NPATE NTATA OPRISK MVBV UPP 
SIZE 1      
NPATE 0.0626   1     
NTATA 0.2140   0.1957   1    
OPRISK 0.0008 -0.4739 -0.0526   1   
MVBV 0.2658   0.3487   0.1363   0.0339 1  
UPP 0.0217   0.4570   0.1149 -0.0024 0.5432 1 
Note: This table shows the matrix of correlation coefficients of all the independent variables. Dummy variables are excluded. 
 
 
Table 4.3.2.3: Regression Results of the Dependent Variable DDE 
 FULL 
SAMPLE 
 STAPLED  NON-
STAPLED 
 
VARIABLE COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
INTERCEPT    -140.5380    -3.0601***  -56.6594  -0.6071   -32.6312  -0.1213 
GFC   42.6764     2.6045**    -4.9863  -0.1657    68.8058   1.7342* 
SIZE     7.5477     3.6458***     4.8212   1.2672      0.9015   0.0689 
NPATE    -0.1813    -6.5708***    -0.1868  -4.5003***     -0.0561  -0.8579 
NTATA     0.3504     8.0946***     0.1390   0.4614      0.3059   4.8669*** 
OPRISK      -57.5569    -2.6237***    -4.9334  -0.1484   -74.1702  -1.6521 
MVBV   -6.2820    -4.5862***  -10.3915  -3.5722***    29.4089   1.9047* 
UPP     0.0585     1.5539    -0.0357  -0.5920      0.2155   2.0581** 
GFC*SIZE    -1.4350    -1.5520    -0.4230  -0.5512     -1.6414  -0.9034 
GFC*NPATE     0.1500     3.3637***     0.1196   2.0068**      0.0076   0.0801 
GFC*NTATA    -0.0881    -1.7029*     0.0955   0.4057      0.0085   0.0895 
GFC*OPRISK       47.5008     2.2734**   27.2748   1.3840    49.4781   1.0858 
GFC*MVBV   -9.5838    -2.8977*** -10.3348  -2.9268***   -39.6786  -2.6450** 
GFC*UPP   -0.0390    -0.7646     0.0799   1.0537     -0.2278  -1.7458* 
       
Adjusted R2 0.8273  0.5745  0.8429  
F-Stat Prob 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.1266  0.0670  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin Watson 2.0653  1.5795  1.7157  
Observations 201  123  78  
Note: This table displays the estimation results of ordinary least squares panel regressions on 201 observations. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt 
to debt plus equity (DDE), which is also split over stapled and non-stapled A-REITs. The independent variables are GFC: approximated by a dummy 
value of zero in 2006 and 2007 financial years, and one otherwise; Size, the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE); profitability, NPAT divided by book 
equity (NPATE); tangibility, the book value of tangible assets divided by total assets (NTATA); operating risk: the standard deviation of EBIT scaled by 
total assets (OPRISK); market perceptions of growth opportunities, that is, total market capitalisation divided by book value of equity (MVBV), and 
market perceptions of performance: percentage growth in unit price relative to the previous year (UPP). The F-statistic is the result of analysis of variance 
tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The adjusted R² values show the 
proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the independent variables. The panel regression is given for seven years 
between 2006 and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable post GFC onset. Independent variable t-
Statistics denoted *** are significant at the 1% level, those denoted ** are significant at the 5% level, and those denoted * are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.3.2.4: Regression Results of Dependent Variable DPU 
 FULL 
SAMPLE 
 STAPLED  NON-
STAPLED 
 
VARIABLE COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
INTERCEPT    25.9220   2.5956*** -26.5310  -1.7260* -24.3217 -3.3122*** 
GFC     -2.7718  -2.9364***   -4.7605  -0.7558   -2.1545 -1.6382 
SIZE     -0.1232  -0.5866    1.1491   1.7868*     1.2188  3.3384*** 
NPATE      0.0083   4.6550***    0.0082   1.0027     0.0062  0.9428 
NTATA      0.0048   0.6575    0.0198   0.7216     0.0017  0.8724 
OPRISK     -1.5831  -0.6395    5.5690   0.9514     4.3136  4.1462*** 
MVBV     -0.5122  -6.3677***   -0.5037  -2.5875**     0.3468  0.7599 
UPP      0.0074   1.8950*    0.0143   4.7687***   -0.0070 -0.8595 
GFC*SIZE      0.1454   3.8911***    0.2688   1.2432     0.1490  2.2747** 
GFC*NPATE     -0.0106  -4.7133***   -0.0118  -1.3766   -0.0069 -0.9483 
GFC*NTATA     -0.0015  -0.1470   -0.0035  -0.1426   -0.0013 -0.7700 
GFC*OPRISK     -0.4275  -0.2059   -6.0221  -1.4359   -2.3136 -3.2843*** 
GFC*MVBV      0.5244   1.9615*    0.9774   2.3527**   -0.6933 -1.8280* 
GFC*UPP     -0.0070  -2.1456**   -0.0142 -7.1211***    0.0064   0.7871 
       
Adjusted R2    0.8048  0.7939  0.9090  
F-Stat (Prob)   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob)   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Likelihood Ratio   0.0000  0.0000  0.0265  
Durbin Watson   2.2025  2.7198  1.6684  
Observations 201  123  78  
Note: This table displays the estimation results of ordinary least squares panel regressions on 201 observations. The dependent variable is the ratio 
of debt to total units outstanding (DPU), which is also split over stapled and non-stapled A-REITs. The independent variables are GFC: 
approximated by a dummy value of zero in the 2006 and 2007 financial years, and one otherwise; Size: natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE); 
profitability, NPAT divided by book equity (NPATE); tangibility, the book value of tangible assets divided by total assets (NTATA); operating 
risk, the standard deviation of EBIT scaled by total assets (OPRISK); market perceptions of growth opportunities, that is, total market capitalisation 
divided by the book value of equity (MVBV), and market perceptions of performance, that is the percentage growth in unit price relative to the 
previous year (UPP). The F-statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The adjusted R² shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the 
independent variables. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the impact of 
each independent variable post GFC. The independent variable t-Statistics denoted *** are significant at the 1% level, those denoted ** are 
significant at the 5% level, and those denoted * are significant at the 10% level. 
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4.4 INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Both models 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4 show similar results over the entire sample 
period, which appears to validate the use of a more accurate DPU proxy. The results 
of both models are analysed and reasons are given where applicable for any 
significant deviations. As a prelude, Table 4.4.1 replicates the expected and main 
reported relationship between the independent variables and capital structure, 
alongside the results over the entire sample period and post GFC. Table 4.4.2 shows 
support or otherwise for the various theories and the variables concerned. 
 
Table 4.4.1:Comparison of Theoretical, Mostly Reported and A-REIT (2006-2012) 
Relationships 
Variables Expected 
theoretical 
relationship 
Mostly reported in the 
empirical literature 
A-
REITs 
2006-
2012 
A-REITs to 
2012 after 
GFC onset 
Firm Size + + + + 
Profitability +/- - +/- +/- 
Tangibility + + + - 
Earnings 
volatility/ 
Operating risk 
+/- - - + 
Growth 
Opportunities 
+/- - - +/- 
Share/Unit Price 
Performance 
- - + - 
Note: Compiled by the author from findings in the literature and from findings in this chapter. 
Table 4.4.2: Support or Otherwise of Postulated Theories for A-REITs (2006-2012) 
THEORY VARIABLES SUPPORTED VARIABLES REFUTED POST GFC VARIABLES 
SUPPORTED 
POST GFC 
VARIABLES 
REFUTED 
PECKING 
ORDER 
SIZE 
TANGIBILITY 
 
PROFITABILITY 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
PROFITABILITY 
SIZE 
 
TRADE-OFF SIZE 
PROFITABILITY 
TANGIBILITY 
OPERATING RISK 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
PROFITABILITY (TAX) 
GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
TANGIBILITY 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
SIZE 
PROFITABILITY 
AGENCY TANGIBILITY 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
OPERATING RISK,  
 
TANGIBILITY 
OPERATING RISK 
PROFITABILITY 
SIGNALLING  GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 GROWTH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
MARKET 
TIMING 
 UNIT PRICE 
PERFORMANCE 
UNIT PRICE 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Note: Compiled by the author from findings in this chapter. 
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Drawing on Tables 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.2.4, A-REIT size (SIZE) has a generally 
positive and significant impact at the 1% level on leverage in the DDE model but is 
negative and insignificant in the DPU model with the exception of stapled A-REITs. 
Size can be a proxy for the quantity of information that managers must convey to the 
market, reducing the information gap between insiders and outsiders (Morri & 
Berretta, 2008). If information is not asymmetric, A-REITs would be able to issue 
equity without much discounting because of the sensitivity associated with this type 
of security (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). The positive DDE model result is 
consistent with the work of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Booth et al. (2001), Pandey (2001), Prasad et al. (2003), Chikolwa (2009), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), and Harrison et al. (2011). It also supports static trade-off 
theory (Ang et al., 1982; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Feng et 
al., 2007), where larger A-REITs have a lower probability of bankruptcy and can 
borrow at lower cost. The negative impact of size in the DPU model supports 
pecking order theory and may highlight that smaller entities pay relatively more than 
large entities to issue new equity (Morri & Berretta, 2008). Another possibility is the 
uptake of relationship lending amongst smaller entities, whereby lenders also rely on 
the provision of ‘soft’ information. This is particularly important given the riskier 
environment caused by the GFC. Stapled A-REITs in this sample are larger than in 
the non-stapled group and carry more debt, both as a percentage of capital and in 
dollars per unit. They tend to be larger due to their consolidation with another entity 
and appear to be able to absorb larger aggregate debt expenses. 
The DPU model significantly shows that, after onset of the GFC, larger A-
REITS with more nominal debt increase leverage by even more. Some intuitive 
possibilities are raised. This increase may have been specific to short term debt 
because equity and long term debt are relatively expensive for smaller entities to 
issue (Morri & Berretta, 2008), particularly during periods of instability. The 
propensity for smaller A-REITs to undertake cheaper short term debt during unstable 
periods is plausible, where short term debt rollovers help reduce the risk of 
insolvency. The negatively significant post GFC result  found in the DDE model may 
be evidence of the smallest 10 entities increasing gearing by an average of 21% in 
2009 (BDO, 2010). This result suggests that smaller A-REITs have had difficulty 
raising sufficient equity capital since the GFC and rely more on debt to fund further 
expansion.  
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The effect of profitability (NPATE) on leverage is negative and significant at 
the 1% level in the DDE model. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), Fama 
and French (2002), Zoppa and McMahon (2002), Cassar and Holmes (2003), 
Hammes and Chen (2004), Westgaard (2008), and Harrison et al. (2011). In a raw 
sense, this result would support pecking order theory for entities that are able to 
retain earnings and use less debt, but because debt becomes the first preference in the 
absence of retained earnings, this theory is refuted for this variable. The result 
supports trade-off theory whereby more profitable A-REITs prefer to reduce cheaper 
debt for greater fear of approaching bankruptcy, especially when they are not 
integrated with the tax system. Given the strong result and inclusion of stapled A-
REITs in the sample, lower debt usage suggests that tax deductions play little or no 
part in the gearing decision, weakly refuting the tax component of trade-off theory. 
The positive and significant result in the DPU model is consistent with the findings 
of Smith and Watts (1992) and Barclay et al. (2001). This supports the preference of 
debt over equity in the absence of retained earnings for more profitable A-REITs. It 
also indicates that higher profitability may be key to negotiating a lower cost of debt, 
or that the relative scarcity of lending during the credit crunch led to the preference 
of more profitable borrowers. This could support trade-off theory if the benefit to 
profitable A-REITs of more favourable interest rates exceeds the cost of approaching 
bankruptcy. 
After the onset of the GFC, the DDE model shows that more profitable A-
REITs with lower debt ratios have increased debt, although the association with non-
stapled A-REITs is not significant. Significant relationships are at the 1% level. 
Possible reasons for a positive significance revolve around the credit shortage and 
banks’ greater unwillingness to lend funds to poorly performing entities after the 
GFC onset. It appears that stricter lending criteria and the scarcity of funds led to the 
likelihood of more profitable (or less unprofitable) A-REITs to obtain a greater share 
of debt financing at the expense of less profitable ones. Evidence of this is provided 
by the sample data showing a weakly positive correlation of 0.1719 between A-REIT 
profitability and debt issues scaled by A-REIT size after 2008.  With some A-REITs 
facing fast expiring debt facilities, it may have been less costly to promptly refinance 
where they could, and to avoid the uncertainties involving drawn-out, more 
expensive equity issues. From a theoretical perspective, it appears as if pecking order 
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theory prevails and both agency and trade-off Theories are refuted when profitability 
is analysed during an unstable period. The reasons appear to be more opportunistic 
when facing urgent expiry deadlines than focusing on long term net costs. The DPU 
model conversely shows a negative and significant post GFC relationship when more 
profitable A-REITs reduce their debt levels or increase their relative quantity of 
outstanding units. This may be related to the post GFC relationship with unit price 
performance (explained later), where increasing unit prices given better profitability, 
lead to a reduction in debt ratio.  
 The relationship between leverage and tangibility (NTATA) is positive in 
both the DDE and DPU models. It is significant at the 1% level (DDE) but not in the 
DPU model. This finding is inconsistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Booth et 
al. (2001) but is consistent with the work of Prasad et al. (2003) and Suto (2003), 
who find a positive significant relationship for Malaysian entities, Harrison et al. 
(2011), for U.S.-REITs, Deesomsak et al. (2004), who find a positive relationship 
among Australian entities, and Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) for A-REITs up to 
2009. Long term debt is typically used to fund larger asset purchases over a longer 
period, and thus incorporates a duration premium within its cost. All or part of this 
premium may translate into lenders’ demand for collateral. The pre-GFC period also 
coincides with a greater number of long term property purchases and an increase in 
long term gearing at the height of the economic cycle. The results show strong 
support for agency theory whereby collateral opportunities in the form of fixed 
charges increases with the level of debt. If the relationship were negative, then one 
would see A-REITs with lower levels of tangibility borrowing at higher cost, also 
contravening pecking order theory. Trade-off theory is also supported by the results 
because with a higher number of tangible assets, losses to creditors are minimized 
should default occur.  One also sees support for these theories anecdotally where the 
A-REIT market is generally more highly geared than non A-REIT entities and has a 
higher degree of tangibility with real estate assets in the absence of intangibles such 
as goodwill and research and development.  
With onset of the GFC, both models show that highly tangible A-REITs 
reduce debt levels. However, this is significant only in the DDE model. This result 
may simply reflect negative asset revaluation once economic pessimism lowered the 
present value of expected future income generated by assets. In turn, the magnitude 
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of collateral fell and it appears that both trade-off and agency theories hold with 
respect to tangibility. The lowering of debt levels aims to reduce the impact of 
default on creditors and also minimises the cost of debt where lenders would 
otherwise be under-collateralised. 
Operating risk (OPRISK) has a negative impact upon debt levels and is 
significant at the 1% level in the DDE model but insignificant in the DPU model. 
This result supports trade-off theory whereby volatile earnings make financial 
distress more likely. A-REITs appear to have reduced leverage in this regard to 
reduce mandatory interest repayments and reduce the risk of distress. The result does 
not appear to support agency theory, whereby debt levels are expected to increase 
with earnings volatility to ensure that managers maximise unit holder wealth whilst 
they can at the expense of debt holders. Since this is the case, it can be suggested that 
the A-REIT market is not at the critical stage where its viability is in jeopardy. The 
converse would have suggested a last-ditch attempt to appease unit holders before 
the metaphorical ship sank. Non stapled A-REITs have a positively significant 
relationship in the DPU model and are likely able to attract greater debt funding 
because they demonstrate a much lower operational risk than stapled A-REITs do. 
After the onset of the GFC, the results are mixed, in that A-REITs with 
volatile earnings and lower debt levels either further reduced debt (DPU model) or 
increased it (DDE model) relative to assets. The DPU result is insignificant and 
suggests that the trade-off theory, despite holding in prosperous times is not quite as 
rigid during an uncertain period where it is expected to be.  It can also be suggested 
that the lack of significance is due to risky A-REITs expecting such financial results 
and having previously reduced debt levels in preparation for further volatility. It is 
also possible that A-REITs with high operating risk are slow to react in reducing debt 
levels when faced with the uncertain magnitude of the GFC. Looking back at Table 
4.1.1, debt issues in the sample increased from $5.8 billion in the 2006/07 financial 
year to $9.3 billion in 2007/08, before falling to $1.9 billion in 2008/09 after the 
shock hit. The DDE model supports agency theory after the GFC, where the gearing 
ratio increases with the level of operating risk. Without being certain of exactly how 
close certain A-REITs came to insolvency, the ASX delisting of 23 A-REITs 
between July 2008 and June 2012 may lend support to agency reasons for increasing 
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debt. Alternatively, there may have been a shortfall in expected equity subscriptions 
given the high volatility of earnings at this stage. 
Growth opportunities (MVBV) have a negative relationship with gearing 
levels. It is significant at the 1% level in both the DDE and DPU models, which is 
consistent with the results of Titman and Wessels (1988), Chikolwa (2009), and 
Harrison (2011), but in contrast to the work of Deesomsak et al. (2004), Feng et al. 
(2007), Giambona (2008), and Zarebski and Dimovski (2012). The results support 
agency theory, whereby A-REITs with high growth potential are expected to shy 
away from lender monitoring. The theory states that there is potential to undertake 
opportunities that are riskier than optimal, with the cost of debt reflecting this risk. 
A-REITs with larger growth opportunities prefer to reduce borrowings, which may 
reflect an increased cost of debt and suggest a propensity to engage in projects of 
above average risk, whilst reducing the level of debt-induced monitoring. In 
supporting trade-off theory, intangible growth opportunities appear to place debt 
serviceability in doubt. Growth opportunities do not seem to be solidly substantiated, 
eliciting more pessimism. This contrasts with signalling theory where high-growth 
A-REITs may be borrowing more as a signal to the market that their strategy will 
withstand further monitoring. To further support this result, many studies of U.S.-
REITs show that growth opportunities are not typically funded with debt. This can be 
seen as a sign of undertaking more aggressive, risky growth strategies without the 
pressure of additional monitoring in the more competitive and condensed U.S. REIT 
market. The results also refute pecking order theory, which states that growth 
opportunities are preferably funded by cheaper debt than highly discounted equity. In 
contrast, non-stapled A-REITs tend to use more debt in the presence of growth 
opportunities. The purchase of mainly existing property is less risky than engaging in 
property development, which is typical of stapled A-REIT activity, and so costs of 
debt for non-development appear generally less prohibitive. 
After the onset of the GFC, A-REITs with higher growth opportunities and 
increased debt levels appear to have even further reduced gearing in the DDE 
models, significant at the 1% level. In a sense, there is a slight indication that 
managers may have been trying to reduce the scrutiny of lenders after revising the 
expectations of their projects. It is more likely; however that A-REITs saw greater 
volatility in growth opportunities after GFC onset, and followed trade-off theory by 
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reducing debt and mandatory interest payments in favour of more expensive equity 
funding. This signifies a potential move away from confident signalling to lower 
monitoring when growth is impaired.  In contrast, the DPU model shows a positively 
significant relationship at the 10% level after GFC onset. This moves away from 
trade-off theory and perhaps better reflects the distant post GFC recovery and 
improving confidence in creditor monitoring of growth opportunities.  
In both models, unit price performance (UPP) has a positive relationship with 
debt levels, and is significant at the 10% level in the DPU model. The positive result 
contrasts with those of Baker and Wurgler (2002), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Li et al. 
(2007), and Ooi et al. (2010), but is consistent with Zarebski and Dimovski (2012). 
This result contrasts with market timing theory by suggesting that higher unit prices 
elicit the greater use of debt. A possible explanation is that despite the potential to 
raise sizeable amounts of equity capital when unit prices are high, debt was relatively 
inexpensive before the GFC and on average, there may have been a desire to not 
dilute the unitholder base. Drawing on Table 4.1.1, the total debt issued in the sample 
in the 2005/06 and 2006/07 financial years before the GFC was $7.429 billion 
whereas total equity issued over the same period was $7.062 billion. These similar 
figures help explain that there was no specific preference for equity despite unit price 
performance being considered superior. It can be contended that A-REITs do not 
appear to have taken advantage of information asymmetry by strategically offering 
equity when units were overvalued. Even if price performance did lead to more 
equity being issued, it must be shown that unit values were positively deviating from 
their intrinsic value in order to assert that managers opportunistically acted upon 
information asymmetry. 
After the onset of the GFC, A-REITs with superior market performance and 
higher debt levels appear to have reduced debt and increased equity, with a 
significant impact in the DPU model at the 5% level. This is likely due to the fact 
that despite tremendous falls in market capitalisation initially from December 2007, a 
large number of A-REITs were actively raising equity capital in the short term to 
improve their financial position, as seen in Table 4.1.1. This supports market timing 
theory over the recovery with rising equity prices but shows that the GFC appears to 
have distorted decisions that managers may have planned to make under stable 
economic conditions.  
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Finally, the GFC has a pronounced negative impact in the DPU model, 
significant at the 1% level. Its general negative impact reflects the concern of A-
REITs of being overexposed to debt when revenues are uncertain. Two effects 
prevail. The first conforms to trade-off theory whereby uncertain revenues place the 
ability to cover mandatory interest repayments in doubt. A-REITs actively attempted 
to reduce this default risk by issuing equity to pay off debt. In some cases, equity 
issues assisted in making interest payments when profitability was highly negative in 
the 2007/08 and 2008/09 financial years. The GFC also reduced the supply of loan 
funding and led to a tightening of credit policy. This means that A-REITS were 
scrambling to secure refinancing of debt facilities while they could, and to a greater 
extent, to obtain equity capital. The second effect comes into play when asset values 
fall and ‘artificially’ raise debt ratios despite A-REITs having not varied their 
nominal debt significantly across financial years. This effect creates the positively 
significant result in the DDE model. Higher debt ratios in turn raise the cost of debt 
because lenders run the risk of the loan-to-value margin decreasing or book equity 
becoming negative as was seen with Centro Property Trust. Again, the desire to 
secure equity capital despite its low price and high cost shows that this strategy is the 
lesser of two evils compared to the potentially prohibitive cost of debt, increased 
monitoring and risk of bankruptcy. 
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
 
The Australian listed property sector is an unique market in its own right and, 
given the conflicting determinants of capital structure in numerous previous studies, 
the GFC has created an environment where the effect of the classic expected 
determinants seem to be distorted. This does not mean that the way in which they 
interact with the debt ratio is illogical but, rather, appears to achieve an outcome that 
is focused on A-REIT survival instead of managerial opportunism. The effects of a 
tax ruling exempting A-REITS from paying corporate tax if they pay out their 
earnings plays a large part in differentiating the theoretical predictions across A-
REITs and the usual corporate entity. The results have been interpreted in light of 
this criterion. The robustness of the traditional capital structure model (DDE) is 
tested by using a second model (DPU) with a proxy debt ratio measure. The results 
are similar over the entire sample period and the proxy model is found to reflect 
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capital structure decisions better. This appears plausible because the DDE variable 
incorporates large variations in the book equity denominator that are somewhat 
beyond managerial control during periods of market volatility. 
The results are similar to those found in both REIT and corporate entities 
internationally and show that several explanatory variables have differing impacts 
where the GFC does play a part in affecting capital structure decisions. The results 
also show that the determinants of A-REIT capital structure and their signs compare 
similarly with those of U.S.-REITs and, given conflicting results abroad, it is 
difficult to give definitive reasons. A-REITs have been, however, more prompt than 
U.S.-REITs in issuing significant equity post GFC onset and this is a likely reason 
capital structure currently has a lower proportion of debt. At the genesis of the GFC 
recovery, U.S.-REITs had close to $20 billion of equity issues in 2010 and their debt 
levels remained at 50% as opposed to those of A-REITs, which changed to 30% (St 
Anne, 2011).  
Capital structure theories, including the pecking order, trade-off, agency, and 
market timing theories, are both supported and refuted in this study, depending on 
the interplay of certain independent variables with the level of debt. It is important to 
note that by confirming that a particular theory holds true, another cannot be 
necessarily discounted, since they are not mutually exclusive, rather, the theories 
provide insight into capital structure decisions from different perspectives and under 
a changing financial environment. Stapled A-REITS tend to have a higher level of 
debt because they are larger than unit property trusts, consistent with trade-off 
theory. Non-stapled A-REITs, however, are found to attract more debt for growth 
opportunities because they are a less risky prospect to creditors than stapled A-REITs 
in this regard. There is potential for further research in terms of analysing the long 
term impacts of financial crises, including the degree and timing of reversion back to 
the status quo. The impacts of traditional determinants on both long and short term 
leverage decisions can be compared given the invisible optimal capital structure that 
exists under different environments. There is also greater scope for more research 
with U.S.-REITs, since the GFC has had the largest impact there and should provide 
more insightful differences across different periods.  
The research in this chapter is important because it gives insight into the 
combination of debt and equity that management believes maximises firm value. 
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This can assist future management in aiming for a structure based on prevailing 
financial variables and that shares consensus over many entities within specific 
industries. Extending this study over the GFC may assist future managers to replicate 
successful capitalisation strategies in maintaining solvency over future crises. 
Successful navigation of crises and communication of such to stakeholders can also 
lead to improved market confidence, meaning that investor fear will not precipitate 
market collapse, and equity values can be better maintained.  
Generally, as the A-REIT sector attempts to ride out the effects of the GFC, 
one can expect a more passive investment strategy, with less active investment in 
property development and a simpler financial structure to appeal to more risk-averse 
equityholders. This expectation however, may be prescriptive, since debt issues have 
increased markedly in the years after the onset of the GFC. It seems that harsh 
lessons have been learned, given the unfailing optimism within the financial industry 
right up until the GFC shock, and that the Australian listed property sector will in the 
future position itself with a sustainable mix of capital at every stage in the economic 
cycle. 
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APPENDIX: Sample of A-REITs Used in Chapter 4 
   
Name ASX 
Code 
STAPLED 
   
Abacus Property STP ABP YES 
Agricultural Land Unt AGJ NO 
ALE PRP GRP STP LEP YES 
Aspen Grp STP APZ YES 
Astro Jap Prop STP AJA YES 
Aust Education UNT AEU NO 
Bunnings Warehouse UNT BWP NO 
Carindale Prop UNT CDP NO 
CFS Retail Prop UNT CFX NO 
Challenger Winetr UNT CWT NO 
Commonwealth Prop Ord UNT CPA NO 
Coonawarra Aust UNT CNR NO 
GEO Prop Grp STP GPM YES 
Goodman Grp Forus GMG YES 
GPT Grp STP GPT YES 
ING Industrial Fd UNT IIF NO 
ING Office FD STP IOF YES 
ING Re Com Grp STP ILF YES 
ING Real Est Ente UNT IEF YES 
Living & Leisure Grp STP LLA YES 
Mirvac Grp STP MGR YES 
Rabinov Prop Tr UNT RBV NO 
RNY Prop Tr UNT RNY NO 
Stockland STP SGP YES 
Thakral Holdings UNT THG YES 
Tishman Speyer UNT TSO NO 
Trafalgar Corp STP TGP YES 
Trinity Grp STP TCQ YES 
Valad Prop Forus VPG YES 
Westfield Grp STP WDC YES 
Westpac Office Tr UNT WOT NO 
 
TOTAL 
 
31 
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CHAPTER 5 
A-REIT FIDUCIARY REMUNERATION AND THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
In recent times, company fiduciaries have come under scrutiny because of the 
marked difference between their compensation and that of the average employee. It 
seems to be an on-going issue of such importance, that it was highlighted by a recent 
Australian Productivity Commission study on remuneration (Productivity 
Commission, 2009). This was the case prior to the global financial crisis (GFC), but 
became more prominent after its onset. There has been regulated disclosure of 
remuneration figures and policies, and shareholders were awarded the right to vote 
on remuneration reports in 2005. This issue however has been gaining such 
momentum, that the Australian Corporations Act (2001) recently included an 
amendment in which if 25% or more of votes cast at two consecutive annual general 
meetings oppose the adoption of a remuneration report, the company must formally 
respond by asking all board members, except the managing director, to stand for re-
election within 90 days. In addition, key management personnel whose remuneration 
is disclosed in the remuneration report are excluded from voting, ensuring that those 
with an obvious interest in the outcome cannot vote. Similar new laws have been 
introduced in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe, which highlight the 
extent of shareholder discontent.  
The study of fiduciary remuneration is important because an employment 
arrangement that involves the custody of many billions of dollars of investor wealth 
must be seen to be fairly driven and compensated. Motivational financial incentives 
need to be clear and publicly transparent to ensure that investors understand the link 
between their wealth and the costs they expend towards fiduciaries to grow it. In the 
absence of complete contractual information being conveyed from fiduciaries to 
investors, it is the role of academicians to provide insight into the catalysts behind 
efforts that will maximize the efficiency of this relationship. Prior literature has 
analysed segments of the entire pay-for-performance story. Chopin et al. (1995) 
study the impact of profit and revenues on executive pay, whilst Hardin (1998) was 
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the first to study performance variables, managerial, and equity real estate investment 
trust (REIT) attributes. Scott et al. (2001) isolate incentive pay from other types, 
whilst Pennathur and Shelor (2002) study the way in which performance measures 
affect the change in compensation. Pennathur et al. (2005) further examine share-
based pay, and Ghosh and Sirmans (2002; 2005) study board composition and its 
relationship with REIT performance and chief executive officer (CEO) pay. Feng et 
al. (2007) focus on REIT director remuneration and performance, whilst Griffith et 
al. (2011) study REIT CEO pay-for-performance relationships using power, 
performance, and risk-related attributes.  
The aim of this research chapter is to isolate various determinants of 
remuneration explored in previous research such as performance, risk, and the 
concentration of fiduciary power, and examine their impact on the three senior layers 
of Australian REIT (A-REIT) management, namely, non executive directors (NEDs), 
CEOs, and top management. The primary responsibility of NEDs is to monitor agent 
CEOs, who are ultimately responsible for maximising unitholder returns efficiently. 
Top management consists of the delegates of the CEO, responsible for various 
individual divisions. Each level of management is compensated for specific tasks. 
The reasons for awarding specific amounts of compensation and the way these are 
attributed to certain performance, risk, and power measures are largely internal 
knowledge. Whilst Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listing rules mandate some 
public mention of justifying remuneration types, this is far from specific enough for 
stakeholders to be able to scrutinize exactly the factors responsible for determining 
each component. 
 Building upon prior research, the intention of this chapter is to find not only 
the determinants of each fiduciary level’s remuneration, but also the drivers of each 
remuneration type. For instance, is pure base salary driven by obscure industry 
standards or do performance, risk, and power measures play a part? What exactly 
leads to the composition of bonus payments and under what circumstances do they 
fluctuate? Annual reports of listed entities are mandated to specify the proportion of 
long term incentive equity pay. This is a rule designed to signal that fiduciary 
decisions will also affect their own wealth, but does not specify exactly why this 
apparent agency mitigation tool fluctuates from year to year. The level of CEO 
power is of particular interest because this in itself has the potential to dilute the level 
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of equity compensation offered if CEOs are able to influence their own 
remuneration.  
This chapter also builds on previous literature by focusing on all fiduciary 
levels simultaneously and determining the unique drivers of pay for each level to 
give the reader an insight into the complex interrelationships between externally 
obscure individual contracts. It further builds on past research by incorporating the 
GFC to examine the change in performance-based contracts within A-REITs through 
the initial shock in the 2008 financial year into the subsequent recovery. This is 
important because fiduciaries suddenly needed to take action to avoid or at least 
attempt to minimize any negative impact on their entities. These actions must have 
been sufficiently motivated, given the urgency of the unexpected shock. Thus, this 
type of event needs to be studied to reveal any changes in existing contractual 
dynamics and the motivational forces behind them.  
This chapter also isolates and models stapled A-REITs separately from the 
rest of the sample to gauge whether remuneration is constructed differently given the 
increased risk and development responsibility. If there are any differences between 
stapled and non-stapled A-REITs, these will be isolated and interpreted. As a 
cautionary word, it is not the intention of this chapter to provide commentary on the 
magnitude of remuneration, because this needs to be set at a level that attracts highly 
skilled professionals at the very least, rather, this chapter intends to examine the 
linkages between fiduciary responsibility and its financial reward over a period of 
financial volatility and prolonged recovery.  
Australia has the second largest REIT sector in the world and very little 
research has been done to date into remuneration determinants here. This is the only 
study analysing pay and incentives across all three levels of senior management of 
A-REITs and the GFC. It therefore fills an important gap in the literature, with the 
potential to inform many stakeholders of the status quo, with connotations for future 
regulation such as mandating a minimum proportion of incentive pay relative to base 
pay and lengthening minimum vesting periods such that any strategy truly benefits 
investors over the long term. Overall, this research will answer the following 
questions: Do financial performance, risk, fiduciary power, and A-REIT attributes 
determine different pay components of the three types of fiduciaries?, Are agency 
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issues present in the determination of pay?, And has the GFC altered the dynamics 
between base salary, short term bonuses (STBs) and long term incentive pay (LTI)?  
The findings show that NEDs are compensated for increasing unitholder 
wealth and risk reduction. Some agency elements apply when CEO power is reduced 
and the board is less diluted, especially after GFC onset, when their jobs became 
more difficult. CEO base pay is affected by past systematic returns, rising risk 
factors, and loss of bonuses since the GFC. They receive higher bonuses for 
decreasing debt and greater responsibility, but much of these are affected by 
systematic factors. CEO LTIs have diminished since the GFC, since they are no 
longer as much of an incentive and this effect is more prominent for CEOs who are 
also board chairs. Top management base salaries seem to account for risk beyond top 
management’s control and for both reduction in debt and increased responsibility 
since the GFC. Bonuses are based on risk reduction and increases in profits and 
unitholder wealth. They are also more prevalent post GFC relative to LTIs for ‘fast’ 
motivation. 
Table 5.1.1 shows the sample average base salary, short term cash bonus and 
long term incentives for NEDs, CEOs, and executives listed in A-REIT financial 
reports as part of the group of highest earning management (TOPMAN). Table 5.1.1 
also shows the percentage of the total average remuneration for each pay type. The 
sample consists of A-REITs that disclose individual fiduciary remuneration and does 
not include those that have a responsible entity because their reports do not disclose 
the breakdown in compensation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: A-REIT Fiduciary Remuneration and the Global Financial Crisis 
133 
 
Table 5.1.1: Averages of Remuneration Types and Percentages of the Total.  
NED FEES 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 657,954 771,844 904,749 869,599 712,742 740,092 869,492 
CEO 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SALARY 1,261,818 1,397,744 1,619,418 1,520,329 1,523,490 1,685,092 1,613,880 
% OF TOTAL 43% 36% 44% 52% 44% 45% 46% 
BONUS 1,156,192 1,672,197 1,159,835    764,092 1,266,675 1,332,634 1,234,741 
% OF TOTAL 39% 43% 32% 26% 36% 36% 35% 
LTI    526,294    795,574    879,588    655,856    702,096    868,450 677,464 
% OF TOTAL 18% 21% 24% 22% 20% 19% 19% 
TOTAL 2,947,338 3,865,516 3,668,867 2,940,278 3,492,260 3,886,176 3,526,085 
TOP MAN 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SALARY 2,273,062 2,930,103 3,635,466 3,883,899 2,558,446 2,798,575 2,822,907 
% OF TOTAL 47% 41% 51% 64% 48% 47% 49% 
BONUS 1,632,735 2,572,465 1,615,358    824,986 1,216,468 1,472,683 1,645,995 
% OF TOTAL 34% 36% 23% 14% 23% 25% 29% 
LTI    955,589 1,651,581 1,905,418 1,365,060 1,515,190 1,653,646 1,283,422 
% OF TOTAL 19% 23% 26% 22% 29% 28% 22% 
TOTAL 4,861,386 7,154,059 7,156,241 6,073,945 5,290,104 5,924,904 5,752,324 
Note: Compiled by the author from A-REIT annual reports. 
Poor average financial results, shattering share price performance, and 
declining balance sheet health across large spans of the corporate sector throughout 
the 2008 and 2009 financial years elicited the public perception that fiduciary 
remuneration was excessive and did not reflect the ability of management to 
maximise shareholder wealth. On one hand, share values reflect investor sentiment 
and are susceptible to the downward ‘follow the herd’ approach once markets begin 
to crash. In this case, severe negative changes in share values are not entirely within 
management’s control. On the other hand, market crashes must also have some 
catalyst. In the case of A-REITs, low interest rates, the high tangibility of property 
assets, and the high resulting collateral on offer to lenders, enabled borrowing that 
was arguably excessive (Kawaguchi et al., 2005; Erol et al., 2011). The shock of the 
GFC onset and resulting market downturn, coupled with tremendous urgency to 
reduce debt and offer equity (Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012; Zochling & Phipson, 
2012) clearly demonstrated that some A-REITs had not practiced due diligence by 
managing risks before the event. 
These negative characteristics appear to have borne the brunt of negative 
shareholder sentiment with respect to fiduciary remuneration. One of the reasons it is 
important to study A-REITs is their excessive negative response to the GFC event, 
previously explained in Chapter 4. Table 5.1.2 compares A-REIT total returns with 
the ASX All-Ordinaries Index and four other substantial REIT indices around the 
world in the four years following GFC onset. In Australia, the ASX, in which A-
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REITs are included, substantially outperformed the specialised A-REIT index, 
primarily minimizing heavy comparative losses.  
 
Table 5.1.2: Total Returns of the REIT and ASX Indexes, 2008-2011 
 A-REIT ASX U.S. 
REIT 
U.K. 
REIT 
JAPAN 
REIT 
TURKISH 
REIT 
2008 -40.45 -18.34 -14.15 -23.48 -47.84 -21.38 
2009 -42.78 -15.90 -43.74 -30.84   20.40 -10.46 
2010   11.06     6.07   55.23   -7.48 -11.44   53.26 
2011    -3.99     3.12   34.09  33.22   16.71   35.60 
AVERAGE  -19.04   -6.26     7.86   -7.15    -5.55   14.25 
Note: This table includes the initial two years of GFC-induced negative returns and two subsequent recovery years. 
Source: The ASX (http://au.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-asx-200-a-reit-sector), accessed 2 August 2012. 
  
Abroad, U.S. and Turkish REITs averaged positive returns. A-REITs 
specifically appear to have been one of the poorest performing markets on a global 
scale. They experienced one of the biggest declines in total returns, including two 
years of sub 40% returns and subsequently one of the slowest increases during the 
recovery period (ASX, 2012). A-REIT units have been trading at a discount to net 
asset value since 2008, which has made any issues of equity more expensive, given a 
higher cost of equity capital. The increased liquidity factor in comparison to unlisted 
A-REITs has left them more susceptible to downward market trends beyond their 
control and has made the targeted remuneration contracts of fiduciaries even more 
critical as motivation to arrest those trends.  
Analysis of fiduciary remuneration is vital because fiduciary compensation 
structure is critical in compensating and offering incentives to best manage A-REIT 
responses to a worsening economic environment. For example, as A-REITs approach 
insolvency, short term cash bonuses (STBs) would best invite fast remedial action, as 
opposed to long term incentive options and equity pay (LTIs). LTI values through 
equity grants may take a long time to appreciate, creating a lag in desirable 
managerial strategy. LTIs also depend on market factors beyond fiduciary control 
and may not reflect the magnitude of fiduciary efforts. These would therefore not be 
expected to be included in a first-best incentive contract in a critically declining 
economic environment. The risk that equity incentives pose invites fiduciaries to 
command a premium over an acceptable level of fixed cash pay (Core et al., 2001) 
under the assumption of risk aversion, leading to inflated overall compensation and a 
widening of the fiduciary-employee pay gap. In stable periods, however, a 
combination of both STBs and LTIs would assist in reducing agency issues. In a 
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previous study of U.S companies between 1980 and 1994, Hall and Liebman (1998) 
find that the majority of pay-performance sensitivity involves stock options, which 
was measured as being 53 times greater than that of base salary and STBs alone. 
Table 5.1.3 shows the percentage of A-REITs that increased the three types 
of remuneration for each type of fiduciary relative to the year before in the two years 
preceding and four years succeeding the GFC onset. Remuneration for the remainder 
of A-REITs either decreased or stayed constant. A smaller number of A-REITs 
appear to have increased total remuneration after the GFC onset. It is interesting to 
note the contrast between the different pay types, where the propensity of A-REITs 
to increase them differs over individual years. One general theme, however, is that 
there is a greater tendency to increase base salary over other types from year to year, 
especially for top management. This may indicate a strategy by remuneration 
committees to diminish the focus on bonuses, which signal the most obvious 
managerial belief that targets have been achieved, even if the same sentiment is not 
shared externally. 
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Table 5.1.3: Percentage of A-REITs That Increased Previous Remuneration 
NED  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FEES % INCREASE 74% 65% 90% 33% 52% 82% 73% 
CEO  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SALARY % INCREASE 88% 76% 81% 38% 65% 81% 36% 
BONUS % INCREASE 71% 77% 33% 13% 60% 33% 50% 
LTI % INCREASE 91% 86% 57% 35% 55% 52% 73% 
TOTAL % INCREASE 76% 88% 56% 38% 75% 67% 50% 
TOP MAN  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SALARY % INCREASE 76% 91% 75% 52% 67% 65% 64% 
BONUS % INCREASE 61% 65% 47% 21% 45% 59% 56% 
LTI % INCREASE 67% 78% 53% 32% 50% 60% 78% 
TOTAL % INCREASE 70% 91% 68% 41% 52% 78% 73% 
Note: Compiled by the author from A-REIT annual reports. 
 
Table 5.1.4 shows the average percentage increase or decrease for each type 
of remuneration for all three fiduciary types relative to the previous year. 
 
Table 5.1.4: Average Percentage Increase (Decrease) in Pay 
NED               2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FEES 26% 17%  17%    (4%) (18%) 4%  17% 
CEO 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SALARY 31% 11%  16%    (6%)      0.2% 11%    (4%) 
BONUS 36% 45% (31%) (34%)   66% 5%    (7%) 
LTI 92% 51%  11% (25%)     7% 24% (22%) 
TOTAL 45% 31%   (5%) (20%)   19% 7%   (9%) 
TOP MAN 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SALARY 23% 29%   24%     7% (34%) 9%    1% 
BONUS 59% 58% (37%) (49%)   47% 21%  12% 
LTI 79% 73%   15% (28%)   11% 9% (22%) 
TOTAL 26% 47%     0.03% (15%) (13%) 12%   (3%) 
Note: Compiled by the author from A-REIT annual reports. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 explains the data and 
methodology, Section 5.3 analyses and interprets the results, and Section 5.4 
provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
 
5.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data were chosen over seven years, from 2006 to 2012. This period 
incorporates the effects of the GFC, which began mid way through the 2007/08 
financial year. More specifically, its onset has been chronologically traced to 17 
December 2007, when several A-REITs concurrently recorded statistically 
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significant negative abnormal returns (Dimovski, 2009). To improve consistency, the 
aim is to use only A-REITs that are listed continuously and retain their CEO over at 
least two years during the period. As a result of this parameter, the sample size is not 
very large on an annual basis. Furthermore, several A-REITs are considered too 
volatile over the sample period and are omitted. This volatility manifests itself 
through several annual report line items and financial ratios that are substantially 
greater than three standard deviations from the mean. 
 Another issue is that several A-REITs are not obliged to disclose individual 
managerial remuneration because this is paid by their responsible entity. On several 
occasions, responsible entities were either jointly owned by multiple companies, 
unlisted in Australia, or subsidiaries of unlisted foreign companies. In these cases, 
the management fees that were disclosed could not be apportioned to certain 
individuals and could not be used. In some A-REITs, management was the same as 
their group parent. In all, there are 26 suitable and largely stable A-REITs in the final 
sample, 23 having been excluded for the above reasons. Therefore a panel 
methodology is employed with 148 observations. Table 5.2.1 shows a list of the A-
REITs, both those used in the sample and omitted from it. 
Using a panel methodology has certain advantages in this case. It is 
unbalanced, allowing for more data and degrees of freedom, which reduces the risk 
of collinearity between explanatory variables and increases efficiency of estimates. 
The panel format reduces any effects of omitted and unobserved variables that are 
correlated with explanatory variables. Using fixed effects also does not require the 
assumption of no correlation between individual effects. The data are retrieved from 
annual reports through the Connect 4 and DatAnalysis Premium databases. 
Remuneration and managerial unit holding disclosures are from the directors’ report 
section of annual reports and the performance and risk figures are from financial 
reports and converted into ratios. Unit price data are taken from DatAnalysis 
Premium.  
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Table 5.2.1: A-REITS both Used and Omitted 
A-REITs Used ASX Code A-REITs Excluded ASX Code 
Abacus Property Trust ABP Aurora Property Group AUP 
APN Property Group AEZ Australian Social Infrastructure AZF 
Agricultural Land Trust AGJ Brookfield BPA 
ALE Property Group LEP BWP Trust BWP 
Australand Property Group ALZ Carindale Property Trust CDP 
Aspen Group APZ CFS Retail Property Trust CFX 
Astro Japan Property Group AJA Charter Hall Retail REIT CQR 
Australian Education Trust AEU Commonwealth Property Office  CPA 
Challenger Diversified Group CDI Federation Centres FDC 
Charter Hall Group CHC Galileo Japan Trust GJT 
Cromwell Property Group CMW Generation Healthcare GHC 
Centro Properties Group CNP Ingenia Group INA 
Coonawarra Australia CNR Investa Office Fund IOF 
Dexus Property Group DXS Lantern Hotel Group LTN 
Goodman Group GMG Macarthurcook MPS 
Growthpoint Property Trust GOZ Mirvac Industrial Trust MIX 
GPT Group GPT Multiplex European  MUE 
Living and Leisure Group LLA P-REIT PXT 
Mirvac Group MGR Real Estate Capital Partners RCU 
Redcape Property Trust RPF RNY Property Trust RNY 
Stockland Group SGP SCA Property Group SCP 
Trinity Group TCQ U.S Masters Residential Fund URF 
Thakral Holdings THG Westfield Retail Trust WRT 
Trafalgar Corporation TGP   
Valad Property Group VPG   
Westfield Group WDC   
Note: This table shows A-REITs taken from The Australian, as of 4 August 2011. 
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Table 5.2.2 shows descriptive statistics for the dependant variables salary, 
short term cash bonus, and long term incentives for both CEO and top management 
as disclosed in the annual reports. It also shows only salary for NEDs, since they are 
primarily independent and do not typically receive performance-based rewards. 
Salary is comprised of base pay, fringe benefits and superannuation, whilst LTIs 
include the nominal value of A-REIT units and options. Any exercising of options by 
executives is not included due to the contingent nature of this activity and is 
independent from its initial offer as an incentive. The above three elements of 
compensation are also tested in aggregate (Total Compensation) because analysing 
the interactions between the variables on a net basis is important, as well as each 
element of compensation. The following model, similar to that of Griffith et al. 
(2011) and Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), is used: 
Remuneration it = α0 + β 1 Performance n-1 + β 2 Riskn + β 3CEO Power n + β 4 
Attributes n + eit 
Base remuneration shows a mild trend from year to year, therefore inflation-adjusted 
remuneration over time is the appropriate measure to use. The array of independent 
variables used in each regression depends on their relatedness to each respective 
fiduciary. For example, a CEO’s remuneration would be expected to depend more on 
factors that lead to improving shareholder wealth, whereas top management 
remuneration should depend more on operational results rather than on the outcome 
of investment and financing decisions. 
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Table 5.2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
VARIABLES NON-EXEC  
SALARY 
CEO 
SALARY 
CEO 
BONUS 
CEO LTI TOP MAN 
SALARY 
TOP MAN 
BONUS 
TOP MAN 
INCENTIVES 
MEAN 830,579 896,700 493,433 395,653 2,887,587 1,130,692 657,737 
MEDIAN 702,694 866,474 149,387 169,575 2,752,415 468,000 217,893 
MINIMUM 9,000 28,275 0 0 89,988 0 0 
MAXIMUM 2,215,205 2,048,992 2,750,000 1,998,079 8,401,426 7,426,231 5,663,290 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
589,372 493,110 623,432 499,416 1,901,911 1,374,691 919,303 
Note: Descriptive statistics are provided for the entire panel (2006-2012) and are not listed for any particular year. Remuneration is specified in 
Australian dollars. NED and top management figures are an aggregate of all individuals disclosed as required by corporate legislation. CEO 
remuneration for Westfield Trust includes the average income for Frank, Peter and David Lowy because being additives would have placed them well 
outside three standard deviations in the data set. 
 
The performance category includes the following measures in the year prior to 
remuneration being awarded: 
TWOYEARAVRET: Two year average return is defined as the average return over 
the current and previous year. A return is calculated using net profit after tax divided 
by revenue; 
EPS: Earnings per share (unit), defined as earnings before interest and tax divided by 
the number of A-REIT units outstanding at the end of the financial year; 
ROE: Return on equity, which is defined as net profit after tax divided by total book 
equity (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003); 
MVA: Market value added, which is the difference between the market capitalisation 
and book capital contributed. This is an indicator of unitholder wealth maximization, 
where positive values indicate value added from the market’s perspective; 
TOBQ: Measured as the sum of market equity and book liabilities, divided by the 
sum of book equity and book liabilities. A Tobins q value greater than one indicates 
that overall REIT investments have made an economic profit over and above the 
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weighted average cost of capital. This also measures positive contributions to unit 
holder wealth; 
AVGINDRET: S&P A-REIT Index Returns. The daily average return over a 12 
month period is used as a systematic measure of A-REIT market performance;  
UPP: The average A-REIT-specific unit price performance over a 12 month period, 
used as a measure of positive contributions made by executives, reflected in unit 
prices. This variable is calculated by finding the average daily percentage change in 
price over one year. 
 
The risk category includes the following measures: 
OPRISK: Operating risk, defined as the standard deviation of earnings scaled by 
total assets, used to represent performance volatility; 
SDSHARET: Standard deviation of unit returns, which measures the volatility of 
contributions to unitholder wealth; 
SDINDRET: Standard deviation of S&P A-REIT Index returns, which measures the 
volatility of the index; 
GEARING: Gearing, or interest-bearing liabilities divided by the sum of interest-
bearing liabilities and book equity. This represents the debt ratio; 
DPU: Debt per unit, an alternative measure to the gearing ratio above. This 
represents total interest-bearing debt divided by the number of units on issue. This 
measure is arguably a better representation of capital structure given that book equity 
values fell due to asset devaluations post GFC and artificially inflated debt ratios, 
even when nominal debt was reduced (Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012). 
 
The CEO power category is based upon the hypothesis that a CEO will have some 
power in the setting of their remuneration. Variables are the following: 
CEODIR: Proportion of units owned by the CEO relative to those owned by the 
board of directors. This measure indicates implied relative ownership power, even if 
the CEO is not formally a member of the remuneration committee; 
Chapter Five: A-REIT Fiduciary Remuneration and the Global Financial Crisis 
142 
 
CEOTOT: Proportion of units owned by the CEO relative to those owned by all 
other unitholders. This is an alternative measure of CEO power where the rest of the 
board unit holdings are not isolated; 
DIRTOT: Proportion of units owned by the board of directors, excluding the CEO, 
relative to all other unitholders. This is a measure of director power in general. 
 
The attributes, category includes the following: 
SIZE: Natural logarithm of total assets. Executives are expected to be compensated 
more as their degree of responsibility rises; 
YEARSEXP: Years of experience, representing the number of years of experience 
the CEO has in the property industry. This represents the relative skill and ability of 
the CEO to make better wealth-maximising decisions; 
EXECDUR: CEO duration, a proxy for experience gained in the current position. 
This approximates a CEO’s relative success and knowledge and is expected to rise 
with remuneration. It may also proxy power, where longer serving CEOs have a 
bargaining advantage and better access to corporate resources; 
DAC: A dummy indicating the CEO is currently acting as a director of a separate 
entity. This variable indicates the diversification of skills on a greater, lateral scale; 
CHAIR: A dummy variable indicating that a CEO is also chair of the board; 
NODIR: The number of directors on the board, a measure of board strength. Larger 
boards are expected to be less efficient and less united in their convictions against 
CEO agency; 
GFC: A dummy that equals one in the 2008-2012 financial years and zero otherwise. 
For consistency with the other annual variables, the 2007/08 financial reports were 
the first to be released since the onset of the GFC in December 2007. 
Table 5.2.3 represents the correlation matrix of all independent variables 
representing performance, risk, and power. If a correlation lower than -0.6 or greater 
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than +0.6 is recorded between any two variables, only one of these as a maximum is 
included in any given regression to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
The regressions are performed at the levels of the above non-correlated 
independent variables to gauge financial relationships. Further regressions are run in 
a log-levels format to identify the percentage change in fiduciary pay as per 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990; 1992) to control for 
size-related heterogeneity. The latter format is only possible with total pay and salary 
regressions because logarithms are not possible in the many instances where bonuses 
and incentives equate to zero. Interaction variables involving the GFC dummy and 
other independent variables are included where significant, to indicate effects in a 
changing environment post December 2007. All regressions are tested for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and corrected where necessary using a 
heteroskedasticity-corrective function within Eviews and an autoregressive variable, 
respectively. The panel format requires testing for both fixed and random effects 
using the likelihood ratio and Hausman tests. The appropriate effect is reported, 
along with its cross-sectional probability. 
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5.3 RESULTS, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
5.3.1 NEDs 
 
The results for NED remuneration are presented in Tables 5.3.1.1 and 5.3.1.2. 
The first model shows NEDs because they are responsible for approving annual 
results and represent the last intermediary with a direct interest in reportable content 
prior to conveyance. Reported variables are explained if they are either significant, or 
have been significant in past research. Due to the large number of independent 
variables used, in addition to interaction variables, those that are highly insignificant 
or have no expected relationship with the dependent variables are not shown in the 
tables. Inclusion would otherwise reduce the adjusted R2 and create clutter. Another 
reason is that the risk variables ‘Gearing’ and ‘DPU’ are alternatives and are not used 
together. The suffix LAST, indicates an independent variable from the preceding 
financial year.  
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Table 5.3.1.1: NED Fees and their Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
C -1,705,361 -3.4759 *** -1,629,215 -2.6443*** 
GFC     104,074  2.9654 ***      141,728  4.0610*** 
MVALAST   0.000015  2.9061 ***   0.000013  2.4706** 
GEARINGLAST       -3,418 -3.8734 ***        -2,896 -2.9040*** 
SDINDRETLAST     -19,314  -1.4000      -26,804 -1.9297* 
CEOTOT     -12,280  -1.7292*      -15,718 -2.7167*** 
DIRTOT        -1001  -0.4036               89   0.0393 
SIZELAST     108,922   4.3932***     102,750   3.3237*** 
YEARSEXP          -105  -0.0271          1,892   0.6963 
NODIR      53,507   3.3341***        42,507   5.3894*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.9473  0.9587  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.0007  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.9607  1.8950  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of NED Fees and determinants was formulated using a least squares panel methodology with 
fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of Non Executive Director 
Fees, and is regressed on levels of all independent variables. The adjusted R2 value shows the proportion of 
movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the 
result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that 
skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of 
autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away 
from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each 
independent variable over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents 
a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
The NED model (Table 5.3.1.1) seems to be very well explained. Peripheral 
diagnostics show that regression residuals are normally distributed, with both 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2005) 
accounted for. The likelihood ratio and Hausman tests suggest a fixed effects model 
is appropriate and is required in all regressions to avoid omitted variable bias. Fixed 
effects are therefore assumed to be correlated with independent variables.  
The only significant performance-related measure is MVA from the previous 
year. Its impact is positive and implies that this type of salary is somewhat dependent 
upon the contribution made to unit holder wealth. This is similar to the result of Feng 
et al. (2007), who find a positive relationship using a market-to-book ratio measure 
of wealth building. One risk measure, gearing from the last period has a negative and 
significant influence, consistent with the work of Bryan et al. (2000) but in contrast 
to that of Brick et al. (2006). It appears that recent non-systematic reduction in debt 
levels rewards directors, as does the overall systematic reduction in unit price 
volatility. Its relationship with higher NED fees indicates a greater distribution of 
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earnings towards directors for a job well done.  This seems to also be the case for 
NEDs of stapled A-REITs, who receive higher fees when there has been a prior 
reduction in systematic risk, supporting a link with an industry standard fee base. 
The proportion of total units owned by the CEO is negative and significant, 
supporting Brick et al. (2006) and Bryan et al. (2000). This implies that agency 
factors may play a part when the remuneration committee feels less inhibited by a 
CEO’s power via unit ownership to raise NED fees. It may also imply that lower A-
REIT ownership by CEOs diverges their interests from that of unitholders, eliciting 
greater NED fees for more monitoring. The proportion of total units owned by NEDs 
is negative and insignificant. This association does not reflect agency issues but 
highlights the fact that the NED ownership proportion with respect to total 
unitholding in A-REITs should not be significant enough to elicit power interplay 
with this type of remuneration. Feng et al. (2007) find that power factors are 
insignificant overall.  
A-REIT size from the previous period has a positive influence on fees. Larger 
A-REITs carry a greater burden of responsibility and NEDs appear to be 
compensated for this, which is also supported by Feng et al. (2007). Although not 
statistically significant, a CEO’s relative degree of inexperience may place greater 
monitoring responsibility onto NEDs and lead them to command increased fees. A 
positive relationship with the number of directors indicates overall increased 
responsibility, which is typical of larger A-REITs. This is in contrast to the findings 
of Ryan and Wiggins (2004), Brick et al. (2006), and Feng et al. (2007), who find a 
negative relationship, although their findings support the results of this study after 
the onset of the GFC. The assertion is that fewer directors are better able to agree on 
higher adequate fees to compensate their greater monitoring function. The GFC 
dummy variable therefore substantiates the positive and significant impact on NED 
fees by roughly $104,000. It appears that turbulent performance and the uncertain 
economic outlook placed a greater onus on NEDs to be involved in strategic planning 
and the subsequent monitoring of CEOs. Fees increased to compensate them in this 
regard. 
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Table 5.3.1.2: Percentage Change in NED Fees and their Determinants, 2006-
2012 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C  1.3994  3.9872*** 
MVALAST  0.0001  5.7720*** 
GEARINGLAST -0.0004 -1.3085   
SDINDRETLAST -0.9939 -8.0691*** 
CEOTOT -0.0253 -4.5920*** 
SIZELAST  0.2243 17.3301*** 
NODIR  0.0568   6.7337*** 
GEARINGLAST*GFC -0.0036  -7.2462*** 
SDINDRETLAST*GFC  0.9925   7.9352*** 
CEOTOT*GFC  0.0132   2.2793** 
SIZELAST*GFC -0.0166  -4.1734*** 
NODIR*GFC -0.0272  -4.8075*** 
   
Adjusted R2 0.9684  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.1814  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.9189  
Observations 148  
Note: The model of percentage change in NED Fees and determinants was formulated using least 
squares panel methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent 
variable is the log of Non Executive Director Fees, and is regressed on levels of all independent 
variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can 
be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests 
on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that 
skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on 
the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests 
the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either 
positively or negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 
and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable over 
the entire period and specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of less than 
10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 
1%. 
 
When comparing regressions using the level-level and log-level formats, 
there is the potential for divergent results. A level dollar coefficient may be 
significant yet its log percentage counterpart may not be, and vice versa. Table 
5.3.1.2 shows the percentage change in NED fees. Considering stand-alone variables, 
the relationships mirror those in Table 5.3.1.1, with a reduction in the volatility of the 
previous year’s A-REIT index being the most influential in determining fee 
increases.  
After GFC onset, the intentional lowering of gearing level percentages 
increased fees by 0.36%, compared with 0.04% before the GFC. The systematic 
volatility of the index has the opposite effect to what it does over the entire period. 
Rather than rewarding directors for helping achieve a more stable index, fees 
increase with volatility, seemingly compensating NEDs. This indicates that recent 
past systematic uncertainty may reflect a similar future environment and compensate 
NEDs for additional planning and strategy accordingly. The general assertion that 
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less CEO unit holding power elicits agency issues is significantly negated after 2007. 
The reduction in debt levels, along with its associated natural monitoring by creditors 
looks to have led more powerful CEOs to induce greater NED monitoring through 
higher fees, despite their greater unit ownership better aligning their interests with 
those of unitholders. It is therefore plausible that more powerful CEOs have greater 
input in setting higher NED fees when recognising more pronounced challenges.  
Alternatively on a more negative note, Jensen (1993) points out that higher 
paid NEDs may be less likely to ‘rock the boat’ and may be associated with a culture 
that does not allow for constructive criticism, especially when the CEO has more 
power and may even have been instrumental in attracting the NED to the board in the 
first place (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). In facing greater challenges after 2007, an 
inverse relationship with the number of board members most likely reflects 
compensation for greater responsibility and job difficulty in the face of greater 
turnover and more resignations. NEDs directing smaller A-REITs experienced 
greater increases in pay post GFC. This seemingly reflects an incentive to partake in 
strategies to consolidate their A-REITs and take advantage of growth opportunities 
during the recovery period that were not present previously. In previous revisions to 
this chapter, data excluding the year 2012 showed this effect to be insignificant. 
 
 
5.3.2 CEOs 
 
For total CEO remuneration (Table 5.3.2.1), which includes base salary, 
bonuses, and long term incentives, non-systematic performance measures show 
mixed results. Earnings per unit (EPS) have a negative and significant impact, 
whereas the return on equity from last period is positively significant, consistent with 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) and Griffith and Najand (2007). The significance of these 
measures supports Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), who show that profitability 
impacts CEO compensation. Given that A-REITs have been refinancing with equity 
on a large scale since the GFC onset, earnings relative to the number of units on issue 
are dropping.  
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Table 5.3.2.1: CEO Total Remuneration and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
C 2,417,123   6.0435*** 2,229,203  4.9993*** 
GFC    995,569   8.4287*** 1,119,818  7.0722*** 
EPS   -230,179  -2.2408**  -189,877 -1.7174* 
ROELAST        1,878   4.8698***        1,751  3.8304*** 
MVA    0.00018   1.9144*      0.0002  1.9069* 
AVGINDRET 1,590,409   3.7260*** 1,338,920  2.3196** 
AVGINDRETLAST    850,214   3.0430***    914,396  2.5417** 
OPRISKLAST     -31,625  -3.7875***     -20,258 -1.8121* 
GEARINGLAST       -3,787  -1.6148        -2,860 -1.0192 
CEODIR        4,872   3.1172***        4,936  2.9087*** 
YEARSEXP    -55,738  -3.6128***     -51,512 -2.9204*** 
DAC   370,940   3.2420***    447,656  2.8066*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.7944  0.8048  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0127  0.0180  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.7542  1.8147  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of CEO total remuneration and its determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with 
fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of CEO total remuneration, and is 
regressed on levels of all independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables 
that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the 
result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result 
of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the 
presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away 
from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent variable 
over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and 
*** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 
Earnings per share increased from an average of 21 cents per unit in 2005 to 
38 cents per unit at their peak over the sample period in 2007, then dropped to -14 
cents per unit in 2008 and fell further to -50 cents per unit at their lowest point in 
2009. It appears that the equity refinancing function has a bigger impact than 
earnings themselves on this ratio and plays its part in rewarding CEOs. This assertion 
is further verified with debt reduction in the last period also increasing total CEO 
remuneration.  
Market value added leads to a positive and significant impact, and the 
systematic performance measure of average A-REIT index returns from both current 
and past periods is positive and significant. It appears that aggregate CEO 
compensation within each A-REIT depends partially on other A-REITs such that the 
aggregate average performance in unit values seems to contribute towards the setting 
of individual CEO remuneration contracts. A publicly obscure standard industry rate 
of pay appears to be prevailing that is dependent on industry profitability and it is 
used as a benchmark. Hall and Liebman (1998) urge that a portion of pay should be 
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based on a market index to compensate CEOs for things they have control over, but 
the relationship should be negative. The positive association with total CEO pay in 
the results of this study shows that this is not the case, which implies that A-REIT 
CEO contracts are not purely tailored to reflect individual performance that is under 
CEO control. This result seems to validate Bebchuk and Fried’s (2003) argument that 
CEO employment contracts are bad for shareholders because they are a product of 
managerial power. Operating risk is negative and significant, in contrast to the 
findings of Griffith and Najand (2007). This implies that total remuneration is 
intended to reward CEOs for reduced operational volatility. The level of gearing is 
negative and marginally insignificant, supporting the relationship of Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2005), implying that agency issues may be prevalent when the amount of 
creditor monitoring decreases. 
CEO power effects appear to be present such that as a CEO’s proportion of 
directors’ total unit holdings rises, total remuneration increases. This indicates that 
the setting of a CEO’s total remuneration may not be fully independent and allows 
the CEO to extract rents (Bebchuk &Fried, 2003). Griffith and Nejand (2007) and 
Griffith et al. (2011) also find a positive, significant association, indicating that 
agency issues among A-REITs exist as in the United States. This issue is expected to 
be more serious, since urgent recapitalisation takes place because the degree of 
external monitoring is reduced. Creditor monitoring tends to restrict management in 
specified ways, for example, a contractual negative pledge prevents management 
from taking on additional debt as a condition of a current finance application. The 
repayment of debt removes any pre-existing contractual obligations related to it and 
frees up future cash flow that has the potential to be used inefficiently, exacerbating 
the agency problem in the case of entities with retained earnings.  
A potential factor mitigating this type of agency problem is outsider 
perception of compensation. Although Johnson et al. (1997) find that negative media 
coverage of compensation leads to more conservative subsequent CEO pay increases, 
there is currently not enough data to test this notion here. Another mitigation of 
agency is the two strikes law, which was established as a result of recommendations 
by the Productivity Commission (2009) to allow a board spill if more than 25% of 
shareholders do not approve of a remuneration package over two consecutive years. 
This has not yet been enforced in this sample of A-REITs, indicating that unitholders 
do not yet perceive the influence of CEO power to be an issue. 
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Interestingly, total pay increases when CEOs have less overall experience in 
the A-REIT sector. This finding is consistent with that of Pennathur and Shelor 
(2002), who use CEO age for this proxy but differs from that of Griffith and Najand 
(2011), who find it to be marginally positive. This finding may seem counter-
intuitive, yet could arise when A-REITs use total pay as a motivating tool to 
incentivise future potential rather than reward past experience. Less experienced 
CEOs are expected to have accumulated less overall wealth than more experienced 
ones, and given a diminishing marginal utility of income, higher pay could increase 
any motivational effect on those with less experience. CEOs who are also directors 
of other entities receive higher total pay. This may indicate that those who currently 
diversify their skill base over multiple businesses and have broad experience, rather 
than enduring experience, are rewarded for their multi-dimensional contribution.  
The onset of the GFC has a positively significant impact on total pay. If one 
is to extend agency implications, this indicates that when bonus targets were not met, 
other components of remuneration were increased by a greater degree to compensate 
for this loss. It is also plausible that increases in total pay reflected upon the more 
challenging tasks facing CEOs and the greater effort that was needed post GFC. 
These tasks range from reversing negative profitability to maintaining solvency. 
In terms of the impact on the percentage change in total CEO pay (Table 
5.3.2.2), earnings per unit and past return on equity are no longer significant and, 
therefore profitability measures do not seem to drive changes in total pay. Better 
systematic index returns continue to contribute greatly in setting greater total pay, as 
does the reduction of prior Operating Risk. The only significant factor post GFC in 
increasing CEO pay is the reduction in debt levels. This priority task is evidenced by 
a slightly higher coefficient, although not excessively larger than that during the 
entire period. 
To make the results more intuitive, total remuneration is partitioned into its 
three sources, namely, base salary, STBs and LTIs. For the setting of CEO base 
salary (Table 5.3.2.3), REIT-specific performance and unitholder wealth-maximising 
measures do not appear to play a part. The EPS, ROE and Tobins-Q variables from 
last period are all insignificant, as is the two-year average return, similar to the results 
of Griffith and Najand (2007). Nearly all the measures however, have negative 
coefficients, which allows the agency-related assertion that base salary may be 
inflated in light of poor individual performance and to make up for bonus reductions. 
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This is consistent with the findings of Tian and Twite (2010), who confirm that base 
CEO salaries in Australia are higher than those in the United States (Clarkson et al., 
2011). 
 
Table 5.3.2.2: Percentage Change in CEO Total Remuneration and its 
Determinants, 2006-2012 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C 5.9394 55.7056*** 
GFC 0.3738    3.2765*** 
EPS -0.0017  -0.0689 
ROELAST 0.0002   1.2871 
AVGINDRET 0.1610   1.7171* 
AVGINDRETLAST -0.0038   -0.0486 
OPRISKLAST -0.0073  -2.1827** 
GEARINGLAST 0.0038   2.7993*** 
CEODIR 0.0010   2.1651** 
YEARSEXP -0.0086  -2.6438*** 
DAC 0.0889   2.9664*** 
GEARINGLAST*GFC -0.0042  -1.9318* 
   
Adjusted R2 0.8270  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0118  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.5901  
Observations 148  
Note: The model of the percentage change in CEO total remuneration and determinants was formulated 
using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent 
variable is the log of CEO total remuneration, and is regressed on levels of all independent variables. The 
adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the 
independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that 
there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic 
is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. 
The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in 
the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming 
more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away from 2. The panel regression is 
given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the impact of 
each independent variable over the entire period and specifically post GFC. * represents a significance 
probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a 
significance level under 1%. 
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Table 5.3.2.3: CEO Base Salary and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-
STATISTIC 
C 499,403   0.8578 116,711    0.3175 
EPSLAST -49,773  -1.2306 -37,786  -0.8517 
ROELAST     -123  -0.5530      -142  -0.6386 
TWOYEARAVRET 6.0447   0.0600         50   0.6123 
TOBQLAST -23,573  -0.9296 -16,068 -0.6651 
AVGINDRETLAST 213,249   1.7631* 123,357   0.7839 
OPRISKLAST    -4,447  -0.6847    -2,827 -0.4842 
SDSHARETLAST    9,808   1.1290    10,782   1.2562 
CEODIR   1,738   2.0066**     1,927   2.6363*** 
SIZE 29,666   1.1350   44,489   2.6240** 
YEARSEXP -24,886  -3.8244*** -21,098 -3.1468*** 
EXECDUR    6,407   0.6669        878   0.0854 
DAC 161,094   2.9699*** 161,827   3.6034*** 
GFC 290,942   5.1662*** 302,033   5.0656*** 
DPULAST     5,093   2.3432**     5,555   3.0858*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.8511  0.8507  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0001  0.0000  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.9658  1.9967  
Observations 148  129  
 Note: The model of CEO base salary and its determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed 
effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of CEO base salary, and is regressed on levels 
of all independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained 
by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no 
linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on 
the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the 
null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, 
with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away from 2. The panel regression 
is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period. * 
represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a 
significance level under 1%. 
 
From a systematic perspective, the average A-REIT index return from the 
previous year positively and significantly affects salary. This finding may reflect 
overall market performance and is in line with investor expectations whereby 
opposition to salary increases have little basis. The increasing volatility of an A-
REIT’s unit prices also increases salary. This may occur as a premium for 
remuneration risk to protect CEO total pay in the face of expected bonus reductions 
when unit price appreciations are lower than targeted, or when offered as advance 
compensation for a more difficult job ahead. Larger A-REITs offer higher base 
salary, consistent with Ciscel & Carroll (1980), Lambert et al. (1991), Davis & 
Shelor (1995), and Ghosh & Sirmans (2005), given the increased complexity and 
scope of management. This becomes significant for CEOs of stapled A-REITs. Not 
only do they bear more responsibility with the inclusion of a management or 
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development company with their REIT, but they also bear responsibility for 
operations within the attached company that may differ from the fundamental 
operations of a unit trust. CEOs who direct other entities and less experienced CEOs 
also receive more, in contrast with the findings of Griffith and Najand (2007). The 
effects of the onset of the GFC and higher debt levels in the previous period are both 
positive and significant. It therefore appears that base salary is raised to compensate 
for more difficult future management and the possible diminishing of bonus 
payments. Another implication of higher debt levels is that debt will increase the size 
of assets under management and, according to agency theory, may be a strategy to 
encourage greater base compensation (Baumol, 1959; Jensen, 1986; Baker et al., 
1988; Dyl, 1988; Lambert et al., 1991). Conversely, the reduction of debt is rewarded 
through CEO bonuses, so it appears that CEOs will be compensated regardless of an 
A-REIT’s debt strategy in a given economic environment. 
 
Table 5.3.2.4: Percentage Change in CEO Base Salary and its Determinants, 
2006-2012 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C 5.2887  24.2993*** 
GFC 1.3378  15.3229*** 
SIZE 0.0380    4.4247*** 
YEARSEXP -0.0154   -7.2821*** 
DPULAST 0.0022    1.3096 
SIZE*GFC -0.0714 -11.6790*** 
AVGINDRETLAST*GFC 0.0613    0.9602 
SDSHARETLAST*GFC 0.0101    1.9115* 
YEARSEXP*GFC 0.0118    5.0146*** 
DAC*GFC 0.1142    4.2611*** 
   
Adjusted R2 0.9005  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.1223  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.7174  
Observations 148  
Note: The model of percentage change in CEO base salary and determinants was formulated using 
least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent 
variable is the log of CEO base salary, and is regressed on levels of all independent variables. The 
adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by 
the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The 
Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is 
normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that 
fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of 
autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or 
negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along 
with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period and 
specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a 
significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
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The significance of base CEO salary percentage changes is shown in Table 
5.3.2.4. The GFC, A-REIT size, CEO experience and past gearing levels show 
similar relationships to the levels regression in Table 5.3.2.3. Post GFC onset, the 
interaction variables indicate that CEO base salary increases as A-REIT size 
diminishes. This result is consistent with the decline in total property asset values, 
which are used to measure size. This further supports the notion that a larger slice of 
total pay is geared towards fixed salaries in light of reducing bonuses. A CEO’s years 
of experience exhibit a reversal post GFC onset. This may be attributed to struggling 
A-REITs trying to attract better quality CEOs with higher base pay. Base salaries 
have so far appeared to be adjusted to match the difficulty of CEO tasks and to 
compensate for the loss of other types of remuneration. It follows that bonuses 
should be paid purely as a reward for achieving good performance and position.  
Table 5.3.2.5 shows the determinants of CEO bonuses. Return on equity and 
unit price performance have a positive relationship with bonuses paid, which is 
expected, since these variables are key indicators of the value gained by unitholders.  
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Table 5.3.2.5: CEO Bonus and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C 489,836   1.1904 387,572  0.6799 
ROE     6,063   1.3365      8,102  1.4822 
UPP 292,888   1.8079* 323,376  1.7625* 
MVA -0.00008  -0.0230 0.00002  0.0512 
SDSHARET -22,293  -0.9817 -35,746 -1.1688 
GEARING    3,550    1.2583     4,328  1.0940 
SDINDRET -45,197  -1.6444 -27,847 -0.6964 
CEODIR       453   0.3368         672  0.4289 
YEARSEXP -25,508  -2.2005** -26,618 -2.2142** 
DAC 169,172   1.6681* 212,793  1.8978* 
NODIR   29,405   0.8880   38,279  0.9225 
EPS*GFC 112,696   1.0229 103,465  0.9285 
ROE*GFC    -5,508  -1.2516    -7,617 -1.4254 
MVA*GFC 0.00029   2.8141*** 0.00028  2.5559** 
GEARING*GFC    -7,498  -2.3871**    -6,893 -1.8407* 
SIZE*GFC   42,417   4.2125***   44,252  3.7066*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.7687  0.7606  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0328  0.1713  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 2.1913  2.1624  
Observations           148  129  
Note: The model of CEO bonus and Determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of CEO bonus, and is regressed on levels of all 
independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the 
independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its 
presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for 
seven years between 2006 and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the 
entire period and specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level 
under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 
The volatility of both individual and index unit returns has a negative 
relationship where again reduction in market-related risk is rewarded, but it is not 
significant. It appears that the primary criteria for bonus payments are linked to the 
creation of unitholder gains. These outcomes are all expected (Scott et al., 2001; 
Griffith & Najand, 2007; Griffith et al., 2011), partly because of outsider sensitivity 
to bonus payments. These payments have been approved according to various 
internal criteria and the direct benefit to unitholders via unit price appreciation allows 
these criteria to be seen as viable and tangible. 
There is a positive but insignificant relationship between CEO power and 
bonuses paid where CEO ownership increases as a proportion of all directors’ units 
owned. This is consistent with the findings of Griffith and Najand (2007) and 
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Griffith et al. (2011), who find no sign of power imposition. This may apply to either 
the bonus magnitude or the specific A-REIT circumstances to trigger a bonus. CEOs 
with less industry experience or who direct other entities receive higher bonuses, 
which is consistent with the relationship that is shared with base salary. Perhaps 
lower targets are set for CEOs with less experience and are therefore more frequently 
attained. The variable YEARSEXP reflects the scope of experience in the current 
environment at one point in time and should be differentiated from experience 
attained within a single entity over many years. 
Being an active director of another entity incorporates a multi-dimensional 
view regarding current economic circumstances and this likely increases a CEO’s 
ability to reach more optimistic targets. Another possibility for this result is the 
interlocking of directors, which may compromise independence when setting 
bonuses. This finding is consistent with that of Core et al. (1999), who find that 
remuneration is higher when directors are busier. This however does not necessarily 
mean that busy directors are harmful to an entity (Ferris et al., 2003). The positive 
yet insignificant relationship between CEO bonuses and the number of board 
directors is similar to the result of Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), and indicates a 
propensity for bonuses to be granted due to a combination of a weaker, disjointed 
board and greater CEO power. If a CEO is also the chairperson of an A-REIT, there 
is no significant increase in bonus paid (not tabulated), consistent with Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2005) but in contrast to Core (1997), suggesting no agency motivations for 
executives in this position. Given the very low number of joint CEO-chair people, a 
contrary result would otherwise make this particular agency issue easy to identify 
across specific A-REITs. While bonuses and gearing levels seem to be unrelated over 
the entire sample period, they have a strong negative association post GFC onset. 
This finding lends support to urgent restructuring by means of debt reduction being 
specifically targeted and rewarded (Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012). A-REIT size is 
positively associated with CEO bonuses, which appears to be an obvious 
consequence of both bonuses and asset values decreasing after 2007.  
In determining LTIs (Table 5.3.2.6), the previous year’s MVA has a positive 
and significant impact, yet two year average returns since the GFC are not 
significant. This result is similar to those of Griffith and Najand (2007) and Griffith 
et al. (2011), who find no significant relationship. Based on the assumption that a 
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long term positive association will continue, offering equity and options will increase 
CEO wealth through unit price appreciation. As an incentive, this seems an 
appropriate course of action in aligning CEO and unitholder interests. Under healthy 
economic circumstances, LTIs may also be increasingly offered in the knowledge 
that less experienced CEOs will be motivated to perform better. They will then reap 
the benefits of appreciating units of equity, therefore optimising this type of 
incentive. However, the uncertainty surrounding A-REITs post GFC onset appears to 
reduce the offer of LTIs for less experienced CEOs. This is logical because STBs 
increase for this sub-group, presumably in an attempt to highlight the urgency of 
improving performance quickly. Furthermore, falling unit values after 2007 have 
reduced any incentive from this type of remuneration.  
The LTIs of CEOs directing other entities increased post GFC onset. This 
seems to have been another option along with both increasing bonuses and base 
salary. Although not tabulated, A-REIT size and risk factors are highly insignificant, 
supporting the results of Griffith and Najand (2007) and Griffith et al. (2011). This 
implies that CEOs do not tend to be awarded LTIs for risky projects. Joint CEO/chair 
persons are more likely to have their LTI component reduced, although not 
significant over the entire period. This finding supports Griffith et al. (2011) but is 
found to be negatively significant by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and positively 
significant by Griffith and Najand (2007). The reduction in LTIs diverges CEO and 
unitholder interests. If there is CEO intervention in determining a lower LTI 
component, then it perpetuates agency issues and sends out the signal that the CEO is 
not confident that management will lead to higher unit values. The situation becomes 
even more plausible given much greater coefficient and variable significance during 
the period of unit price stagnation in the financial years succeeding the GFC.  
Generally, the onset of the GFC led to a reduction in LTIs, seemingly due to the 
large decrease in unit values and the risk of CEO wealth and motivation from this 
type of remuneration stagnating over shorter vesting periods. 
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Table 5.3.2.6: CEO LTIs and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C  827,991   6.0971***   550,238  3.6784*** 
MVALAST    0.0001   6.0962*** 0.000094  5.5437*** 
YEARSEXP   -22,613  -5.3368***    -12,124 -2.5388** 
CHAIR -191,612  -1.2383  -203,865 -1.3314 
GFC -830,363  -3.1960***  -375,228 -1.1903 
TWOYEARAVGRET*GFC         522   1.1190            612  1.3992 
MVALAST*GFC -0.00008  -2.5808**  -0.00007 -2.2438** 
YEARSEXP*GFC     36,527   4.9994***      19,438  1.8860* 
DAC*GFC   234,402   2.9031***    248,477  5.5056*** 
CHAIR*GFC -672,304  -3.5221***  -535,724 -2.5364** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.5301  0.5240  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.9507  1.9099  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of CEO long term incentives and determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of CEO long term incentives, and is regressed on levels of all 
independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the independent 
variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis 
is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or 
negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the 
impact of each independent variable over the entire period and specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, 
** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 
 
5.3.3 Top Management 
 
The determinants of total remuneration for top management, excluding CEOs 
(Table 5.3.3.1) show positive and significant relationships with the ROE and Tobins-
Q measures from previous periods. It appears that some responsibility for 
performance has been delegated to top management, which is expected given the 
many unique responsibilities. This is similar to the finding of Chopin et al. (1995), 
who report a positive relationship with revenue. The relationship with average index 
returns from the last period is also positively significant. This may indicate that total 
pay increases across the board in a good financial climate, so that skilled executives 
are retained by their respective REITs when pursuing a competitive advantage. The 
total salary of top management also has a positive relationship with both the 
increasing volatility of individual A-REIT unit returns from the previous period and 
current A-REIT index returns. It appears that total pay increases to compensate top 
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management for these negative market factors which are not entirely within their 
control, similar to the results of Jensen and Murphy (1990a; 1990b), who state that 
remuneration is akin to that received by bureaucrats, and Bebchuk and Fried, (2003). 
More specifically, a CEO is expected to assume the greater burden of downward 
market trends, and the loss of bonuses usually paid to top management could be at 
least partially insulated. Total pay is slightly higher, given a reduction in debt levels 
for the top management of stapled A-REITs. Given that these A-REITs inherently 
face greater risks and challenges, it appears that a reduction in this factor is 
specifically rewarded to reduce equity holder sensitivity. 
                   
Table 5.3.3.1: Top Management Total Pay and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-
STATISTIC 
C -9,358,817 -5.3088*** -9,638,061 -4.8315*** 
ROELAST         1,879  2.0150**          2,009  2.0798** 
TOBQLAST     175,450  3.7968***     161,807  3.3445*** 
AVGINDRETLAST  3,603,748  2.4468**  4,094,932  2.7400*** 
SDSHARETLAST         5,169  0.0467       25,552  0.2333 
GEARINGLAST     -17,767 -1.6496     -21,034 -1.6644* 
SDINDRET    539,513  2.1118**    576,072  2.2802** 
SIZELAST   669,490  6.2014***    680,838  5.8270*** 
CHAIR 1,213,939  2.1450** 1,199,131  2.0709** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.7901  0.7796  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.8520  1.7383  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of top management total pay and its determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with 
fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of top management total pay, and is 
regressed on levels of all independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables 
that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the 
result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result 
of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the 
presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away 
from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent variable 
over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and 
*** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 
Larger A-REITs offer more total pay to top management (Smith & Watts, 
1992; Chopin et al., 1995; Hardin, 1998). Again, this is likely due to a greater area of 
responsibility. Total managerial pay increases if the CEO is also the chairperson of 
the REIT. This potentially reflects agency issues where top managers gain the benefit 
of CEO power and influence, particularly when they are closely related. 
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The effect of the onset of the GFC (Table 5.3.3.2) is generally positive and 
significant when determining total managerial pay. Similar to the results found for 
CEOs, it appears that top managers are awarded more of the other pay types to either 
mitigate the decline in bonus pay, or to compensate them for a heftier workload 
during the crisis. This is shown with systematic factors of index return and volatility 
tending to have the greatest individual influence on total pay, and poor post GFC 
onset unsystematic performance variables eliciting higher remuneration. The 
negative relationship with the volatility of index returns post GFC onset seems to go 
against the trend so far, which indicates that pay increases to compensate managers 
for a challenging environment. 
Table 5.3.3.2: Percentage Change in Top Management Total Pay and its 
determinants, 2006-2012 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C 3.7499  3.1507*** 
GFC 0.6177  9.7116*** 
ROELAST 0.0014  0.9164 
TOBQLAST 0.0936  2.5387** 
SDSHARETLAST -0.0112  -1.2730 
SDINDRET 0.3236  4.8497*** 
SIZELAST 0.1132  1.9767* 
ROELAST*GFC -0.0010 -0.6317 
TOBQLAST*GFC -0.1362 -1.8627* 
AVGINDRETLAST*GFC 0.2013  1.0952 
GEARINGLAST*GFC -0.0053 -7.1593*** 
SDINDRET*GFC -0.2698 -4.5744*** 
   
Adjusted R2 0.8974  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0536  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.6461  
Observations 148  
Note: The model of percentage change in top management total pay and determinants was 
formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
The dependent variable is the log of Top management total pay, and is regressed on levels of all 
independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables 
that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance 
tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness 
and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence 
of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or 
negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along 
with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period and 
specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a 
significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
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However, a further look at the impact on the managerial bonus coefficient (Table 
5.3.3.5) shows that the loss of bonuses based on this variable is larger than the gains 
in base pay (Table 5.3.3.3), leading to an overall negative effect. 
Table 5.3.3.3: Top Management Base Salary and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-
STATISTIC 
C -21,365,032 -3.0604*** -22,710,955 -3.0582*** 
EPSLAST     -564,704 -2.3662**      -629,604 -2.8168*** 
ROELAST         -4,114 -3.2301***          -4,338 -3.5146*** 
MVALAST       0.00010  1.4808        0.00012  1.5215 
AVGINDRETLAST    1,449,759  1.2429    1,860,522  1.8572* 
OPRISK    1,741,702  2.1322**    1,839,822  2.1051** 
GEARINGLAST        -11,015 -4.1149***        -13,042 -3.4926*** 
SDINDRET       424,158   2.3118**       411,921  2.4529** 
EXECDUR        -12,893 -0.4599          -9,415 -0.3165 
SIZE    1,140,168  3.4963***    1,191,948  3.5698*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.7983  0.7840  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.0014  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.8048  1.5635  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of top management base salary and its determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology 
with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of Top management base salary, 
and is regressed on levels of all independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent 
variables that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the 
result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result 
of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the 
presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away 
from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent variable 
over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and 
*** represents a significance level under 1%. 
         
The wealth maximising measures of EPS and ROE from the previous period 
have a significant impact on top management base salary (Table 5.3.3.3). These 
measures may be distorted given substantial releases of equity in the 2008 and 2009 
financial years, but they nevertheless show that the benefits of dominating equity 
increases in the ratios look to have been incorporated into the base salary. The prior 
MVA shows a link between increasing unitholder wealth and salary appreciation, 
supporting Hardin (1998), but falls just outside the 10% significance level. 
Increasing unitholder wealth is not particularly rewarded through bonuses but rather, 
consolidated in long term salary. Prior average systematic returns are positive and 
become significant relative to the base salaries of stapled A-REIT top management. 
This finding confirms a link between industry performance and industry-standard 
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base pay. Increases in operating risk and market volatility are linked to a significant 
increase in base salary. Reduction in prior gearing is also rewarded through long 
term base pay increases over the entire period. The necessity of lowering debt levels 
is obvious immediately post GFC onset, but its negative relationship with salary 
across the entire sample gives little support to the notion that fiduciaries undertake 
debt capital such that they can grow faster and increase their own compensation. 
However, this finding also suggests agency issues exist when external monitoring by 
credit providers is reduced and are perhaps compensated for. An increase in A-REIT 
size increases the magnitude of responsibility, leading to greater salary. Ceteris 
paribus, growth through large issues of equity could be seen as fiduciaries trying to 
maximise income, but in light of the economic downturn and the risk of insolvency, 
this reason is doubtful. Again, the GFC interaction variables (Table 5.3.3.4) show 
that base salary was increased after 2007 for the reasons previously mentioned 
regarding NEDs and CEOs. 
 
Table 5.3.3.4: Percentage Change in Top Management Base Salary and its 
Determinants, 2006-2012 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C 1.0357  0.6334 
GFC 0.3924  18.5106*** 
OPRISK 0.4078  2.1586** 
SDINDRET 0.2431  8.7950*** 
SIZE 0.2356  3.0636*** 
GEARINGLAST*GFC -0.0037 -7.0294*** 
SDINDRET*GFC -0.1983 -9.9174*** 
   
Adjusted R2 0.8814  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.9648  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.6023  
Observations 148  
Note: The model of percentage change in Top management base salary and determinants was 
formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
The dependent variable is the log of Top management base salary, and is regressed on levels of all 
independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables 
that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance 
tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness 
and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of 
autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or 
negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along 
with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period and 
specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a 
significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
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Table 5.3.3.5: Top Management Bonus and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
C -3,050,157   -2.8189*** -2,321,110  -3.0298*** 
MVA       0.0001    1.6319     0.00008   1.3040 
SDINDRETLAST  5,863,627    3.7213***     466,455   3.9376*** 
DAC     136,221    0.9281     357,009   2.9848*** 
GFC -2,317,898   -0.6526 -1,507,318  -0.3621 
ROE*GFC            667    1.0498          1,039   1.7631* 
UPP*GFC   -220,348   -0.8604      -87,389  -0.3192 
MVA*GFC      0.0005    2.6126**        0.0005   2.6740*** 
SDSHARET*GFC   -147,958   -4.8890***    -140,502  -4.8000*** 
SDINDRETLAST*GFC -5,860,255   -3.7189*** -4,686,135  -3.9749*** 
DAC*GFC     252,684    2.0069**      -67,601  -0.3735 
SIZELAST*GFC     337,018    2.1191**     267,182   1.4931 
     
Adjusted R2 0.6836  0.7276  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0000  0.0000  
Durbin-Watson 1.9612  1.8285  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of top management bonuses and determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of Top management bonuses, and is regressed on levels of all 
independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the 
independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that 
skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do 
not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the 
statistic moves either positively or negatively away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along 
with interaction variables to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period and specifically post GFC. * represents a 
significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 
 
Regarding top management bonuses (Table 5.3.3.5), the top management of 
stapled A-REITs receives significantly higher bonuses if their CEO is also a director 
of another company. It seems that the additional lateral experience CEOs bring, 
assists delegate management in reaching their individual bonus targets, but only 
when this knowledge is applied to a more work-intensive, risky environment, where 
it is most needed. Increasing return on equity and improving market value added 
have a positive association with bonuses post GFC, despite the former being 
insignificant generally. However, after the GFC onset, ROE is significant at the 10% 
level for stapled A-REITs. It appears that given the additional operational risk faced 
by stapled entities, this measure is especially important and warrants a delegate 
bonus when assessing risk-adjusted returns. Unit price performance is negative and 
insignificant, contrary to the findings of Coughlan and Schmitt (1985) and Murphy 
(1985). The MVA variable directly measures the differential between the market and 
book values of equity and its coefficient shows it becomes significant and increases 
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bonuses by a factor of five after 2007, relative to the entire sample period. It seems to 
be a good motivational tool to directly link short term financial rewards to urgent 
value appreciation for unitholders after the negative market shock. These 
relationships consolidate the assertion that top management’s focus on operational 
matters also extends somewhat to maximising unitholder wealth, for which top 
management is rewarded when it improves.  
Overall, index volatility appears to significantly increase bonuses. If the risk-
return relationship holds true, then it follows that a bonus better rewards returns. 
However, after the onset of the GFC, the effect is the opposite and roughly of the 
same magnitude. The greater goal of stabilising the market and enticing investors on 
an industry scale appears to dominate, and the same result also applies to the 
volatility of individual unit returns. Therefore, unit movements that are more 
predictable and stabilise equity values elicit greater bonuses. If a CEO is a director of 
another entity, it is expected that the CEO’s diversified corporate knowledge will be 
shared with top management, thus increasing the probability of obtaining more 
favourable results for which greater bonuses are offered. Given that the GFC period 
leads to several urgent CEO recruitments, it seems that a broader skill base assists 
top managers to best respond to the crisis and receive larger bonuses accordingly. 
This reasoning is supported by a post GFC onset coefficient almost two times larger 
than during the overall sample period.  
Larger A-REITs are reasonably expected to provide greater opportunities for 
management to assist in making larger profits. It appears as though these 
opportunities materialised and invited greater bonuses, with larger A-REITs 
responding to the crisis more efficiently. The GFC, unlike base salary, had a 
negatively significant impact on bonuses of approximately half a million dollars in 
the aggregate on average. This result is likely due to initial impaired results and 
implies that the main focus of top management is in generating positive operational 
outcomes. In contrast to CEO bonuses after the onset of the GFC, strategic tasks such 
as debt reduction were not a major target in top managerial activity and, so, bonuses 
did not appear to be greatly extended for these.  
The determinants of top management LTIs (Table 5.3.3.6) are considerably 
fewer in number compared with those of other fiduciaries and types of pay. 
Reduction in ROE appears to be a case for increasing managerial equity incentives. 
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Unit price performance has an insignificant and positive impact, in contrast to 
Pennathur et al. (2005) but in support of Hall and Liebman (1998), Scott et al. (2001) 
and Grifith and Najand (2007), whilst risk factors such as debt per unit and operating 
risk in the last period interact positively, also supporting Pennathur et al. (2005). The 
latter two rising risk factors are also intended to be rectified through managerial 
motivation such that the long term value of incentive remuneration depends on risk 
factor mitigation.  
Dwindling unit values seem to elicit higher LTIs such that management is 
motivated to improve the financial situation, but there is also a systematic effect 
whereby increasing past index returns tend to increase incentives. A-REITs with a 
CEO who is also a director of another company tend to increase long term equity 
incentives paid to top management. This is not consistent with CEO incentives across 
the entire period, inferring that A-REITs with busy CEOs prefer to motivate 
management to better assist in their delegate capacity. Unlike motivation for CEOs in 
this study, incentive treatment for management reduces the agency problem. Higher 
expectations appear to be placed upon management, where not only are sound 
published results expected, but they are also expected to be translated into positive 
perceptions via increasing market values.  
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Table 5.3.3.6: Top Management LTIs and its Determinants, 2006-2012 
 FULL SAMPLE  STAPLED  
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T-
STATISTIC 
C -1,507,663 -1.2612 -1,426,162 -1.0301 
ROE       -1,241 -2.2659**        -1,231 -2.1631** 
UPP      40,024  0.2624          4,735  0.0274 
OPRISKLAST     17,055  0.7875        12,191  0.4809 
DPU     16,268  1.9470*        15,099  1.6100 
DAC   487,351  2.4420**      525,324  2.6317** 
SIZE     -2,709 -0.0420        23,568  0.3469 
SIZELAST     90,450  0.8571        58,270  0.4725 
GFC   190,047  0.8677      211,487  0.8881 
AVGINDRETLAST 1,914,940  3.3927***   1,930,657  3.0080*** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.3960  0.3898  
F-STAT (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Jarque-Bera (Prob) 0.0000  0.0000  
Likelihood Ratio 0.0054  0.0889  
Durbin-Watson 1.7310  1.6893  
Observations 148  129  
Note: The model of top management incentives and determinants was formulated using least squares panel methodology with 
fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the magnitude of Top management incentives, and is 
regressed on levels of all independent variables. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables 
that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the 
result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result 
of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the 
presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves either positively or negatively away 
from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012, along with interaction variables to gauge the 
impact of each independent variable over the entire period and specifically post GFC. * represents a significance probability of 
less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 
Tables 5.3.3.7 and 5.3.3.8 summarise the signs and significant relationships 
for all three types of fiduciary over the entire period and post GFC onset. 
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Table 5.3.3.7: Summary of all Significant Relationships: Level Models  
  
 
 
VARS 
NED NED 
POST 
GFC 
CEO CEO 
POST 
GFC 
CEO CEO 
POST 
GFC 
CEO CEO 
POST 
GFC 
TOP 
MAN 
TOP 
MAN 
POST 
GFC 
TOP 
MAN 
TOP 
MAN 
POST 
GFC 
TOP 
MAN 
TOP 
MAN 
POST 
GFC 
  FEE FEE SAL SAL BON BON LTI LTI SAL SAL BON BON LTI LTI 
PERF TWOYEA
RAVRET 
              
 EPS         -**      
 ROE         -***    -**  
 MVA +***     +*** +*** -**    +**   
 TOBQ               
 AVGIND 
RET 
  +*          +***  
 UPP     +*          
RISK OPRISK         +**      
 SDSHA 
RET 
           -***   
 SDIND 
RET 
        +**  +*** -***   
 GEARING _***     -**   -***      
 DPU   +**          +*  
POWER CEODIR   +**            
 CEOTOT _*              
 DIRTOT               
ATTRIB SIZE +***     +***   +***   +**   
 YEARS 
EXP 
  -***  -**  -*** +***       
 EXEC 
DUR 
              
 DAC   +***  +*   +***    +** +**  
 NODIR +***              
 CHAIR        -***       
 GFC +***  +***    -***        
Note: This table summarises all significant variable relationships that apply to the level models of each type of NED, CEO and top management remuneration. * represents 
a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
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Table 5.3.3.8: Summary of all Significant Relationships: Log Models  
  
VARIABLES 
NED NED POST GFC CEO CEO POST GFC TOP MAN TOP MAN POST GFC 
  FEE FEE SAL SAL SAL SAL 
PERF TWOYEARAVRET       
 EPS       
 ROE       
 MVA +***      
 TOBQ       
 AVGINDRET       
 UPP       
RISK OPRISK     +**  
 SDSHARET    +*   
 SDINDRET -*** +***   +*** -*** 
 GEARING  -***    -*** 
 DPU       
POWER CEODIR       
 CEOTOT -*** +**     
 DIRTOT       
ATTRIB SIZE +*** -*** +*** -*** +***  
 YEARSEXP   -*** +***   
 EXECDUR       
 DAC    +***   
 NODIR +*** -***     
 CHAIR       
 GFC   +***  +***  
Note: This table summarises all significant variable relationships that apply to the log models of each type of NED, CEO and top Management 
remuneration. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance 
level under 1%. 
 
 
5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This contemporary study of fiduciary remuneration has been undertaken 
because of the need to understand the basis of how pay is structured and what 
priorities it compensates. Information received by investors is incomplete, and this 
lack of knowledge is causing discontent among investors and regulators because they 
cannot be sure if the marginal costs they expend to fund their fiduciaries are worth 
the marginal benefits. Different levels of management incur unique responsibilities 
and it is these responsibilities that are compensated for over a constantly changing, 
dynamic economy. The GFC arguably posed the most challenging environment for 
fiduciaries, where A-REITs were competing not only against each other and other 
investment vehicles, but also against the threat of insolvency and illiquidity when 
asset values and revenues fell. It is therefore essential to analyse the indicators of 
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most importance to A-REITs and the types of remuneration that ensure target 
strategies are undertaken efficiently.  
This study separates fiduciaries into NEDs, CEOs and top management using 
a sample period from 2006 to 2012, with the onset of the GFC during the 2007/2008 
financial year. Remuneration is split up into totals, base salary, short term cash 
bonuses, and long term equity incentives. Independent variables are also categorised 
into five parts. Performance indicators include types of profitability and variables 
that measure the degree of unitholder wealth creation. Risk indicators include both 
systematic and unsystematic measures that are critical in avoiding approaching 
insolvency and helping to assist future profitability. Power indicators are proxied by 
the proportional fiduciary ownership of equity and are included to test whether 
agency is prevalent in the pay setting. Other attributes include A-REIT size and a 
range of dummy variables that indicate the breadth and length of CEO experience. 
The study yields several insightful outcomes.  
NEDs appear to be better compensated with fixed fees when poor economic 
conditions bring up challenges and the need for greater vigilance and monitoring. 
They are also better compensated for assisting to maximise unitholder wealth and 
approving debt reduction strategies. NED fees rose slightly after GFC onset as self-
compensation. However, systematic factors of risk reduction seem to dominate pay 
raises. NEDs tend to be less inhibited in setting a higher remuneration for themselves 
when CEOs hold less power. However, this agency indicator reverses after onset of 
the GFC, suggesting CEOs with greater proportional unit holdings recognise the 
need for greater fees to compensate for job difficulty and may use their power to 
support such fees. Larger A-REITs tend to pay NEDs higher fees, which again reflect 
their level of responsibility. This became even more prominent after GFC onset, with 
average total fees rising by approximately $100,000. Higher fees are also paid to 
remaining NEDs as they diminish in number, inflating the agency implications of 
less diluted boards. Fees increase by approximately 6% for each member reduction. 
This raise also seems to compensate remaining members for their increased 
workload. 
CEOs are compensated via base salary, short term cash bonuses and long 
term incentives. Positive past systematic returns have the largest impact, with 
associated base pay raises difficult to argue against. Risk factors such as high debt 
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tend to increase the challenges CEOs face, which are compensated via greater base 
salary. Active debt reduction is alternatively rewarded with higher bonuses at a time 
when insolvency is a serious threat to A-REIT survival. Agency issues also seem to 
play a role when increasing CEO power relative to other unitholders increases total 
pay. This situation is expected to deteriorate further with reducing debt levels and 
associated creditor monitoring. As for NEDs, larger A-REITs pay higher base 
salaries to compensate for additional responsibility. However, in the face of crises, 
shrinking A-REITs increase base pay, seemingly to compensate for the reduction in 
bonus payments. CEOs with external directorships and lateral experience receive 
more pay and those with longer experience earned higher salaries post GFC onset 
due to an A-REIT strategy to attract more capable individuals.  
The payment of bonuses is largely as expected, with increases in profitability 
and wealth creation and reduction in risk factors rewarded with higher bonuses. 
Again, systematic risk reduction dominates in setting the value of bonuses, which 
implies there may be a standard rate of bonus prevalent in the industry related to 
specific index performance. Agency issues again arise, with higher bonuses paid to 
CEOs who own greater proportions of equity relative to NEDs. However, certain 
profitability measures appear to be distorted given the radical restructuring and 
equity offers post GFC onset. 
Long term incentive remuneration appears to be structured in favour of 
CEOs, incorporating both motivational and self-wealth maximising effects. Recent 
market value added seems to increase the propensity to offer LTIs in the hopes that 
equity values will continue to show improvement. The GFC unequivocally brought 
about a reduction in LTI offerings because the danger of severe unit value 
depreciation mitigated the intended incentive effect. This effect is particularly 
prominent for less experienced CEOs, where STBs make up for the reduction in 
LTIs. The urgency to offer stable cash rewards instead makes this a sound strategy in 
such an environment. One interesting observation is that joint CEO-board chairs tend 
to have lower LTI allocations. This effect has become nearly four times as strong 
since the onset of the GFC and suggests power issues are involved in avoiding CEO 
wealth stagnation with additional depleting unit ownership. 
Factors affecting top management remuneration seem to have more obvious 
determinants when segregating base salary from bonuses, but the focus on operations 
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management appears to be blurred, with remuneration also depending on factors that 
involve unitholder wealth in addition to traditional operational performance 
measures. Both are compensated with a mix of base pay and bonuses. Active debt 
reduction is incorporated into base pay. As is the case for CEOs, A-REITs tend to 
increase base pay to compensate top management for uncontrollable negative market 
factors that could reduce bonuses. Also similar to CEOs, managers of larger A-
REITs are compensated with base pay for a greater scope of responsibility and are 
awarded larger bonuses, presumably in return for the greater number of opportunities 
converted. The GFC generally caused a distortion in remuneration with respect to 
bonuses. Managerial bonuses suffered after its onset because they were partially 
limited to compensating for operational outcomes. As for CEOs, top management’s 
base salary benefits from strategic reductions in debt. 
Top management bonuses also reward both profitability and increasing 
unitholder wealth. They tend to be used more frequently in place of LTIs since GFC 
onset for motivational urgency. Risk reduction by top managers seems to be 
rewarded only after 2007, and at other times risk taking appears to be encouraged. 
Since GFC onset, the lateral experience of CEOs who are also directors of other 
entities seems to benefit managers under their guidance via increasing bonuses. 
Larger A-REITs offer larger bonuses, likely due to greater profit generating 
opportunities, and the GFC generally did not have a significant impact.  
Finally, LTIs for top management do not seem to incentivise the prompt 
rectification of unit performance and risk factors. There appears to be a difference in 
policy between LTI allocation to CEOs and to top management. CEOs tend to have 
their LTI allocation reduced following declining unit performance, more so than top 
managers. Coupled with an even more prominent reduction in LTIs for CEO/chairs, 
it appears that the more power an individual holds within an A-REIT, the less the 
individual tends to conform to the principal-agent incentive structure. Further 
evidence of this is shown when the GFC has no significant impact on managerial 
LTIs, yet the opposite is true for CEOs. There are clearly many interactions between 
remuneration and other factors, and this study has highlighted that these complex 
relationships do exist and transform for different individuals and within different 
environments. 
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Some intuition can be gained from isolating stapled A-REITs. CEOs in this 
category are compensated for the diversity of skills required relative to unit trust 
CEOs. Both NEDs and top management have a portion of their pay that is linked to 
systematic risk and returns. Top management is also rewarded for a reduction in risk 
factors in what is a riskier operating environment and for increasing risk-adjusted 
returns in an even more volatile industry since the onset of the GFC. These rewards 
appear to be assisted by the additional lateral experience that their CEO can impart.  
This chapter addresses several future implications for A-REITs. It highlights 
the need for greater information flow to investors regarding pay for performance 
relationships. It is suggested that A-REITs clearly articulate every consideration that 
goes into formulating managerial contracts, including base salary, which needs to be 
truly independent of performance factors because this distinction is currently not 
clear in annual reports. Targets for bonuses need to be systematically compared to 
the bonus rewards given and justified, whereas fluctuations in LTIs need to be 
explained regarding the way in which these incentives will provide the best 
motivation. These improvements can be similarly applied to any corporate entity 
because the principles involved are the same. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN A-REITS AND THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Institutional investors are large financial entities that own substantial blocks 
of equity in other entities. They are typically insurance and superannuation 
companies that invest premiums and retirement contributions on behalf of their 
members. Institutions tend to have billions of dollars under management and have a 
tremendous responsibility to maximize the returns they earn. Due to the sheer size of 
funds under their stewardship, they are powerful enough to influence the direction of 
the entities they invest in and are thus capable of monitoring the fiduciaries who 
manage them. Two schools of thought exist in the literature about the degree of 
involvement of institutions with investee companies. The first is that large 
institutional ownership creates a natural monitoring function where any costs 
associated with this function can be absorbed (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Gillan & 
Starks, 2000). The second is that institutions undertake active trading and simply 
shift ownership when not satisfied with company performance (Hartzell & Starks, 
2003; Parrino et al., 2003).  
This chapter aims to provide insight into Australian real estate investment 
trust (A-REIT) investor behaviour, following the methodology used by Frank and 
Ghosh (2012). A-REITs are relied upon heavily in the portfolios of institutional 
investors, and exist in 98% of industry superannuation funds (Newell, 2007). Due to 
their popularity, it is clear that institutions see merit in their inclusion. The headline 
questions analyse the degree of institutional investment in A-REITs and the degree 
of institutional involvement in the raising of new equity capital. Institutional 
investment is explained by certain performance and risk measures, size, and an array 
of board and CEO characteristics. This line of inquiry is important because managers 
of institutional investors are experts, aiming to discharge their fiduciary duties by 
achieving the highest return for capital providers. The decisions they make will 
impact upon the wealth of many smaller investors. This investigation will provide 
insight into the characteristics of corporate governance that expert investors deem 
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most important to wealth creation. Knowing the factors behind successful 
institutional placements is vital for A-REIT fiduciaries. Private placements are faster 
than public equity issues and funds do not need to be spent on costly prospectuses 
(Dimovski & O’Neill, 2012). If A-REITs choose to offer equity ahead of debt, or are 
compelled to, as was the case shortly after onset of the global financial crisis (GFC), 
then they need to be aware of the characteristics that will maximize their chances of 
attracting institutional investment. This information will assist A-REITs to structure 
themselves appropriately such that urgent placements have the best chance of 
success. The GFC has been a large threat to wealth maximization and these questions 
are answered in light of differing A-REIT characteristics since its onset that can 
potentially change the tactics of institutional professionals. 
Another area of importance is large investor concentration. Section 9 of the 
Corporations Act (2001.Cth) defines a substantial holding as an interest in 5% or 
more of the voting power within an entity. Section 671B of the Corporations Act 
(2001.Cth) further mandates that entities must disclose information regarding a 
minimum 1% change in ownership of substantial shareholders. These changes can 
have an impact on existing shareholders. In this section, the questions asked are the 
following: What A-REIT determinants influence the level of large investor 
involvement? Did the GFC lead to changes in the determinants that are attractive to 
large investors? How do determinants differ between institutional and large 
investors? And how does a stapled structure alter the behaviour of large investors?  
The findings from examining the top 20 A-REIT unitholders will give insight 
into the way major investors react to the aforementioned A-REIT characteristics. In 
this study, other major unit holders are included, in addition to institutional investors. 
Institutional investors include institutions which utilise investment of capital on 
behalf of smaller investors, whereas large non-institutional investors are also 
expected to be self interested, but do not provide this service as their primary 
function. Therefore, any difference in results between the two investor types is 
expected to be attributed to the agency issues prevalent among institutional investors 
and their expected focus on short term returns. This chapter will also isolate and 
model stapled A-REITs separately from the rest of the sample to gauge whether 
institutional and large investors treat buy and sell transactions any differently given 
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the increased operational risks faced by managers of stapled entities and any 
subsequent distortions incurred by the GFC. 
All the above lines of inquiry have implications on A-REIT monitoring. An 
increasing concentration of large investor blocks is expected to bring about 
advantages such as increased monitoring, which will also benefit smaller investors 
and increase free riding. However, a decreasing concentration of substantial and 
institutional investors may suggest that the future outlook of a given A-REIT is poor, 
leaving greater numbers of smaller investors with little or no professional experience 
exposed to a reduction in wealth and greater costs of individual monitoring. This 
chapter adds to the literature by examining the decisions of institutions and large 
investors to invest specifically in A-REITs. Further examination is made of 
investments in both small and large A-REITs to test the robustness of overall results. 
Another reason to split the sample in two is to gain insight into institutional 
preferences according to A-REIT size. Larger A-REITs are owned by a greater 
number of institutions, therefore institutional concentration is higher. As a result, 
greater volatility of investment is expected if institutions follow a liquid and tactical 
strategy of short term holding periods. As far as is known, this is the first study of 
institutional investors and agency issues in the Australian listed property sector, and 
the first study examining the impact of the GFC on their investment strategy. 
This type of study is important because fiduciary institutions may exhibit 
agency issues in their own behaviour. With a focus on superior short term returns, 
the liquid nature of their capital mobility has the potential to impact upon the 
volatility of equity values, and to simultaneously deny the initial providers of capital 
to institutions greater long term growth and returns by doing so. The benefits of this 
strategy accrue to institutions by attracting greater funds under management and 
larger aggregate management fees. A better understanding of institutional behaviour 
will reveal if all the benefits provided by institutional investment expertise is 
somewhat diminished by their self-serving behaviour. 
 A-REITs are a subset of corporate institutions that invest in property and 
employ a governance structure made up of agents to represent the interests of 
unitholders. With any form of agency where the monitoring by principals is not 
complete, there is a potential for the interests of principals and agents to diverge. 
This divergence manifests itself in the absence of incentives that completely align the 
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interests of both these parties. Directors and CEOs bear the ultimate responsibility as 
agents for managing the capital of principal unit holders and debt providers, but the 
divergence of incentives may lead to agent decisions that are costly to principals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). As adequate corporate 
governance including optimal incentives improves, the probability of agents 
engaging in positive net present value investments increases (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Companies are therefore expected to have greater value added if their 
governance is structured to promote efficiency in maximising shareholder returns. 
A-REITs have, on average, thousands of individual unitholders, thus the 
resources each individual unitholder possesses to monitor agent activity is likely to 
be deficient relative to total capital under management. If individual monitoring does 
take place, the monitoring costs expended by each unitholder would be extremely 
large in the aggregate and likely exceed the benefits. These deficiencies can be at 
least partially offset by aptly incentivised governance mechanisms, which act to 
promote the interests of unitholders (Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Linck et al., 2008). An 
additional external mechanism that can act to increase internal A-REIT efficiency is 
the effective unionisation of unitholders via institutional investment vehicles. 
Institutional investors are extremely important because they are usually the majority 
owners in listed corporate entities as a whole. The large amount of capital they 
provide enables many companies to purchase assets, grow, employ, and provide 
returns, which are ultimately re-injected into the economy. The superannuation 
industry has grown substantially since the introduction of the compulsory 
superannuation guarantee scheme in 1992, from a base of $183 billion, to current 
estimates of $1.6 trillion (The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia 
ASN, 2013). This growth has increased the number and concentration of Institutional 
investors such that equity holders are professionals with the knowledge to efficiently 
trade on not only well analysed publicly available information, but also private 
information that is expected to affect any given company. 
Institutional investors can be affiliated with two major bodies in Australia. 
The Investment and Financial Services Association, with an institutional membership 
of $1.1 trillion in funds under management, and the Australian Council of 
Superannuation Investors whose institutional members control $250 billion of funds 
under management. Institutional investors may also include mutual and hedge funds, 
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investment arms of bank and non-bank financial institutions, brokerage firms, and 
external fund managers who act on behalf of institutions. Individual unitholders in 
institutions usually pay entry and management fees, which are a percentage of the 
capital contributed. These fees compensate institutional investors for seeking out and 
investing pooled funds in the best options and implicitly include compensation for 
the greater monitoring function of the ultimate destination of their capital. The 
benefit of unitholder unionisation through an institutional intermediary is 
summarised in Figure 6.1.1. It depicts that minimal monitoring by small individual 
investors can be increased through an intermediary institution. In the absence of 
internal agency issues, institutions can monitor to their full potential, although such 
monitoring will never be perfect given agency issues within the ultimate investee 
recipient of capital. 
 
Figure 6.1.1: Benefits of Monitoring Efficiency 
 
  
  
      
    
                   Individual Investor          Institutional             Potential Institutional                Ultimate Investee 
              Monitoring                      Monitoring              Monitoring Efficiency            Managerial Actions 
 
 
Monitoring by institutions is beneficial but not perfectly efficient for two 
reasons. First, the risk management and diversification principles of institutional 
investors require that only a nominal proportion of capital be allocated to and 
invested in any single ultimate entity. Therefore, the amount of external monitoring 
allocated to each ultimate entity is relatively small. Second, fees paid to institutional 
investors by individual investors are not based on performance. The institutions 
themselves exhibit agency issues, since they will be paid fees based on the 
proportion of capital under management, which does not in itself reward or punish 
their choice in the ultimate investment vehicle. This setup is, however, sub-optimally 
efficient because individual investors may withdraw funds at will, subject to payment 
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of an exit fee in some instances, if they are unhappy with the investment choices and 
performance of the institution. In the case of institutional investors delegating 
investment decisions to subordinate fund managers, there is the potential for several 
layers of agency to occur, with each layer stripping away at the efficiency sought by 
the original provider of capital.  Net efficient monitoring can be summarised as 
follows: 
NEM f (PBF + ICUE + PTU – DEL - COMP), with the following definitions: 
NEM is net efficient monitoring, and is a function of: 
PBF, the component of fees paid to institutional investors that are performance 
based. Fees based only on performance would provide the best incentive to fund 
managers; 
ICUE is the proportion of institutional investor capital allocated to a single ultimate 
entity. A smaller spread of investment targets increases the incentive to monitor each 
one; 
PTU is the proportion of an ultimate entity’s unitholders who invested via an 
institution. As per Figure 6.1.1, this reduces the individual costs of monitoring; 
DEL is the degree of delegation of target entity analysis by the original institutional 
investor to other subordinates. It has a negative sign due to the principal-agent 
relationship between them; 
COMP is competition faced by institutional investors from other fund managers. 
The sign is negative because competition forces institutions to aim for superior short 
term returns at the expense of a long term, highly monitored relationship with the 
ultimate recipient of capital.  
Monitoring can be classified into two different types. The first is a more 
direct type of monitoring (Gillan & Starks, 2000), which is usually undertaken by 
large individual investors or institutions. These groups have more of an incentive to 
exert costs to ensure their substantial unit holding is monitored and that their 
monitoring is known to the ultimate entity. As the number of large unitholders 
decreases, monitoring costs of smaller investors increase, leading to an incentive for 
the remaining unit holders to free ride on the monitoring efforts of existing large 
unitholders (Hartzell & Starks, 2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1997), claim that 
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institutional investors usually hold a stake large enough to have some influence 
through direct monitoring on the ultimate entity’s managerial decision making.  
Another type of monitoring specified by Maug (1998), Parrino et al. (2003), 
and Hartzell and Starks (2003), does not include costly direct monitoring, but rather, 
is premised on the value of liquidity to institutions. Institutions do not have input 
with managerial decisions, instead taking an evaluative stance with their smaller unit 
holdings, such that they freely dispose of bundles of units if the ultimate entity’s 
performance does not satisfy their objectives. This is consistent with the finding of 
Heineman and Davis (2011), who show that the average holding period of 
institutional investors in the United States is approximately eight months. Another 
agency concern is that incentive compensation for institutional portfolio managers 
often rewards active short-term trading and performance relative to other fund 
managers, rather than long term stewardship (Millstein, 2009). This represents a 
misguided contractual objective focused on short term institutional competition. 
Table 6.1.1 shows the major institutional investors in this chapter’s sample of 
28 A-REITs, and the number of A-REITs in which they have an ownership stake 
over the 2011 and 2012 financial years. This table shows that ownership within the 
major institutions is highly fragmented and diversified. By nature, this is the norm 
with institutional investment diversification and risk management policy, but it 
comes at the expense of incentives to place any great emphasis on monitoring 
individual ultimate entities (Millstein, 2009). This in itself may preclude institutional 
intervention into A-REITs that have a sub-optimal governance structure. Although 
identified as an issue at the Millstein Center Roundtable for Institutional 
Responsibility, it must be remembered that primary institutional fiduciary 
responsibility is ultimately directed to the original investors, not toward the ultimate 
entity. 
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Table 6.1.1: A-REIT Institutional Owners and Their Involvement 
HSBC Custody Nominees 28 
JP Morgan Nominees 24 
Citicorp Nominees 23 
National Nominees 23 
RBC Investor Services 20 
BNP Paribas Nominees 15 
Cogent Nominees 14 
Bond St Custodians 13 
UBS Wealth Management 11 
Note: Classified by the author as reported in the 2011 and 2012 A-REIT financial reports 
Monitoring, albeit at a low level, is not the only type of pressure institutional 
investors can place on ultimate entities. Barton (2011) argues that institutional 
investors exert pressure on boards to increase short term equity prices at the expense 
of balanced long term investment and risk management. This is a direct example of 
agency where institutions may influence the loss of long term investor gains and 
efficiency to promote their standing against rival funds. The origins and impact of 
the GFC are explained in previous chapters with respect to capital structure and 
fiduciary remuneration dynamics. Institutional investors have been criticised for 
being too passive toward the causes of the credit crisis, on one hand, and for being 
too active in coercing ultimate entities into taking on greater debt to promote short 
term equity price gains (Davis et al., 2009). This had the effect of exacerbating the 
severity of the GFC.  
More recently, the U.K. stewardship code and the Dodd-Frank reforms in the 
United States were enacted to improve the effectiveness of institutional stewardship. 
More specifically, the intent of these policies was to enforce greater institutional 
disclosure of monitoring and voting, and to specify the active protection of initial 
investors. There has not been a significant demand for official regulations such as 
these in Australia, but Industry Best Practice Guideline Principle II.F.1 was 
introduced to recommend the disclosure of institutional investors’ corporate 
governance and voting policies (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2011). On the international stage, 121 Australian institutional 
investors are signatories to the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, 
which encourage the incorporation of environmental, social and governance factors, 
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and active ownership into investment decision making. However, Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) Listing Rule 7.1 has the potential to limit active 
ownership because it allows the ultimate entity to issue up to 15% of shares per year 
without pre-emptive rights (ASX, 2013). This has the potential to dilute the 
ownership of institutional investors and therefore any constructive influence on the 
board. In this chapter, the GFC is again included as a major distortion.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 explains the 
data and methodology, Section 6.3 analyses and interprets the results, and Section 
6.4 draws conclusions. 
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6.2 DATA AND METHDOLOGY 
 
The data are chosen over seven years, from 2006 to 2012. This period 
incorporates the immediate and after-effects of the GFC, which began midway 
through the 2007/2008 financial year (Dimovski, 2009). This study requires CEO 
long term incentive (LTI) information, as well as comprehensive unitholder 
information. On several occasions, responsible entities were either jointly owned by 
multiple companies, were unlisted in Australia, or were subsidiaries of unlisted 
foreign companies. In this case, management fees that were disclosed could not be 
apportioned to the CEO and could not be used. This study aims to use all A-REITs 
with available remuneration data; however, some of these A-REITs have not 
provided ownership details. Several A-REITs also did not include clear data on long-
serving board members in certain years. In all, there are 28 suitable A-REITs in the 
sample, therefore an unbalanced panel methodology is employed with 170 
observations.  
Using a panel methodology has certain advantages in this case. It is 
unbalanced, allowing for more data and degrees of freedom, which reduces the risk 
of collinearity among explanatory variables and increases the efficiency of the 
estimates. The panel format reduces any effects of omitted and unobserved variables 
that are correlated with explanatory variables. Using fixed effects also does not 
require the assumption of no correlation between individual effects. The data were 
retrieved from annual reports through the DatAnalysis Premium database. 
Remuneration, managerial unit holdings, and director attribute disclosures were 
taken from the directors’ report section of the annual reports, performance and risk 
figures were taken from financial reports and converted into ratios, whilst unitholder 
data was taken from the ASX-mandated additional information section of the annual 
reports. Issued unit data were from Aspect Huntley’s DatAnalysis Premium database. 
Table 6.2.1 shows the sample of A-REITs used, along with some of their attributes.  
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Table 6.2.1: Sample A-REITs Used 
A-REIT ASX CODE STAPLED TYPE 
Abacus Property Group ABP YES Diversified 
Agricultural Land Trust AGJ  NO Agricultural 
ALE Property Group LEP YES Commercial 
APN European Retail Property Group AEZ YES Retail 
Aspen Group APZ YES Diversified 
Astro Japan Property Group AJA YES Diversified 
Australand Property Group ALZ YES Diversified 
Challenger Group CDI YES Diversified 
Charter Hall Group CHC YES Diversified 
CNPR Group CNP YES Retail 
Coonawarra Australia Property Trust CNR  NO Agricultural 
Cromwell Property Group CMW YES Diversified 
Dexus Property Group DXS YES Diversified 
Goodman Group GMG YES Industrial 
GPT Group GPT YES Diversified 
Growthpoint GOZ YES Diversified 
Ingenia Group INA YES Residential 
Lendlease Primelife Group LLP YES Residential 
Living and Leisure Group LLA YES Commercial 
Mirvac Group MGR YES Diversified 
Oak Hotels and Resorts Limited OAK YES Commercial 
RCL Group RLG YES Residential 
Stockland  SGP YES Diversified 
Thakral Holdings UNT THG YES Commercial 
Trafalgar Corporate Group TGP YES Office 
Trinity Group TCQ YES Diversified 
Valad Property Group VPG YES Industrial 
Westfield Group WDC YES Retail 
Note: Extracted by the author from A-REIT financial reports 
 
Table 6.2.2 shows descriptive statistics for each of the dependent variables. 
The variables are classified into two categories. The first includes variables that 
proxy for institutional investment. The variable INSTINV is expressed as a 
proportion and is calculated as the percentage of institutional investment within the 
top 20 unitholders, divided by the percentage of total unit holders in the top 20. 
These data are taken from the ASX section of annual reports. It is necessary to 
extract this information from the top 20 unitholders because the data showing the 
precise number of institutional unitholders appearing in the SNL Property database 
report on only 13 A-REITs and do not provide an adequate sample size. Of all unit 
ownership, 73% is represented in the top 20 in this sample and it is argued that this is 
a reasonable sample of total unitholders to represent adequate institutional 
investment ratios. This finding is similar to that of Heineman and Davis (2011), who 
Chapter Six: Institutional Investment in A-REITs and the Global Financial Crisis 
186 
 
find that, by 2009, institutional investors represented 73% of the total ownership of 
the top 1,000 U.S. companies.  
 
Table 6.2.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
VARIABLES INSTINV INSTRAISED INSTOP20 TOTOP20 
MEAN 0.7195 0.2739 0.5329 0.7311 
MEDIAN 0.8615 0.0000 0.5732 0.7739 
ST DEV 0.3009 0.3614 0.2647 0.1603 
MIN 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2666 
MAX 1.0000 1.0000 0.9218 0.9454 
Note: Descriptive statistics are provided for the entire panel (2006-2012) and are not listed for any particular year. The 
dependent variables are expressed as proportions. INSTITINV is expressed as a proportion, and is calculated as the 
percentage of institutional investors in the top 20 unitholders, divided by the percentage of total investors in the top 20 
unitholders. INSTRAISED is expressed as a proportion, and is the value of equity subscribed to by institutional placements, 
divided by the total equity raised through placements, rights issues, and dividend reinvestment schemes. INSTOP20 is the 
percentage of total issued units owned by institutional investors in the top 20 unitholders. TOTOP20 is the total number of 
units held by owners in the top 20, divided by total units issued. 
 
The variable INSTRAISED is expressed as a proportion of one whole and is 
calculated as the percentage of equity raised specifically from institutional investors 
via placements, divided by total equity raised through additional public offers, 
placements, dividend re-investment schemes, and rights issues from 2006 to 2012. 
These data were extracted through ASX announcements and notices. The variable 
INSTOP20 is the percentage of total issued units owned by institutional investors in 
the top 20 unitholders as disclosed in the ASX section of the annual reports. It has 
been converted into a proportion. This variable is included as a robustness check for 
INSTINV because it includes all unitholders in the denominator, whereas INSTINV 
includes only the top 20 unit holders. This check of robustness will help determine 
whether the use of the top 20 unitholders as a proxy for total investment is valid. 
The second category includes a dependent variable that measures the response 
of large unitholders in general.  The variable TOTOP20 is defined as the total 
number of units held by owners in the top 20 unitholders, divided by the total number 
of units on issue. This variable is included as a proxy for movements in units held by 
large investors and as a robustness check. Independent variables were chosen similar 
to those of Frank and Ghosh (2012) because they are expected to influence 
institutional and large investors in real estate. 
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All the independent variables are categorised as performance, risk, and 
governance attributes, and the following defines each variable and explains its 
expected relationship to institutional and large investment: 
The variable for A-REIT Size (TA) is calculated as the natural log of total assets. 
Larger A-REITs are expected to be preferred by larger investors due to their liquidity 
and lower degree of information asymmetry (Chan et al., 1998; Below et al., 2000; 
Clayton & MacKinnon, 2000; Ciochetti et al., 2002). On the other hand, investments 
in smaller A-REITs may allow for greater proportional unit holdings and greater 
influence over the board.  
The performance variables are as follows: 
Funds from operations per unit (FFO): is defined as net profit after tax plus 
depreciation and amortisation less gains from sale of property, divided by the number 
of units on issue. This variable is expected to have a negative association with large 
investors because, given the regulation of A-REITs, all free cash flow must be 
returned to unitholders to enjoy tax exempt status. The traditional free cash flow 
hypothesis concerning U.S.-REITs states that this association should be positive 
because free cash flow from the 10% of earnings permitted to be retained for growth 
purposes exceeds the benefits of reducing free cash flow for governance purposes 
(Frank & Ghosh, 2012). The results for this variable in this study therefore cannot be 
perfectly compared to those for the United States. Another uneven basis for 
comparison is that nearly all of the A-REITs in this study issue stapled securities and 
their reports are consolidated with an associated corporate entity. In this case, FFO 
may be ‘contaminated’ with those of a related entity; 
The variable for return on assets (ROA): is defined as net profit after tax divided by 
total assets. A positive association with large investors is expected, given that 
positive returns increase wealth. However, the association also depends on the return 
that is required by investors, which is expected in the future. Overall, higher returns 
indicate good management; 
The yield variable (YIELD): is defined as the annualised dividend relative to the 
ordinary unit price. All else being equal, the tax related regulation of A-REITs 
ensures that yields will be higher than for corporate entities that prefer to retain 
earnings. High or total earnings payouts act to reduce the free cash flow available for 
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agents to potentially mismanage. This reduces the agency problem and is a natural 
benefit for A-REIT investors. In stable economic conditions, increasing yields reflect 
higher earnings. However, increasing yields since the onset of the GFC may reflect 
the impact of rapidly reducing unit values, where dividends are still positive. In the 
corporate finance literature, there is a trade-off between the need for entities to 
expand using retained earnings and the reduction of agency issues by paying out free 
cash flow (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Miller & Scholes, 1978; DeAngelo & 
Masulis, 1980; Stulz, 1990). A set relationship in either direction is not expected 
with A-REITs, although the GFC-induced reduction in unit prices would initially 
increase yield to where dividends are positive, and allow investors a chance to 
increase unit holdings at a lower price; 
Debt per unit (DPU): is a risk variable and is defined as total interest bearing 
liabilities divided by total units on issue. This is an alternative measure to the 
traditional gearing ratio (Zarebski and Dimovski, 2012). In stable economic periods, 
the gearing ratio is an adequate measure, but after the GFC onset, there was extreme 
volatility and great market value downgrades of property assets. This type of 
volatility has the potential to artificially increase a gearing ratio outside the intention 
of management to directly change the level of debt. Immediately after the onset of 
the GFC, A-REITs issued equity on a large scale to pay off maturing debt. The DPU 
measure directly reflects the nominal dollar value of debt and is very sensitive to 
further releases of equity. A positive association with DPU can imply that large 
investors are attracted to the monitoring that debt issuers can provide, reducing their 
own monitoring costs. The high tangibility of A-REIT assets also provides greater 
collateral for debt providers, enabling a reduction in the cost of debt relative to 
equity.  
However, a negative association can also be expected for several reasons. 
First, according to the general argument attributed to Howe and Shilling (1988), 
REITs compete on the debt markets against other entities that pay corporate taxes 
and are able to claim tax deductions for interest paid. The marginal value of debt will 
be lower for A-REITs from a tax perspective, where they may be forced to endure 
higher rates of interest when competing for debt with other entities. Tax-paying 
corporations can afford to bid up the gross cost of debt because after deductions, the 
cost of debt will be substantially lower, whereas A-REITs do not have that luxury. 
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Second, according to trade-off theory, institutional investors prefer not to risk capital 
in their charge. As the level of debt increases, an A-REIT may approach insolvency, 
placing the entire equity base at risk. Bradley et al. (1998) find that cash flows are 
more volatile at higher levels of debt, which may also detract institutional fiduciaries. 
This finding is also consistent with the interest rate risk and refinancing risk faced 
during the initial stages of the GFC and typical of the prudent investor hypothesis 
outlined by Eakins et al. (1998) and Below et al. (2000). 
The board of directors has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure the 
maximization of unitholder wealth. Part of their duties is to oversee and approve of 
tasks performed by the CEO, and to ensure that the incentives of the CEO and 
unitholders are aligned as far as practicable. Directors can be classified as both 
executive and non-executive. Executive directors serve on the board, whilst also 
performing typical managerial duties. Non-executive directors do not partake in day-
to-day management but do convene often to assess the strategic direction of an 
entity. Non-executive directors can be further classified into independent or non-
independent. Independent directors are considered to perform their duties at ‘arms 
length’, with no material interest in the entity or CEO, aside from their fiduciary 
duties.  
The degree of board independence has been a topical issue recently, with the 
Council of Institutional Investors in the United States (CII) prescribing that at least  
two thirds of a board should be independent (CII, 2013), whilst ASX 
Recommendation 2.1 states that independent directors should make up a majority 
(ASX, 2013). Both are only prescriptions at this stage and there are no regulations to 
mandate this. However, the board independence of listed A-REITs must be disclosed 
and failure to adhere to this recommendation may be relevant in the decision of 
investors to provide capital. As board independence increases, the internal 
monitoring function is expected to become more stringent, which increases the 
integrity of the prescriptions that aim to improve corporate governance. Board 
independence should be regularly assessed and disclosures made when material facts 
change. 
The CII (2013) prescribes that boards should be made up of between five 
and 15 members and that individual directors should not serve on more than five 
for-profit boards. Similarly, ASX Recommendation 2.4 prescribes that the size of 
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a board should be conducive to tasks being performed adequately without 
hindrance from each other or from excessive external commitments. It also 
prescribes that any other directorships in listed entities should be disclosed.  
Independent directors in this sample of A-REITs have an array of external 
directorships, including in schools, charities, government, related responsible 
entities, and both listed and unlisted companies. 
A-REITs retain their trust status if their primary reason for commerce is to 
allocate capital toward investment property in return for rental income. The 
specific focus on property requires that directors have direct knowledge and 
experience in real estate. The tenure of directors is therefore expected to bear 
greater importance when linking experience to A-REIT performance relative to 
directors in conglomerates, who do not require such industry-specific expertise. 
The following defines the governance variables: 
The number of other directorships held by the board (BUSYNESS): is a dummy 
variable equal to one if at least 50% of independent directors were engaged in a 
total of three current directorships or more and zero otherwise. A positive 
relationship is expected when the breadth of independent director experience is 
valued. Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the reputation benefits of busy directors 
provide an incentive to be more diligent in monitoring executive management, 
which is complemented by the findings of Coles and Hoi (2003) and Yermack 
(2004), who assert that busyness leads to more effective monitoring. Field et al. 
(2011) also add that busyness inherently brings wider networking opportunities 
and greater qualifications and commitment. Alternatively, a negative relationship 
indicates institutional investors believe that busy boards are less able to monitor 
management (Friday & Sirmans, 1998; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2005) and practice 
weak corporate governance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). 
The number of directors sitting on the board is denoted (BOARDSIZE): smaller 
boards are hypothesized to assist the flow of information. Jensen (1993) finds that 
the benefits of increased monitoring are overridden by the costs of disjointed 
communication within larger boards, as do Feng et al, (2005) and Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2005). A negative relationship would therefore be expected. However, 
smaller boards may be more conducive to collusion with the CEO, reducing 
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effective monitoring. If collusion is the primary concern of large investors, a 
positive association is expected. 
The proportion of independent directors (INDEP): is calculated by dividing the 
number of independent directors by the total number of directors. When the 
number of independent directors increases, the propensity for collusion decreases 
and monitoring is expected to be more stringent. However, evidence to the 
contrary presented by Boone et al. (2007) and Linck et al. (2008) argues that 
specific skills are needed in a concentrated REIT industry. If large investors place 
greater emphasis on property-specific knowledge than on more efficient 
monitoring, a negative relationship is expected. 
The number of years directors have sat on the board (BTENURE): is calculated 
by summing the number of years each member has held his or her board position 
and dividing this by the number of board members to find the average tenure. The 
duration of directorship has not provided any definitive results (Friday & Sirmans, 
1998; Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003), but two opposing effects characterise the 
relationship with this variable. As tenure increases, property-specific knowledge 
becomes more consolidated; meaning directors are better able to manage strategic 
direction. An alternative hypothesis proposed by Vafeas (2003) states that long- 
tenured directors may have developed a relationship with management, 
compromising efficient internal monitoring. Therefore, a negative relationship is 
expected if large unitholders place greater emphasis on reducing collusion and 
influence. 
The number of years a CEO position has been held is (CTENURE): CEOs who 
hold their position for lengthy periods are said to be entrenched and have the 
ability to select and control a board (Ghosh & Sirmans, 2003, 2006; Feng et al., 
2005, 2007). In this case, a negative relationship is expected when more efficient 
monitoring is valued. However, longer-tenured CEOs are also expected to have a 
better understanding of their A-REITs and greater experience navigating the 
business cycle. Therefore, if large investors’ desire for greater experience 
dominates efficient monitoring, a positive relationship is expected. 
Another proxy for CEO power is proportional ownership in an A-REIT 
(CEOTOT): defined as the number of units owned by the CEO, divided by the 
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total number of units on issue, expressed as a percentage (Frank & Ghosh, 2012). 
A high degree of CEO ownership indicates a greater degree of power, 
deteriorating the benefits of monitoring and increasing its cost (Boone et al., 2007; 
Linck et al., 2008). A high degree of CEO ownership also better aligns the CEO’s 
interests with that of unitholders. Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) and Han (2006) 
state that a trade-off exists between these two effects, which is evidenced by a 
non-linear relationship between institutional investment and CEO ownership. 
CEO power relative to other directors on the board (CEODIR): is defined as the 
number of units owned by the CEO divided by the number of units owned by the 
entire board, including the CEO. This measure of CEO power is arguably better 
than CEOTOT, targeting the CEO-director power balance directly. A negative 
relationship is expected to preserve the importance of monitoring efficiency. A 
positive result may however indicate that the board is more independent by having 
a relatively smaller stake in its entity. 
LTI remuneration relative to total remuneration (LTITOT): is defined as unit-
based pay divided by total pay, which includes base salary, short term cash 
bonuses, and LTIs. A positive relationship indicates that institutional investors 
value increased incentive alignment and decreased monitoring costs (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990b). Hermalin (2005) finds that governance and investor wealth 
increase with a larger percentage of equity compensation. A negative relationship 
may indicate that investors view equity awards as exacerbating the degree of 
power a CEO could have over the board. 
The GFC variable (GFC): is a dummy that equals one between the years 2008 to 
2012 and zero otherwise, as per Zarebski and Dimovski (2012), with the onset of 
the GFC specified by Dimovski (2009) as having occurred in December 2007. The 
volatility in earnings and large decreases in both book and market values of equity 
brought about by the GFC initially led to the expectation that investors would 
attempt to sell their unit holdings as soon as possible. The ensuing recovery may 
reverse this expectation, but the assumption of this study is that large investors 
will nevertheless continue to be cautious given the possibility of this event 
recurring. Table 6.2.3 shows descriptive statistics of all non-dummy independent 
variables, whereas Table 6.2.5 shows their correlations. No correlations lower than 
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-0.6 or greater than +0.6 are recorded between any two variables, thus 
multicollinearity issues are avoided. 
 
Table 6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables 
VARIABLES MEAN MEDIAN ST DEV MIN MAX 
TA 20.9314 20.7580 1.8106 16.0809 24.7470 
FFO 0.0497 0.0685 0.6494 -5.0556 3.1990 
ROA -0.0037 0.0319 0.1441 -1.1765 0.1778 
YIELD 8.4267 7.4700 6.7292 0.0000 43.1400 
DPU 1.8765 0.9748 2.9926 0.0190 17.9091 
BOARDSIZE 6.6647 7.0000 2.2452 3.0000 13.0000 
INDEP 0.6326 0.6250 0.1557 0.2000 1.0000 
BTENURE 5.0572 4.8600 2.9697 1.0000 16.6900 
CTENURE 6.5529 4.0000 9.2972 1.0000 51.0000 
CEOTOT 2.9080 0.1543 8.1921 0.0000 57.1896 
CEODIR 37.8360 35.2743 35.7929 0.0000 100.0000 
LTITOT 0.1368 0.0856 0.1682 0.0000 0.8100 
Note: Data were collected between the years 2006 and 2012 from annual A-REIT reports and DatAnalysis. The variable TA is the 
natural log of total assets and controls for A-REIT size. FFO is the funds from operations divided by total units outstanding. ROA 
is return on assets, and is measured by dividing NPAT by total assets. DPU is debt per unit and is measured by dividing interest-
bearing debt by the number of units on issue. YIELD is the annualised dividend as a percentage of unit price. BOARDSIZE is the 
number of members on the board. INDEP is a measure of board independence, and is expressed as the ratio of independent 
directors to the total number of directors on the board. BTENURE is the tenure of the average board member, in years. CTENURE 
is the number of years the CEO has been in their position. CEOTOT is the number of units owned by the CEO, divided by total 
number of units on issue. CEODIR is the number of units owned by the CEO, divided by the total number of units owned by the 
board, including the CEO. LTITOT is the CEO’s equity-based remuneration as a proportion of total remuneration. 
 
All of the variables are tested in three broad models, with proportion of 
institutional investment, the proportion of institutional capital raised, and the 
proportion of large investment as the dependent variables. These will all be regressed 
on independent variables from the previous year, and are identically defined in the 
following equation: 
Dependent Variables = β0 + β1(Log of Total Assets) + β2(FFO per Unit) + 
β3(Return on Assets) + β4(Dividend Yield) + β5(Debt Per Unit) + β6(Board 
Busyness) + β7(Board Size) + β8(Board Independence) + β9(Board Tenure) 
+ β10(CEO Tenure) + β11(Total CEO Ownership) + β12(Board-CEO 
Ownership) + β13(Equity Compensation) + β14GFC + ε 
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Another set of these models is shown with interaction variables, combining 
each independent variable into a product with the GFC dummy variable. This 
method enables each explanatory variable to include only the after effects of the 
GFC. This is important because the prescriptions in the U.K. Stewardship code, 
Dodd-Frank reforms, new ASX listing rules and Industry Best Practice Guideline 
Principle II.F.1 were constructed to improve the diligence of institutional 
investors. These regulations are even more vital given the negative impact of the 
GFC. Any differences in institutional investor strategy since the GFC onset could 
reasonably be attributed to the GFC after effect prescriptions and individual 
lessons learned. 
All regressions are performed again, with the sample split equally into two 
sub-groups based on A-REIT size. The entire sample is ordered by the log of total 
assets, and every A-REIT in each sample is then reconstructed in an unbalanced 
panel format. If an individual A-REIT appears in both the small and large total 
asset groups, only the particular years in which size is classified as large or small 
are included in either one sub group or the other. The large sample includes the 
largest 50% of A-REIT-years by size, whilst the small sample includes the bottom 
50%. Splitting the sample into two has its advantages. The first is that it provides a 
robustness check over the entire model. Another advantage is that investor 
preferences for either larger or smaller A-REITs can be isolated. This can 
demonstrate implications, given larger A-REITs, which have greater institutional 
ownership concentration and a greater quantity of both institutional and large 
investor capital contributed. Table 6.2.4 shows descriptive statistics for both the 
smaller and larger samples individually. The differences demonstrate that different 
investment philosophies may be present according to the ultimate entity A-REIT 
size. 
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6.3 RESULTS, INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
6.3.1 Institutional Investment 
 
The results of regressions performed on institutional investment (INSTINV), 
including interaction variables, and its robustness check (INSTOP20) are presented 
in Table 6.3.1.1a. The models of INSTINV and INSTOP20 are very similar in terms 
of the sign and significance of the variables, indicating that using data from the top 
20 is a very good proxy for the actual proportion of institutional investment. The 
model of INSTINV is sound, with independent variables explaining 85% of the 
variation in the proportion of institutional investment. The errors follow a normal 
distribution and the likelihood ratio shows that fixed effects are present. The 
Hausman test indicates the absence of random effects, therefore, only fixed effects 
models are shown and interpreted. This is the case for all models presented. 
The GFC seems to reduce institutional investment, and its effect is significant 
at the 1% level. The initial shock and rapidly falling equity values provided a strong 
incentive to preserve investment capital by selling large blocks of units. The post 
GFC period up to 2012 includes the ensuing recovery, so the strong negative 
relationship over that entire period implies that the institutional re-purchasing of sold 
units at lower prices was very slow. This finding is consistent with the recovery of 
A-REIT unit prices and returns lagging behind the United States, Asia, and the global 
average until recently (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.4.2). It is also consistent with 
institutional fiduciaries focusing on short term returns rather than ‘riding the wave’ 
and maintaining a long term outlook. 
The general relationship with A-REIT size is negative and significant at the 
1% level. This suggests that institutions are not shying away from smaller firms with 
greater information asymmetry and lower liquidity. The average size by total assets 
of smaller firms is $303.1 million, whereas that of the large subgroup is $5.2 billion 
This result contrasts with those of Chan et al (1998), Clayton and MacKinnon 
(2000), Ciochetti et al. (2002), and Frank and Ghosh (2012). This relationship 
indicates that institutions may have been motivated by increasing their power and 
relative unit holdings in smaller A-REITs. This would boost the strength of 
individual monitoring activities and active relationships between institutions and A-
REITs. After the onset of the GFC, the same significant relationship persists, 
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although the coefficient shows it to be considerably weaker. The main cause appears 
to be greater liquidity concerns that prevailed at the height of the crisis. 
Funds from operations per unit have a negative relationship with institutional 
investment at the 1% significance level, in contrast to the results of Frank and Ghosh 
(2012). In contrast to the United States, where REITs are allowed to retain 10% of 
earnings before tax penalties kick in, Australian institutions prefer to invest in A-
REITs with lower levels of free cash flow because this reduces the agency problem. 
After the GFC onset, the effect is slightly greater, revealing their desire to keep this 
issue under control. 
Return on assets shows a strong positive effect on institutional investment, 
significant at the 1% level. This is in contrast with the finding of Frank & Ghosh 
(2012). This strong positive effect is expected because higher returns indicate good 
management and institutional fiduciaries should be prioritising A-REITs with these 
returns to maximise the wealth of capital providers. Positive returns provide a 
competitive advantage against rival fund managers, but a sound relative comparison 
would require knowing the returns of all the other investment options. This result 
also highlights that institutions may have a short term focus on competitive 
advantage, rather than investing in the long term growth of ultimate entities. After 
the GFC onset, the effect is substantially stronger, indicating a more competitive 
funds management industry under scrutiny, operating within a more volatile 
environment. 
Debt per unit does not seem to have a significant impact on institutional 
investment, in contrast to the findings of Howe and Shilling (1988), Eakins et al. 
(1998), Below et al. (2000), and Frank and Ghosh (2012). Its coefficient is however, 
positive, which indicates that higher debt levels may assist in external monitoring. 
The effect after the GFC onset is much stronger, indicating a preference for greater 
vigilance, yet remains insignificant, suggesting that other concerns dominate. 
Yield is also insignificant but shows a negative relationship, supporting Frank 
and Ghosh (2012) but in contrast with Wang et al. (1993) and Newell and Peng 
(2008), who find that increased yields of emerging property sectors largely motivate 
institutional property fund managers. However, yield becomes positively significant 
after GFC onset, again reflecting the priority of competing institutions to invest in 
the highest-yielding securities. The inherent nature of A-REITs paying out all 
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earnings assists in being a preferred choice for institutions prioritising short term 
returns. The Responsible entity in stapled A-REITs can however, retain its earnings. 
Busyness shows a negative relationship with institutional investment, 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that institutional investors prefer board 
members who have more time to allocate to their duties in this capacity and that 
other directorial pursuits may pose a distraction. This result is not consistent with 
Coles and Hoi’s (2003) and Yermack’s (2004) hypothesis that busyness leads to 
more effective monitoring, nor does it support Field (2011), who states that busyness 
attracts greater qualifications and commitment. It is, however, consistent with the 
work of Friday and Sirmans (1998) and Ghosh and Sirmans (2005). It may also 
reflect on the findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2006), who conclude that board 
busyness leads to weak corporate governance. After the GFC onset, the relationship 
becomes insignificant and positive, indicating that institutions may favour the 
additional lateral skills of directors during volatile periods to increase the probability 
of a strategy that will navigate a challenging environment. 
Board size is positive and significant at the 5% level, in contrast to the 
findings of Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), Feng et al. (2005) and Frank and Ghosh 
(2012). Institutions appear to want to mitigate the increased possibility of collusion 
between smaller numbers of directors and management, and seem to believe that this 
mitigation overrides the benefits of less disjointed communication experienced by 
smaller boards. After the GFC onset, the impact becomes insignificant and positive, 
indicating no particular preference for either. 
Board independence has a positive and significant impact on institutional 
investment at the 5% level, in contrast to Boone et al. (2007), Linck et al. (2008) and 
Frank and Ghosh (2012). Despite specific property skills being required within A-
REITs, institutions seem to prefer greater director independence, which assists in 
mitigating collusion and increases the quality of monitoring. After the GFC onset, 
the effect is negative and no longer significant, indicating a slight institutional 
preference for the valuable experience that non-independent affiliated directors may 
bring when navigating a volatile environment. 
Board tenure has a negative relationship with institutional investment, 
significant at the 5% level. This supports Vafeus (2003) and Frank and Ghosh (2012) 
and indicates institutional aversion to potential collusion with management through 
long relationships. After the GFC onset, the relationship becomes positive and 
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significant at the 1% level. Again, the turbulent environment elicits a preference for 
the board experience that longer tenure brings. 
CEO tenure is not significant over the whole sample period, but it is positive, 
conflicting with Vafaes (2003) and Hermalin (2005) and supportive of Frank and 
Ghosh (2012). After the GFC onset, the relationship becomes negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This implies that during volatile periods, institutions do 
not favour entrenched CEOs, who may have the ability to select and control a board. 
During the GFC, radical changes in strategy were needed, and so the introduction of 
new CEOs added a new perspective, as well as removed any longstanding CEO-
board relationships. 
The percentage ownership by the CEO is insignificant and negative during 
the entire period, as well as after the GFC onset. The sign is consistent with that of 
Boone et al. (2007), Linck et al. (2008) and Frank and Ghosh (2012). This implies 
that institutions may slightly lean towards a lower degree of CEO power at the 
expense of better aligning CEO and unitholder interests. The percentage ownership 
squared variable is positive and also insignificant, refuting a trade-off between 
incentive alignment and entrenchment, as hypothesised by Han (2006). The 
percentage ownership relative to the board is insignificant over the sample period, as 
well as after the GFC onset. The negative sign may initially indicate greater board 
power and more efficient monitoring. 
The Proportion of LTI remuneration is positive and significant at the 5% 
level, supporting the hypotheses of Jensen and Murphy (1990b) and Hermalin 
(2005), but in contrast to Frank and Ghosh (2012). This result indicates that 
institutional investors prefer on-going incentive alignment, which reduces monitoring 
costs. After the GFC onset, the effect is highly insignificant, indicating there are 
more important factors that govern the desirable characteristics of target investment 
A-REITs. 
The results of stapled A-REITs alone are shown in Table 6.3.1.1b. Stapled 
models across all dependent variables are very similar to the overall models, with 
only a handful of exceptions. Institutional investors tend to treat stapled A-REITs 
with only minimal differences. Board independence retains its negative relationship 
after the GFC onset but is now significant, indicating a stronger institutional 
preference for a more hands-on approach by the board in monitoring and assisting in 
managing riskier ventures in volatile periods. The negative relationship with board 
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tenure loses its significance over the entire sample period, indicating that institutions 
are less concerned about stapled A-REIT boards potentially developing collusive 
relationships with CEOs. The proportion of CEO remuneration allocated to LTIs has 
a significant negative relationship after the GFC onset for stapled A-REITs. This 
result indicates that institutions do not want CEO power over the board to increase 
further, whilst bonuses may be a better way to reward achievements after the GFC 
onset as found in Chapter 5. It appears that a cohesive, longer term, hands-on 
arrangement best manages extra development risk, but a reduction in CEO power 
reduces any further degree of coercion in this relationship. 
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Table 6.3.1.2 replicates Table 6.3.1.1a and also shows the same regressions 
performed on the sample, which has been split into smaller and larger A-REITs. In 
differentiating desirable factors for institutional investors between small and large A-
REITs, they are found to be largely similar, but with some pronounced differences. A 
caution must be mentioned about the results in this section. The sample size for each 
category has been reduced to 85 from the initial 170, possibly leading to artificially 
inflated adjusted R2 values and autocorrelation statistics. 
Institutions prefer smaller A-REITs to obtain lower debt levels. Consistent 
with Howe and Shilling (1998), smaller A-REITs seem to have a greater 
disadvantage on the debt markets when competing for the lowest interest rates. This 
may be due to the smaller amount of tangible property collateral they hold. Being 
exempt from corporate taxes, their interest expenses are not tax deductible and thus 
their net cost of debt would be higher than comparable tax-paying entities. Their 
liquidity is also lower thus institutions may see large debt as excessively risky, such 
that an approach toward insolvency in line with trade-off theory would be more 
likely with smaller A-REITs than with larger A-REITs. 
Board tenure seems to have the opposite relationship for larger A-REITs. It 
seems that institutions prefer these boards to have longer tenures and more 
experience in their current roles. Perhaps it is the skills of these directors that have 
contributed to the growth of the entity. The percentage of units owned by the CEO is 
another point of conflicting institutional preferences. Institutions invest more in 
smaller A-REITs where the CEO has less power, indicating they are more sensitive 
to efficient monitoring. Institutions invest more in larger A-REITs when the CEO has 
greater ownership and power. They therefore believe that it is more important for 
larger A-REITs to have better alignment of CEO and unitholder interests. This seems 
plausible, since larger A-REITs already have greater institutional investment and 
more debt, providing a more established monitoring schedule where CEO power can 
be better mitigated. The CEO ownership squared variable is significant only for 
larger A-REITs, which supports a non-linear relationship. This finding indicates the 
presence of a trade-off between an incentive alignment effect and an entrenchment 
effect. 
The post GFC onset factors are shown in Table 6.3.1.3. Institutions seem to 
hold more units in smaller A-REITs that have a lower return on assets, which is 
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initially perplexing. Due to asset values falling after the GFC onset, this result may 
be indicative of institutions choosing to invest more in smaller A-REITs that suffered 
relatively less dramatic drops in asset values. With earnings held constant, less 
dramatic asset devaluations would result in a relatively smaller return on assets. 
Larger deflations in the denominator of this ratio would artificially inflate positive 
earnings. Therefore, it is probably the case where focusing on smaller A-REITs 
allows the maintenance of asset values relative to others.  
Individually, both smaller and larger A-REITs that are the target of greater 
institutional investment tend to exhibit lower debt per unit post GFC onset. This is 
probably the result of frenetic attempts to repay debt and issue equity capital. 
Institutions prefer the boards of smaller A-REITs to be less busy, but that preference 
reverses for larger A-REITs. Less busyness is consistent with better monitoring. 
With a smaller institutional presence and external monitoring among smaller A-
REITs, it seems likely that institutions prefer a higher degree of internal monitoring 
to compensate.  
Institutions prefer greater independence, especially within larger A-REITs. In 
reference to the summary statistics in Table 6.2.4, larger A-REITs tend to exhibit 
longer board and CEO tenure. These measures have a greater propensity to lead to 
collusion. It is therefore important to mitigate their effects by investing more heavily 
when boards demonstrate greater independence. A greater degree of CEO ownership 
seems to be preferred within larger A-REITs. External monitoring of this subgroup is 
already higher therefore, institutions prefer a higher degree of internal incentive 
alignment mechanisms. 
CEO ownership relative to the board is preferred to be lower amongst larger 
A-REITs. This preference can be linked to institutions valuing independence and 
board power relative to the CEO ownership. Institutions also prefer the CEOs of 
larger A-REITs to have a lower equity incentive component in their salary. 
Following the findings regarding fiduciary remuneration in Chapter 5, the period 
immediately after the GFC onset evoked urgency for CEOs to reverse diminishing 
results as fast as possible. The issuing of long-term equity incentives would not be 
expected to align with this urgency. It therefore seems plausible for institutions to 
support greater offers of short-term cash incentives in place of long-term equity.
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6.3.2 Raising Institutional Equity by Private Placement 
 
The variable INSTRAISED is the percentage of equity raised specifically 
from institutional investors via placements, with respect to total equity raised through 
additional public offers, placements, dividend re-investment schemes, and rights 
issues. This variable is included as robustness check for INSTINV because it 
includes all purchasing unitholders in the denominator, whereas the previous 
variable, INSTINV includes only the top 20 unitholders. This will help determine 
whether the use of the top 20 as a proxy for total investment is valid. This variable is 
also important because it allows new equity raised through institutions to be 
differentiated from past raisings that were made during non-turbulent economic 
periods. It therefore isolates the proportion of new institutional equity desired from 
the institutional ratio accumulated in the past.  
Private placements play an important role in the market. Wruck (1989) 
asserts that placements increase the level of monitoring due to increased ownership 
concentration. Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Slovin et al. (2000) contend that effort-
intensive signals from firms negotiating the placement of equity reflect quality. In 
terms of impact on existing shareholders, Marciukaityte et al. (2007) find positive 
abnormal REIT returns in the long run due to placements, despite negative returns in 
the short term, whilst Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) find that unitholders are not 
significantly worse off in terms of unit price. The results after the GFC onset may not 
necessarily reflect willful capital decisions but rather, urgent ones to expedite the 
equity generating process privately instead of enduring lengthy public offers, along 
with mandated formalities such as prospectuses and disclosure documents. 
Descriptive statistics for INSTRAISED are shown in Table 6.2.2, generally, 
and in Table 6.2.4, based on size. It is interesting to note that whilst the proportion of 
equity owned by institutions is 71.95%, new equity raised consists of only 27.39%. A 
reason may be that institutional ownership is already saturated and further exposure 
to A-REITs increases their required rate of return. It may also indicate aversion by 
A-REITs to excessively dilute existing unitholder ownership. Restrictions on 
placements in Australia are 15% of capital as explained earlier in this chapter, and 
are also prevalent internationally as outlined by Chan and Brown (2004). 
The models of institutional equity raised do not contain as much data as the 
previous institutional investment models. Much of the data record a zero value when 
equity offerings are not targeted toward institutions and there are many A-REIT-
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years when placements were not offered at all. The sample size is smaller, with 108 
observations. This may again lead to inflated R2 values and autocorrelation figures. 
These are magnified even further when the sample is split into two sections, leaving 
only 54 observations in each. Nevertheless, some insight from the results can still be 
gained. These models appear in Tables 6.3.2.1a to 6.3.2.3. Descriptive summary 
statistics are shown previously in Table 6.2.4. 
The GFC period has a negative and significant impact on placements at the 
1% level. With revenues and equity values depreciating, mass purchases of equity 
did not seem to be desired by institutions. Placements did occur, but at a reduced 
frequency relative to non-institutional equity purchases. Institutional placements 
tended to be more prevalent among smaller A-REITs. This seems to be consistent 
with developing greater power and influence over the board and promoting 
institutional objectives. This finding reversed after the GFC onset, with liquidity 
concerns seeming to dominate for new issues. 
Funds from operations per unit are not significant over the entire period, but 
become positively significant at the 1% level after the onset of the GFC. Since most 
A-REITs in this sample are stapled to other corporate entities, consolidated reports 
may include free funds other than those of the trust itself. The positive relationship 
reveals that institutions prefer to purchase units in A-REITs that are relatively more 
profitable in turbulent periods, and have a proven positive cash flow from the 
previous year. Institutions tend to accept placements from A-REITs with higher 
levels of debt per unit. There is already a higher degree of existing debt-provider 
monitoring when they purchase units and therefore their own costs of monitoring are 
expected to be reduced. 
High relative yields appear to entice institutional placements. As fiduciaries, 
institutions are obliged to select better performing options for their clients. This 
effect is not significant after the GFC onset, so it seems likely that yields attracting 
institutions were legitimately high, as opposed to being artificially high when unit 
prices were decreasing and depressed after the crisis onset. The busyness variable is 
negative and significant at the 5% level but becomes positively significant at the 1% 
level after the GFC onset. It seems that institutions generally accept more placements 
if they see that boards have more time to monitor management, although this 
Chapter Six: Institutional Investment in A-REITs and the Global Financial Crisis 
210 
 
reverses in volatile periods when more emphasis is placed on the lateral experience 
that busy directors can bring. 
Institutions tend to subscribe more to A-REITs with smaller boards 
(negatively significant at the 1% level) after the onset of the GFC. It is therefore 
more important for institutions to offer new equity when boards are less disjointed 
and information flows more freely. There is a risk of collusion with smaller boards, 
but institutions likely see this as overridden by the high degree of external 
monitoring during uncertain periods. The negatively significant association with 
board independence after the GFC onset supports this finding. Concerns about 
potential collusion seem to be overridden by directors with a more intimate 
knowledge of and association with A-REITs. 
Board tenure is positively significant at the 1% level, generally, but becomes 
negatively significant at the 1% level after the GFC onset. This is the exact opposite 
behaviour of the placement relationship with CEO tenure. Institutions seem to prefer 
accepting placements when boards have a longer tenure, supposedly attracted to the 
specific knowledge they possess about their A-REIT, although this is mitigated by 
collusion concerns after the GFC onset. Lengthy general board tenures are 
complemented by short CEO tenure in an attempt to avoid collusion. After the GFC 
onset, placements favoured A-REITs with short board tenures and long CEO tenures. 
It seems plausible that volatile periods require active executive management, which 
appears to be more efficient than passive board monitoring, even if it comes at the 
expense of an established, knowledgeable board. 
Institutional placements are more common when CEOs have greater overall 
ownership and power, placing more emphasis on the alignment of interests. This 
situation reverses after the GFC onset, suggesting that reducing the costs of 
monitoring becomes more important. As far as placements are concerned, there is 
evidence of a trade-off between these two effects, evidenced by a non linear 
relationship. Unlike institutional unit holdings, new placements seem to be 
influenced negatively by the power that a CEO holds relative to the board. 
Monitoring efficiency seems to be the dominant effect in this case, but this changes 
after the GFC onset. In volatile periods, institutional placements are more prevalent 
when CEO power is greater relative to the board. It seems that the focus of this 
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association is on owner-CEO interest alignment, lower relative board unit holdings, 
and a greater possibility of independence. 
The positively significant impact of equity incentives on new institutional 
placements is much stronger than that on the degree of ownership. New placements 
are more frequently accepted when the incentive component of CEO salary is high. 
This again emphasizes incentive alignment as an attractive feature in minimizing 
monitoring costs. Deeper insight can be achieved by splitting A-REITs into two 
groups of different sizes. The GFC period maintains its negative impact, but only 
with respect to the larger A-REITS. Relative institutional purchases of smaller A-
REITs seem to increase. It is plausible to attribute these effects to the greater 
discounting of unit prices given the size of institutions relative to smaller A-REITs 
and greater power to negotiate favourable unit prices. Smaller A-REITs also found it 
more difficult to obtain debt refinancing, and so were placed at a bargaining 
disadvantage against institutions. Larger A-REITs within the large subgroup were 
also more successful at placing new units with institutions, although this reversed in 
favour of smaller A-REIT placements after the GFC onset. 
Institutional investors preferring to purchase units where gearing and 
monitoring are high seem to only target larger A-REITs. Their high liquidity appears 
to be the defining factor in deciding to bypass smaller A-REITs. After the GFC 
onset, this situation reversed in favour of smaller A-REITs, with the likely reason 
being better value through the price of units placed. The attraction to higher yielding 
A-REITs seems to be isolated to smaller ones with a high yield. After the GFC onset, 
there tends to be a movement away from larger A-REITs with high yields in favour 
of smaller ones. The negative relationship with board busyness is also generally 
confined to smaller A-REITs, with no significant relationship with larger ones. 
Smaller A-REITs do not undergo the high level of monitoring as large ones, and so 
institutions prefer to offer placements when the board members are less preoccupied 
with other directorships and can devote more time to monitoring management. This 
is also the case with larger A-REITs after the GFC onset. 
Board size is negatively significant at the 1% level for large A-REITs only. 
Institutions seem to prefer placements where information flow is more liquid. This 
risks collusion, but large A-REITs already have an established degree of external 
monitoring to compensate for this. However, the relationship reverses after the GFC 
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onset, with institutions seemingly more concerned about collusion than disjointed 
information flow. Institutions prefer both small and large A-REIT boards to be less 
independent, focusing on specialist knowledge, however, this reverses for larger A-
REITs after the GFC onset, with greater emphasis placed on a lower propensity for 
collusion and stronger monitoring. 
Board tenure maintains its positively significant relationship only within 
larger A-REITs. The increased risks of establishing relationships with management 
can again be mitigated by external monitoring. However, the relationship becomes 
significantly negative after the GFC onset, with institutions placing greater value 
upon a reduction in long, potentially collusive CEO-board relationships. The 
negative relationship with smaller A-REITs generally shows that longer-tenure 
relationships are not favoured when the level of external monitoring is lower. By 
accepting a greater proportion of institutional placements when board tenure is 
higher, institutions seem to be averse to CEO tenure over A-REITs generally, but the 
effect is even stronger for larger A-REITs. After GFC onset, institutions prefer to 
receive placements from larger A-REITs with more experienced CEOs offering the 
benefit of expert executive knowledge, without the simultaneous collusion expected 
with long serving boards. 
The power that comes from CEO ownership is not linear, suggesting a trade-
off between incentive alignment and entrenchment within smaller A-REITs. The 
positive impact of equity incentives seems to be isolated to larger A-REITs after the 
GFC onset. A greater degree of internal incentive alignment leaves room to reduce 
any new costs of monitoring, which would present value for institutions purchasing a 
substantial number of units. CEO ownership relative to that of directors is generally 
preferred by institutions to be low when subscribing to placements, although this 
reverses for larger A-REITs after the GFC onset. This finding may indicate a 
preference for greater board independence. Finally, institutions generally value high 
equity components of CEO remuneration, but this reverses for larger A-REITs after 
the GFC onset, seemingly as an indication that they do not align with the degree of 
short term effort required to arrest increasingly poor results. 
Institutional placements for stapled A-REITs are modeled exclusively in 
Table 6.3.2.1b. It seems that lower yields are preferred for stapled A-REITs after the 
GFC onset. This reflects a tendency for placements to be accepted by institutions to a 
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greater degree when earnings are used for development. In comparison, this 
relationship is not significant over the entire sample. With CEO ownership relative to 
the board, the post GFC onset relationship loses significance. This indicates that 
CEO power over the board is not a major concern, perhaps because the reduction of 
LTIs (also insignificant) mitigates this effect. 
Table 6.3.2.1a: Model of Equity Raised by Institutional Investors 
 
Note: The model of equity raised by institutional investors and its interaction variables were formulated using a least squares panel methodology 
with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the proportion of equity raised from institutional investors, divided 
by total equity raised. This is regressed on levels of all independent variables from one year prior. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of 
movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests 
on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result 
of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on 
the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence 
becoming more likely as the statistic moves away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the 
impact of each independent variable over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance 
level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%. 
 INSTRAISED  INSTRAISED WITH 
POST GFC 
INTERACTION 
 
 COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
C 13.9676  6.8019*** 13.9676  6.8019*** 
GFC -3.3138 -3.4518*** -3.3138 -3.4518*** 
TA -0.5817 -6.4998***  0.3353  5.9070*** 
FFO -0.8858 -1.4280  1.8234  2.8247*** 
ROA -0.6817 -0.1884 -1.1869 -0.3743 
DPU  0.4852  2.1198** -0.2829 -1.2047 
YIELD  0.0555  2.6499** -0.0295 -1.3364 
BUSYNESS -0.3973 -2.5882**  0.2723  2.9721*** 
BOARDSIZE  0.0589  1.2804 -0.2754 -4.2441*** 
INDEP  0.4616  0.7863 -2.1892 -3.5584*** 
BTENURE  0.3193  7.6193*** -0.2765 -6.5340*** 
CTENURE -0.0795 -6.0390***  0.1261 13.9607*** 
CEOTOT  0.3898  4.4455*** -0.1495 -4.8075*** 
CEOTOT2 -0.7421 -5.0509***       -        - 
CEODIR -0.0071 -5.5926***  0.0052  3.0882*** 
LTITOT  0.8906  4.4186*** -0.3230 -0.5788 
     
Adjusted R2  0.5649    
F-Stat (Prob)  0.0045    
Jarque-Bera (Prob)  0.6214    
Likelihood Ratio (Prob)  0.0186    
Durbin Watson  3.0558    
Observations 108    
Chapter Six: Institutional Investment in A-REITs and the Global Financial Crisis 
214 
 
Table 6.3.2.1b: Model of Equity Raised by Institutional Investors, with Stapled A-REITs Only 
Note: The model of equity raised by institutional investors with stapled A-REITs only and its interaction variables were formulated using least 
squares panel methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the proportion of equity raised from 
institutional investors, divided by total equity raised. This is regressed on levels of all independent variables from one year prior. The adjusted R2 
shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of 
analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-
Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the 
result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of 
autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 
2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, 
** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 1%.
 INSTRAISED  INSTRAISED WITH 
POST GFC 
INTERACTION 
 
 COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
C 16.4584  5.0310*** 16.4584  5.0310*** 
GFC -2.4659 -2.6349** -2.4659 -2.6349*** 
TA -0.6788 -4.5336***  0.2928  5.4161*** 
FFO -0.8529 -1.4723  1.8417  3.2889*** 
ROA -1.3140 -0.3405 -0.3285 -0.0998 
DPU  0.5082  2.4154** -0.2648 -1.2002 
YIELD  0.0555  2.6499** -0.0598 -3.7616*** 
BUSYNESS -0.6016 -3.3904***  0.2762  2.6421** 
BOARDSIZE  0.0204  0.2616 -0.2500 -2.7775*** 
INDEP  0.4502  0.8265 -2.2581 -3.6175*** 
BTENURE  0.3807  6.0053*** -0.2653 -5.0237*** 
CTENURE -0.0833 -7.7435***  0.1254 15.7112*** 
CEOTOT  0.3882  6.1810*** -0.1511 -5.4485*** 
CEOTOT2 -0.0426 -6.5802***       -        - 
CEODIR -0.0094 -4.6857***  0.0034  1.6440 
LTITOT  1.0490  6.7659*** -0.3144 -0.5469 
     
Adjusted R2  0.5770    
F-Stat (Prob)  0.0070    
Jarque-Bera (Prob)  0.3361    
Likelihood Ratio (Prob)  0.0183    
Durbin Watson  2.8213    
Observations 102    
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6.3.3 Large Non-Institutional Investors 
 
Institutional investors are a subset of the large investors in the top twenty 
unitholders, but they are prone to exhibit multi-level agency issues and their 
investment choices may be self-serving. Other large investors include parent 
companies, responsible entities, syndicates and individual investors who possess 
enough wealth to be classified as large stakeholders. There are many common 
elements amongst institutional and large non-institutional investors. When the sole 
purpose of institutions is to invest on behalf of smaller equity holders, large investors 
often invest on their own behalf and do not face the scale of agency that other 
investors who have entrusted their capital to institutions do.  
Large investors include companies run by fiduciaries in some cases, but their 
primary business purpose is based on operations other than professional investing in 
the sense that this activity is non-core and peripheral to the fundamental business. 
The involvement of large non-institutional investors is therefore expected to be more 
passive. The distinction between both investor types is made by examining each 
unitholder in the top 20 owners reported in annual reports. Distinctions are based on 
differences in core operations and large investors are deemed to be in their separate 
group if primary operations are not considered classified under the definition as 
institutional. Tables 6.3.3.1a to 6.3.3.3 show the determinants of large investor 
ownership, as evidenced by movement in all top 20 unitholders. 
The GFC period has a positive relationship with large, non-institutional 
investors, significant at the 10% level. It appears that a reduction in both smaller 
investors and institutional involvement increase the relative ownership of large 
investors. This may also be evidence of a long term outlook and being prepared to 
purchase a greater number of units as prices are depreciating. Large investors tend to 
prefer investing in smaller A-REITs. They share this trait with institutions, 
presumably to realise greater power over the board, which slightly reduced after the 
GFC onset. Investment also tends to decrease within the smaller A-REITs in the 
smaller sample. This may also be the result of smaller investors not being as aware of 
smaller A-REITs. 
Unlike institutions, large non-institutional investors prefer A-REITs to have 
more free cash flow, although the significance of this finding is slightly outside the 
10% level. The benefits of free cash flow for growth purposes appear to outweigh the 
benefits of reducing free cash flow for governance purposes. Growth is a long term 
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prospect that seems to reflect the strategy of large investors, although A-REITs 
reducing free cash flow for governance purposes seems to be preferred after the GFC 
onset. Large investors value positive return on assets in both small and large A-
REITs individually, although after the GFC onset, this relationship does not continue 
for larger A-REITs. This finding may indicate greater investment for value purposes 
and a willingness to wait for larger A-REITs to return to profitability. 
Large non-institutional investors seem to believe that A-REITs face a larger 
net cost of debt in comparison to non A-REIT entities, and this is reflected in their 
propensity to prefer lower debt. When isolated by size, large investors prefer larger 
A-REITs to have a higher level of debt, likely for greater external monitoring. After 
the GFC onset, this is the case for smaller A-REITs, but larger ones exhibit a 
significantly negative relationship. This finding indicates a greater desire to minimise 
investment when risk is high, and may highlight the lack of analytical resources large 
non institutional investors have compared to institutional investors. Dividend yield 
does not seem to have any impact during the entire period, or after the GFC onset. 
However when small A-REITs are isolated, yield has a significant negative impact. 
This means that the benefits of limiting free cash flow through increased dividends 
do not seem to outweigh the benefits of using free cash flow to increase growth in 
smaller A-REITs. 
Large non institutional investors tend to prefer large A-REITs when directors 
are less busy, emphasizing the board’s ability to monitor management. The 
relationship changes after the GFC onset, indicating that current lateral experience 
may assist optimal performance in a volatile environment. Board size has an overall 
negative and significant relationship, but reverses for large A-REITs after the GFC 
onset. It seems that avoiding collusion is the major concern when trying to practice 
optimal efficiency after the GFC event. Large investors generally prefer boards to be 
more independent; however, this is not the case with smaller A-REITs. Property-
specific knowledge seems to be more important than the monitoring function to 
enable smaller A-REITs to better compete in the market and grow. This is also 
generally the case after the GFC onset, when more board involvement is preferred 
when attempting to return to profitability. 
Longer board tenure is generally preferred by large investors to maximise the 
level of experience associated with internal monitoring, which is seen as more 
important than the reduction of collusion and CEO power over the board. However, 
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both small and large A-REITs exhibit a negatively significant board tenure 
relationship after the GFC onset. Knowledge and experience remain important, given 
their unchanging relationship with CEO tenure, but in a volatile environment large 
investors seem to prefer sacrificing board longevity to reduce collusion and 
submissiveness to the CEO. Furthermore, this finding indicates that large investors 
prefer boards to be refreshed and to provide new ideas. 
There is generally a negatively significant relationship between large non-
institutional investors and units owned by the CEO, which is indicative of investing 
in A-REITs that exhibit minimal power over the board by CEOs. There are no 
significant preferences across smaller or larger A-REITs, but post GFC onset 
statistics show that the relationship becomes positive. This may indicate a changing 
preference when aligning CEO interests with those of large investors becomes more 
important than any costs of power over the board. This relationship is shown to be 
non-linear, making a trade-off between these effects likely. There is generally a 
positive relationship with the proportion of new LTIs awarded, but large investments 
are increased after the GFC onset when LTIs are reduced. This result is consistent 
with institutional investment whereby reducing LTIs in favour of short term bonuses 
is seen to assist urgent restructuring. 
With stapled A-REITs, shown in Table 6.3.3.1b, large investors prefer more 
free cash flow, in contrast to institutional investors. This reflects their preference for 
long term growth to be funded with cash, and seemingly places less emphasis on the 
possibility of it being used inefficiently.  
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Table 6.3.3.1a: Model of Large Investment 
 
Note: The model of large investment and its interaction variables were formulated using least squares panel methodology with fixed effects, 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the proportion of total investors in the top 20. This is regressed on levels of all 
independent variables from one year prior. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent variables that can be explained by 
the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that there is no linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that skewness and 
kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed effects do not exist in the 
model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the statistic moves away from 
2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent variable over the entire period. * 
represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** represents a significance level under 
1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
MODEL TOTOP20  TOTOP20 GFC 
INTERACTION 
 
VARIABLE COEFF      T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
C  1.2393       5.0673***  1.2393     5.0673*** 
GFC  0.3538       1.9720*  0.3538       1.9720* 
TA -0.0297      -2.3241** -0.0199      -2.0590** 
FFO  0.0971       1.6602 -0.1066      -1.9563* 
ROA -0.0133      -0.0169  0.2224       0.2720 
DPU -0.0222      -2.3071**  0.0197       2.2011** 
YIELD  0.0079       0.9809 -0.0089      -1.0473 
BUSYNESS -0.0258      -1.0703  0.0094       0.3637 
BOARDSIZE -0.0391      -5.1784***  0.0455       6.4250*** 
INDEP  0.3297       2.8275*** -0.2165      -1.7194* 
BTENURE  0.0199       2.8360*** -0.0116      -1.6874* 
CTENURE  0.0045       1.1830             -0.0014      -0.3843 
CEOTOT -0.0177      -2.4767**              0.0096       3.2897*** 
CEOTOT2  0.0008       4.9397*** - - 
CEODIR -0.0002      -0.4741  0.0003       0.7249 
LTITOT  0.1474       4.4539*** -0.1284      -3.4885*** 
     
Adjusted R2  0.8917    
F-Stat (Prob)  0.0000    
Jarque-Bera (Prob)  0.0042    
Likelihood Ratio (Prob)  0.0000    
Durbin Watson  2.3798    
Observations          170    
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Table 6.3.3.1b: Model of Large Investment, with Stapled A-REITs Only 
 
Note: The model of large investment with stapled A-REITs only and its interaction variables were formulated using least squares panel 
methodology with fixed effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the proportion of total investors in the top 20. This is 
regressed on levels of all independent variables from one year prior. The adjusted R2 shows the proportion of movement in the dependent 
variables that can be explained by the independent variables. The F Statistic is the result of analysis of variance tests on the null hypothesis that 
there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic is the result of variance tests on the null 
hypothesis that skewness and kurtosis is normally distributed. The likelihood ratio is the result of variance tests on the null hypothesis that fixed 
effects do not exist in the model. The Durbin-Watson statistic tests the presence of autocorrelation, with its presence becoming more likely as the 
statistic moves away from 2. The panel regression is given for seven years between 2006 and 2012 to gauge the impact of each independent 
variable over the entire period. * represents a significance probability of less than 10%, ** represents a significance level under 5%, and *** 
represents a significance level under 1%.
MODEL TOTOP20  TOTOP20 GFC 
INTERACTION 
 
VARIABLE COEFF T-STAT COEFF T-STAT 
C  1.1572       3.4500***  1.1572        3.4500*** 
GFC  0.3100       2.1389**  0.3100       2.1389** 
TA  0.0010       0.0411 -0.0454      -4.7694*** 
FFO  0.2913       8.2942*** -0.2998      -9.4233*** 
ROA -1.0037      -1.4203  1.0802       1.6344 
DPU -0.0550      -6.5719***  0.0531        8.1071*** 
YIELD  0.0101       0.8824 -0.0114      -0.9757 
BUSYNESS -0.0501      -2.0270**  0.0315       1.1764 
BOARDSIZE -0.0847      -6.9258***  0.0926        7.4144*** 
INDEP             -0.0565      -0.3086  0.1730       0.9457 
BTENURE  0.0338       7.3366*** -0.0268      -6.3732*** 
CTENURE  0.0016       0.3799                0.0034       1.0249 
CEOTOT -0.0245      -2.8247**  0.0141        4.0066*** 
CEOTOT2  0.0011       4.2790*** - - 
CEODIR -0.0002      -0.5111  0.0002       0.7660 
LTITOT  0.2843       6.7845*** -0.2684      -3.9300*** 
     
Adjusted R2  0.8788    
F-Stat (Prob)  0.0000    
Jarque-Bera (Prob)  0.3672    
Likelihood Ratio 
(Prob) 
 0.0000    
Durbin Watson  2.3894    
Observations             156    
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6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter extends the work in previous literature by studying institutional 
and large non-institutional investment in A-REITs, a market not previously 
researched in this regard. It builds upon previous work by analysing changes to 
institutional investment and private placements in response to the GFC, which itself 
is found to distort investor behaviour during economically stable periods. It then 
further compares institutional and non institutional investors, attributing significant 
differences to the agency problem prevalent within institutions. This chapter 
contributes by informing stakeholders of potential agency problems within the 
institutions managing their funds. While beyond the scope of this research, further 
analysis may be able to determine if the opportunity cost to individual investors of a 
shorter term focus on returns by institutions exceeds the alternative of investing 
outside of institutions and expending individual monitoring costs. There may be no 
choice when considering insurance premiums, but the growth in self managed 
superannuation schemes seems to indicate that this is a growing trend. A better 
understanding of institutional behaviour also enables equity holders to evaluate if all 
the benefits provided by the investment expertise of institutions is somewhat 
diminished by the presence of self-serving behaviour. Even when agency issues are 
held constant, layperson investors may be able to learn about A-REIT factors that are 
deemed important and desirable by professional investors who are in competition 
with each other to make the highest returns. Further implications for A-REITs 
involve the way in which their boards are structured to attract faster and lower cost 
equity funding. This is especially the case when re-capitalisation is urgently needed 
in the face of unexpected financial crises. 
Many factors contribute to determining investments in A-REITs. The primary 
interest for unitholders in general, is to maximise wealth by investing in the most 
return-efficient A-REITs. Entrusting the custody of equity capital to fiduciaries can 
be both beneficial and detrimental to this goal. The benefits come from professional 
management and the ability to ‘unionise’ small increments of ownership through 
representative institutions. Unionisation increases collective power, which increases 
the ability to successfully convey instructions to the fiduciaries of investees. As 
beneficial as this may be, the interests of institutional fiduciaries are not always 
aligned with those of the providers of capital. This divergence is caused by the lack 
of commission-based fees and the competitive funds management industry in which 
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institutions operate. Recent regulations have noted these issues and aim to make 
institutional decisions more transparent. 
Large non-institutional investors do not necessarily face multiple layers of 
agency, since many of them manage their own capital, yet they have the ability to 
influence A-REIT boards in a similar fashion as institutions. The aim of this 
research, therefore, is to determine which A-REIT variables influence these two 
types of powerful unitholders, and whether there are differences in their respective 
ownership that may indicate agency on the part of institutions. The onset of the GFC 
forced A-REITs to quickly re-evaluate their strategies and structure, and this also 
impacted upon the investment strategies of institutions and large investors. The size 
difference between A-REITs also impacts upon investment strategies. Large A-
REITs attract a greater proportion of institutional and large investments, supposedly 
due to their ability to grow successfully. They also have the power to negotiate a 
lower cost of debt and have greater tangible collateral. They have busier fiduciaries 
with more experience, and are longer tenured in their positions.  
The results in this study tend to be volatile, but this is expected given the 
severe impact of the GFC event and its after-effects. Institutions are found to 
typically have a short-term focus on returns, whereas large investors do not. A short-
term outlook, exacerbated by the GFC is indicative of striving for better current 
returns, which help in being competitive relative to other institutions and fund 
managers. This is a serious agency issue, since it aims to increase fees from funds 
under management for institutions rather than maximising capital providers’ long-
term wealth. As serious as this finding may be, it is found that institutions do not 
conform to a purely liquid short-term strategy. They are interested in providing 
monitoring to A-REITs, which indicates that their term of investment is not as short 
as other studies have shown. Institutions aim to reduce collusion and CEO power, but 
this seems to take second priority behind valuable board and CEO experience when 
the economy is volatile. Experience is valued by both large and institutional 
investors, but not by the board and CEO simultaneously. This is the same strategy 
undertaken when agreeing to subscribe to large placements. Institutional investors 
also tend to accept the reduction of internal monitoring in return for greater fiduciary 
experience when external monitoring in larger A-REITs is sufficiently high. 
Large non-institutional investors seem to share characteristics with 
institutional investors, as the results show, but with some exceptions. They tend to 
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accept lower yields, particularly in smaller A-REITs both over the entire sample 
period and after the GFC onset. They also tend to increase overall investment after 
the onset of the GFC, which indicates both a long term growth strategy and 
willingness to wait for improvement. They tend to favour the sharing of external 
monitoring with other unitholders and generally see incentive alignment and 
entrenchment as a trade-off, whereas institutions consider a trade-off only in large A-
REITs. In summary, all stakeholders are self interested, but agency issues and 
negative global events tend to cause distortions that reinforce those self interests 
even further. For stapled A-REITs, institutional investors prefer, longer term, less 
independent boards to best manage additional risk, along with a reduction in CEO 
incentives to better balance any existing power. Institutional placements increase in 
magnitude where stapled A-REITs use earnings to grow development, whereas CEO 
power over the board is no longer a concern. Finally, large investors tend to place 
less emphasis on the potential misuse of funds from operations in exchange for the 
funding of development opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides the conclusion to the thesis on Agency issues 
surrounding A-REITs and the Global Financial Crisis. This thesis investigates 45 
individual A-REITs in total, from 2006 to 2012. It consists of three major interrelated 
studies analysing 1) capital structure, a major strategic managerial decision, 2) 
fiduciary remuneration, which internally aims to compensate for managerial activity 
and reward successful decisions, and 3) the degree of institutional investment, which 
is a sign of successful management and productive structure. These studies are 
presented in Chapters 4 to 6, respectively.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 7.2 presents the major findings, 
Section 7.3 presents some policy implications, and Section 7.4 concludes the chapter 
with some limitations and directions for future research. 
 
 
7.2 MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
Chapter 4 presents the determinants of the capital structure of A-REITs in a 
unique tax and regulatory environment, and analyses changes in managerial strategy 
when faced with an unexpected financial crisis that precipitates restrictions on credit 
provision, negative profits, and a decline in asset values. It shows that the pecking 
order, trade-off, signalling, market timing and agency theories are not mutually 
exclusive but display elements that are both supported and refuted. The findings 
continue a trend in the literature, displaying evidence that capital structure decisions 
do not conform to one single theory, but are made with respect to both the 
environment and legislative restrictions. In reality, capital structure strategy should 
conform to all the proposed theories. For example, in the absence of retained 
earnings and to maximise unitholder wealth, debt should be used ahead of more 
expensive equity capital, provided that the present value of expected bankruptcy 
costs does not exceed the present value of net benefits from using debt. In addition, if 
the requirement for equity capital is not urgent, it should be issued when market 
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equity is overvalued, at least from the firm’s perspective, to minimize the cost of 
equity capital and to maximize flows to an entity.  
The GFC caused negative externalities, of which one was the mass 
depreciation of A-REIT property asset values over a short period. This inflated debt 
ratios and, in the face of negative profits, forced A-REITs to seek equity capital as a 
first preference to move away from bankruptcy costs that were increasing in 
probability. This situation in itself is evidence of trade-off model predictions, but 
capital structure decisions analysed in this thesis present optimising behaviour in an 
environment different from that observed in previous literature.  
Other findings show a higher rate of information flow and transparency to the 
market with larger A-REITs, allowing the greater attraction of debt financing. In the 
absence of intangible assets such as goodwill, the higher asset tangibility of A-REITs 
allows for greater offerings of collateral, which in turn assist in lowering borrowing 
costs. A-REITs do not pay tax related to property trust operations therefore tax 
deductions pose no incentive when evaluating the cost of capital, whilst A-REITs 
with volatile earnings have difficulty attracting equity capital. A-REITs stapled to 
management or development companies with growth opportunities are averse to 
using debt funding and its additional associated monitoring, showing evidence of 
risky behaviour and less willingness to have it monitored. This can be contrasted 
with non-stapled A-REITs, which engage in more passive property investment. 
There is no evidence generally, of market timing theory as postulated by Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), but after the GFC onset there is evidence of higher debt use with the 
large drop in market equity value and the subsequent higher issue of equity moving 
into the recovery. 
Chapter 5 presents the determinants of fiduciary remuneration and analyses 
the relationship of base salary, short-term bonuses and long-term incentives as they 
apply to non executive director, CEO, and top managerial performance. 
Remuneration is also linked to CEO power and A-REIT structure to determine the 
presence of agency issues. Regulatory recognition of the lack of transparency 
regarding the link between pay and performance was highlighted in a 2009 report by 
the Australian Productivity Commission. This led to an amendment to the 
Corporations Act (2001), enforcing a spill of board positions if 25% or more of the 
votes cast at two consecutive annual general meetings reject a remuneration report. A 
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major finding is that both CEO remuneration and top managerial remuneration are 
based upon systematic A-REIT market returns and volatility, implying an underlying 
industry remuneration standard based upon factors that are only partially under the 
control of each individual fiduciary. Non executive directors receive significantly 
higher fees if they manage larger A-REITs, and for the extra vigilance required after 
the onset of the GFC. Agency issues are present, with higher fees when the 
proportion of CEO ownership and associated power balance is reduced, however this 
may alternatively indicate a greater degree of internal monitoring. 
There is evidence of agency issues with respect to CEO remuneration, with 
higher equity ownership increasing CEO power and unseen influence in the level of 
pay. After the GFC onset, bonuses were reduced, as expected, given deterioration in 
performance, but this was offset by increases to base salary, showing that CEOs and 
top management are not ultimately held financially responsible for negative 
systematic events. There is a further risk premium incorporated into the base salaries 
of CEOs and top management, compensating for the scale and difficulty of the tasks 
they are responsible for, whereas bonus payments depend partly on profitability and 
both a targeted reduction in gearing and an increase in assets under their control after 
the GFC onset. Long-term incentive equity pay generally increases with additions to 
market value, but there is evidence of a reversal when market values deteriorate after 
the GFC onset. 
 With uncertainty in the movement of unit values during non-vesting periods, 
long-term incentives are significantly reduced, replaced by alternative remuneration. 
This may be a strategy to offer CEOs more immediate cash pay in the face of urgent 
restructuring, but such substitution of pay type is more prominent with more 
powerful CEOs, again indicating further agency issues. Top management base salary 
tends to extend beyond compensating standard responsibilities by rewarding 
additions to unitholder wealth, despite this being the ultimate responsibility of CEOs. 
Bonuses also increase in larger A-REITs which inherently enjoy greater 
opportunities, and when top management is under the instruction of more 
experienced CEOs who are also the directors of other entities. The GFC had no 
significant impact on top managerial long-term incentives, as opposed to previous 
evidence related to CEOs.  
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Chapter 6 presents the determinants of institutional and non-institutional large 
investment and analyses financial and board attributes desirable to institutional and 
other large investors through common equity transactions and private placements. 
Institutions invest a large pool of capital as their primary function and operate within 
a competitive industry. This is in contrast to large non-institutional investors, who 
invest funds on an individual basis or for a function that is secondary to their primary 
purpose for commerce. Section 671B of the Corporations Act (2001) was included to 
increase information transparency and mandates that substantial investors disclose 
transactions consisting of at least 1% of their shareholdings. Its effect is to keep the 
market and smaller investors informed of potential price volatility. The potential 
impact of large, frequent transactions on smaller equity holders is thus acknowledged 
in the statute, but there is still the potential for negative externalities through multiple 
layers of agency at both the A-REIT and institutional fiduciary levels.  
To retain client investors and fee revenue, institutions tend to compete on 
returns and capital value appreciation. The threat to both of these after the GFC onset 
forced institutions to attempt to minimize losses through A-REITs and to revise their 
options. It is found that institutions have a shorter term investment in A-REITs 
relative to non institutional top 20 investors given the competitive pressure they face 
in funds management, although it is not as short term as prior studies have 
speculated. There is evidence of monitoring activity, but this timeframe reduced after 
the GFC onset, exposing smaller investors to greater individual monitoring costs. 
Institutional investors perceive a trade-off between managerial collusion and 
experience. They prefer boards with shorter tenures and greater independence 
generally, but prefer the experience of longer tenures after the GFC onset. Longer-
tenured, entrenched boards are especially favoured in stapled A-REITs, many of 
which engage in risky development, although CEO tenure should be shorter to 
minimize potential collusion with the board. In comparison to institutional investors, 
large non-institutional investors are generally more willing to accept lower yields 
and, after the GFC onset, whilst they are not constrained by short term-focused 
competition, increased their proportional ownership. They are also less concerned 
with the potential misuse of funds from operations than are institutional investors, 
preferring to support growth through development opportunities, although they do 
become averse to this after the onset of the GFC. 
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7.3 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that A-REIT fiduciaries adhere to 
their obligations to unitholders and are compensated for priority strategies, but in 
such a way that protects their remuneration from systematic volatility that is largely 
beyond their control. There are agency issues present that aim to reduce monitoring 
over risky activities and to maximise remuneration by using power and the 
redistribution of pay types. The short term profit-maximising behaviour of 
institutional investors has consequences for smaller investors, but they believe that 
short term profits are a better alternative in the trade-off between long term gains and 
the loss of capital to their competition. These findings therefore inform regulators of 
the need to enforce further, more specific information flow linking pay-for-
performance to investors. Furthermore, ex-ante notice of transactions given by 
substantial investors will give smaller equity holders time to evaluate the potential 
impact on their own equity values. Finally, the findings provide a better 
understanding of the operating and trading decisions of professionals, which may be 
replicated by others when faced with unexpected volatility in the future. 
 
 
7.4 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The conclusion and implications of this thesis are based on findings derived 
in a regulated financial sector in Australia. Existence of corporate agency is prevalent 
across both countries and industries, and this study can be replicated in any 
jurisdiction when assessing financing decisions, fiduciary remuneration and other 
elements that attract powerful professional investors. The GFC is an event with 
lengthy ramifications, but it is not the only event that can distort decisions and inflate 
agency issues. This study can be further replicated in industries that have confronted 
adverse legislative changes through both competition law and strict financial 
regulation. Several Asian REITs in particular are in their early growth phase, with 
the potential to become leading markets on a global scale. Their prudent financing, 
operation, and regulation are vital to realising the potential to be gained for all 
investors involved. 
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This thesis contributes to the literature by examining several prevailing 
theories and agency issues over a financially volatile period. These could be further 
consolidated with analysis when there is a greater availability of data to adequately 
target events of all sizes that have significant implications for their respective 
industries. 
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